WEST AFRICA REVIEW ISSN: 1525-4488 Issue 10 (2007)

Jeanne Maddox Toungara

Résumé

L’Accord de Pretoria signé en avril 2005 et les évènements antérieurs ont démontré que la rivalité entre les différents partis politiques de l’opposition était négociable. Depuis le début des activités multipartistes et avant le décès du Président Félix Houphouët Boigny en 1993, les partis se sont multipliés, dépassant parfois la vingtaine. Mais le coup d’état de 1999 qui a été à l’origine de la présente crise fut plein de leçons. Les divisions ethniques et régionales que le Président Houphouët savait bien supprimer sous le contrôle de son parti unique, le PDCI, se sont révélées intacts et même préjudiciables à l’unité nationale. Suite à l’attentat du 19 septembre 2002, dont le résultat fut l’occupation du pays par la France et les forces internationales des Nations Unies d’une zone de démarcation, le pays fut coupé d’est en ouest. Dans l’incapacité de la communauté internationale de résoudre le conflit, certains partis de l’opposition se sont mis d’accord pour créer un rassemblement de solidarité contre le régime de Laurent Gbagbo. Quatre partis parmi l’opposition ont créé le Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix (RHDP) qui a pour philosophie l’idéologie politique du fondateur de la nation. Un autre groupement, le Groupe des Sept, fut déjà créé lors de l’Accord de Marcoussis et réunissait aussi les trois groupes rebelles du nord. Ce papier examine l’accord créant le RHDP et analyse certains aspects du consensus des partis de l’opposