WEST AFRICA REVIEW ISSN: 1525-4488 Issue 10 (2007)

Mathurin Houngnikpo

Abstract

Depuis 1989, le Bénin s’est embarqué sur la voie de la démocratisation en modifiant sa constitution pour instaurer le multipartisme et consacrer les droits civiques: liberté de presse et d’association, liberté de religion. Toutefois, Le Bénin s’est heurté à de nombreux obstacles tant dans la mise en place concrète de la démocratie que dans l’adaptation de ce système essentiellement étranger aux pratiques sociales en vigueur dans sa société. Dans ce contexte difficile, le Bénin se bat, en partenariat étroit avec les organisations de la société civile, les médias et les syndicats, pour la promotion et l'enracinement de la démocratie, et la consolidation de l'état de droit. Les Béninois se rendent compte que la démocratie n’est pas une guarantie de meilleur niveau de vie et qu’elle n’est pas une fin en soi, mais plutôt un processus qui s’affûte continuellement.

Keywords: Democratization, politics in francophone Africa, Benin, governance, rule of law

The remarkable wave of democratization in the early 1990s engendered high hopes that are gradually giving way to more skeptical perspectives in sub-Saharan Africa. The institutionalization of democratic governance systems continues to elude a number of countries, and an insight into the institutional structures and mechanisms that allow democratic agents to operate shows that the proper role and functioning of political parties remains ambiguous at best. Free and fair multiparty elections, where they have emerged, have failed to erase decades of neo-patrimonial practices. Several obstacles and bottlenecks confront political actors. The establishment of competitive politics and pluralism are important indicators of the democratization process. However, democratic transition is beyond the “fallacy of electoralism,”1 for democratization requires the establishment, not only of a series of regular elections, but also of a wide variety of other institutions and procedures. These include independent legislative, judicial, and investigative bodies within the state, as well as interest groups, civic associations, and political parties within society, which are empowered to hold political executives accountable.

Benin is considered a model of democracy because it has successfully established a democratic political system based on consensus. Since the National Conference of 1990, democracy in Benin has made significant progress and has experienced a remarkable development. Elected officials, the successive governments as well as the people are taking important steps towards laying the foundation for rule of law by establishing stable political institutions that can withstand the test of time. While most of the major democratic institutions such as the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Higher Authority for Audiovisual and Communication are established and are relatively well respected by different actors, recent maneuvers have resurrected “spoils politics” of the past.

Following its independence in August 1960, Benin went through a decade of political upheavals that nearly always resulted in a military coup. In October 1972, the civilian government was overthrown and replaced with a Marxist-Leninist regime that mismanaged the economy until its collapse 17 years later. In February 1990, the political landscape in Benin changed radically when a national conference was held that led to an interim civilian-led government dedicated to a multi-party system of democracy. By March 1991, Benin had held free, fair, and transparent legislative and presidential elections. Benin is now one of the few countries in Africa carrying out comprehensive political and economic reforms that have resulted in deep-seated changes. However, the 2006 presidential elections almost derailed Benin’s democratic experimentation.

Benin’s March toward Democracy

Contrary to expectations, Benin’s second “October Revolution” came to stay. The 1972 coup turned out to be of a praetorian kind in that it marked the emergence of the armed forces as an autonomous political force, acting on its own and according to its own political vision. Though some of the plotters were known to be supporters of members of the previous civilian triumvirate, and a few had acquired a reputation as conservatives or radicals, there was initially no indication that the coup was any different from others.2 However, an ideological militancy and a quest for a radical socio-economic change soon emerged. It became gradually clear that this team, given the personalities of its leaders, and the nature of its early orientations, represented a radical branch of the army. An understanding of the military’s position towards the national conference can only be explained through the path of destruction taken by the leaders of the 1972 coup.3

Under normal circumstances, the armed forces would have been less open to any dialogue between civilians and the military because the armed forces had always kept their grip on civilian leaders. Were it not for the failure of the military to fulfill its “revolutionary” commitment to redress years of mismanagement, corruption and incivility, the incentive to adhere to the concept of a national gathering to discuss critical issues would have been absent. The new leaders intended to fight corruption, disorder, and inter-ethnic or inter-regional rivalry. In a typical coup rhetoric fashion, the military embarked on an impossible mission, promising to rid Benin of its economic, political and social ills.

While they embraced a “new national independence,” the new leaders denounced “foreign domination,” and pledged to take Benin’s economy to new heights.4 There was obviously anger toward past economic policies and those who engineered them. The new military leaders seemed, initially at least, to be motivated by the economic and social development of Benin. Because they believed that economic planning would best achieve internally oriented economic growth, Kérékou (the Chameleon) and his colleagues ascribed to the Beninese state an indispensable role in the promotion of entrepreneurs with policies. Unfortunately, their radicalism would blind their zeal for a better society in Benin. With neither compass nor vision, the new leaders became lost in their own radical rhetoric, with consequences that went beyond their wildest imagination.

After several months without pay, and under declining economic and social conditions, workers started paying some heed to the students’ message: to rise up to get rid of Kérékou and his clique. The anger and resentment of the population increased among both civilians and the military. Sections of the military leadership blamed the civilians for taking the country to an economic dead-end. Both civilian and military apparatchiki embarked on the search for solutions to the severe economic problems Benin faced. Clearly, the mood within the army ranks was one of frustration. The time seemed ripe for a military coup. Yet, the dynamics within the armed forces was not conducive to such an outcome. Therefore, when Kérékou decided to convene a national conference, the military leadership jumped on the opportunity to rescue the country while saving face.

Although the decision to open up the political system came out of a meeting of the ruling party, the intent was rather to initiate a cosmetic change. The military as an institution was feeling embarrassed in light of the armed forces’ pledge to improve economic and social conditions, thereby stopping Benin’s descent into hell.5 Judging by the state of the economy in the late 1980s, it was quite difficult to praise the “abilities” of the military. The armed forces failed to fare better than previous administrations. Everything seemed to have fallen apart around the armed forces, and resistance to democratization would have been nonsensical.

On February 19, 1990, a very important chapter was turned in Benin’s history. The Hotel PLM-Aledjo of Cotonou became the locus of what Béninois thought impossible only a few months earlier. Although invitations were extended to all strata of Benin’s populations, and even to Béninois abroad, the government still hoped to welcome only a token representation of the people in order to avoid deep changes. Unfortunately for the government, and fortunately for the country, the invited guests not only showed up, but they also organized bodies that demanded and obtained representation.6

Participants included members of the single party, trade unionists, civil servants, “political tendencies” (emerging political parties), students, religious leaders, farmers, and the military.7 All former heads of state of Benin, including one sentenced, in absentia, for “subversive activities against the state” were also invited. To grant an international status to the conference, the entire diplomatic corps gratified the gathering with its presence. Drawing strength from their self-proclaimed sovereignty, conference participants embarked on a series of fundamental political transformations. For having allowed the conference to go on, Kérékou received the bonus of remaining in power during a transition period. He was, however, stripped of most of his power and executive authority.8

As a “sovereign and executive” body, the decisions of the conference superseded all existing laws, regulations, and provisions. Kérékou’s acceptance of the resolutions of the gathering did usher in a truly new political environment in Benin. A new constitution was written and approved through a national referendum. Basic civic and political rights, restricted or banned for several years, re-emerged. A new legislation was promulgated to permit the registration of political parties. Independent newspapers and magazines flourished.

The Demise and Rise of the Chameleon

The transition government that followed the national conference succeeded in reversing years of corruption and economic mismanagement, breathing new life into political reforms. These successful reforms included such rudimentary tasks as paying salaries on time and re-opening schools shut down earlier because of teachers and students’ strikes. The transition government’s more remarkable accomplishments included trimming the bloated civil service and revamping the educational system, especially the university curriculum.9

In a two-round presidential election, March 10 and 24, 1991, Nicéphore Soglo, a former World Bank official defeated Kérékou. Inaugurated on April 4, 1991, President Soglo embarked on the Herculean tasks ahead. Having been the interim Prime Minister, he continued to redress the economy, intensifying efforts at economic liberalization. He also followed the recommendations of the national conference by instituting criminal proceedings against corrupt former state officials. But his endeavors were not without difficulties. In his very first year in office, civil servants claiming their salary arrears accumulated under the Kérékou regime undertook intermittent strikes to make their point.10 In May of the following year, a group of disgruntled soldiers who were, supposedly, plotting a coup, were arrested. They subsequently managed to escape from custody, and most were sentenced in absentia. Because the majority of the “coup plotters” were from the north, Soglo was perceived by northerners as someone bent on bringing back into Benin the north-south dichotomy.

Besides his troublesome relationship with the military and northerners, Soglo’s government style also created a great deal of resentment among the general population. His leadership was called into question several times, as he displayed what many Béninois regarded as sheer arrogance. Although he was successful at revamping the economy, he created friction between himself and other political leaders who initially had contributed to his victory. He failed to take into account the fact that he came to power with no formal political party’s support.11 By the time, La Renaissance du Bénin (RB), the party formed by his wife in 1992 came to his rescue, the damage was done. Despite a pro-Soglo majority in the parliament, the anger of former allies of Soglo’s made passing some legislation very difficult. His lack of courtesy vis-à-vis the National Assembly continued to haunt him, and dissent within RB did not help his case. In October 1993, when fifteen members of the coalition withdrew their support, Soglo lost his majority and his uphill battle began.12

Earlier in the year, civil servants had already conveyed, in a three-day strike, their disapproval of the ten percent reduction in salaries. But, with the fifty percent devaluation in January 1994 of the CFA franc, Soglo had to face social unrest.13 Salaries were increased by ten percent, housing allowances were reintroduced (after being abolished in 1986 by Kérékou’s regime), and an eight-year freeze on promotions within the civil service was lifted. But, in 1994, when the parliament approved increases in wages and student grants beyond the government’s projections, a constitutional crisis emerged. When the matter was referred to the constitutional court, Soglo prevailed. Unfortunately, that legal victory contributed to his downfall, because several politicians realized that only a united front could weaken Soglo’s determination.

Another incident with the parliament occurred in January 1996, when the National Assembly rejected the government’s budget. In a defiant act, Soglo issued an edict enacting the budget, claiming that failure to implement his plan would jeopardize the country’s finances, by blocking a loan of $500,000,000 pledged by the international community.14

Clearly, Soglo earned the respect of the international financial community for his handling of Benin’s economy,15 but there was uneasiness within Benin that strong economic growth had been achieved at the expense of pressing social concerns. Moreover, criticism was increasingly leveled at what was termed the regime’s “authoritarian drift” and alleged nepotism. In the wake of a very poor relationship between the executive and the legislative, Kérékou, who emerged as the only challenger, gathered enough momentum to upset President Soglo. The latter’s strict adherence to an IMF/World Bank structural adjustment program, alienated him from representatives/parliamentarians (députés), civil servants, and the poor, despite some economic gains for Benin as a whole.

In an ironic mirror image of Kérékou’s downfall in March 1991, Soglo had become the target. Having secured a slim lead over Kérékou in the first round of March 3, 1996 presidential elections, Soglo fell to a “uniting for democracy” policy by the opposition.16 Thanks to the support of all the other defeated candidates, Kérékou won the second round of the balloting. Despite allegations of vote rigging, intimidation, and calls for cancellation of the results, the constitutional court confirmed the outcome of the elections, allowing Kérékou to return to power.

Unfortunately, “Kérékou II,” as his return was dubbed in Benin, did not differ from his first experience with power in the country. Although, he became a “born again” in political, economical, and religious matters, his true self took over some practical and pragmatic decisions. Kérékou’s government stated priorities were to strengthen the rule of law, to promote economic revival and social development, and to strive for national reconciliation. However, his first efforts of acknowledgement of the opposition’s support through a government of national reconciliation, led by a de facto Prime Minister17 Adrien Houngbédji, lasted only a few months. Due to diverging views on how to manage civil servants’ strikes, Houngbédji resigned in 1998, taking with him his support for Kérékou.

Later on, Kérékou named a new government with the return of several former “comrades.” However, his rehabilitation of former associates has generated a great deal of anxiety within the population in general, and among civil servants and students in particular. In fact, Benin renewed with frequent strikes and social unrest due to the return of former “comrades.” Relations between the government and civil servants strained because of the lack of governmental political will to satisfy workers’ demands. Given the declining living conditions in Benin, a new coalition and reshuffling of government were not enough to tackle the severe economic problems facing the country. His “re-election” in 2001, amid allegations of massive fraud, was resented by many because it made elections in Benin a fading shadow of democracy.18

Democracy’s Travails in Benin

Despite visible progress, democratization in Francophone Africa continues to face significant challenges. Flawed elections, poorly managed civil-military relations, weak political parties, and partisan bureaucracies continue to mark African politics. But the biggest challenge to democratization remains the lack of political alternation. Ensuring equitable representation and participation in the political process is a concern even in established democracies which have gradually overcome that challenge by developing a variety of mechanisms and structures designed to facilitate it. While there is no perfect electoral system, Benin continues to improve its electoral and parliamentary systems. However, if democratic politics is to be sustained and a political culture supportive of democracy built, such systems should facilitate political inclusion and encourage the formation of representative parliaments, responsive to the needs of all citizens. Transparent and honest elections, managed by competent electoral commissions, would help to build credibility in the electoral process.

The Road to the 2006 Presidential Elections

Frustrated by declining economies and degrading standards of living, Béninois joined other Africans in demanding an end to corrupt and misguided rule. All over the continent, the advent of democracy brought a genuine sense of relief and hope. However, the initial sense of elation was crushed when some leaders “re-arranged” their authoritarian regimes to accommodate democratic demands. Within a few months, the “People’s Republics” were truly given back to the people, market economies introduced or re-introduced in many countries, and single party and military rule was dismantled. However, democracy’s ongoing journey is proving treacherous. Several countries, originally on a democratic path are now back in the hands of “born again” military democrats. Several African countries still struggle to democratize, with the chances of success seeming more and more remote in other countries. Because of disunity among the opposition, the skills of incumbent leaders and outside support from allies, democracy’s travails continue unabated. The stakes are such that old regimes cling to power with unexpected resolve. Regardless of conjecture about an ideal sequence of economic and political liberalization, many African countries face concurrent political and economic reform. If political liberalization enables a departure from the practices and institutions associated with neo-patrimonial rule, then democratization in African states can also begin to shift the terms of economic governance. There is, however, a possibility that traditional politics may persist, although perhaps in a different guise.

As the 2001 elections approached, analysts therefore predicted a smooth ride for a country increasingly considered Francophone Africa’s “laboratory of democracy.” Unexpectedly, however, the tide turned. The opposition banded together to challenge President Kérékou’s early and substantial lead in the first round of the March 4 elections. The challengers accused Kérékou of vote rigging and, pointing to the disparity between the Elections Commission’s returns and those of the Constitutional Court, called into question the Commission’s competence and neutrality. Runner up Soglo refused to participate in the runoff election required when no candidate obtains an absolute majority in the first round. The Election Commission, with the Constitutional Court’s blessing, then invited third place candidate Adrien Houngbédji to replace Soglo in the runoff. Houngbédji, who had endorsed Soglo in the runoff, turned down the invitation. Although some of its members resigned in protest, the Commission extended the invitation to fourth-place finisher and Kérékou’s ally and minister, Bruno Amoussou, who agreed to face Kérékou in the runoff. Not surprisingly, Kérékou “won” the runoff with 84 percent of the vote. The problems that characterized Benin’s 2001 presidential election, point to the unsettled state of democratic development in Francophone Africa.19 The 2006 presidential elections also faced similar challenges and were held only because of the tenacity of civil society.

The Challenges of the 2006 Presidential Elections

Consistent with his nature, Kérékou hardly imposed any fiscal discipline on his cabinet members. The economic mismanagement worsened, social upheavals became evident, and the only consolation was the fact that his second term would be his last, according to the constitution. Term and age limits allowed some optimism since both President Kérékou and Soglo, now the Mayor of the economic capital, Cotonou, could not run. However, a wave of constitutional amendments in other African countries, and especially frequent visits by dignitaries of those countries led some to speculate that Kérékou was going to follow suit, and his conspicuous silence on the subject did not help. Several close associates wanted and stated publicly their intent to force Kérékou to amend the constitution. According to his supporters, Kérékou has brought peace and democracy to Benin, and remains the only political figure to consolidate democracy’s gains. The debate raged on through the media and the longer Kérékou maintained his silence, the louder the speculations got.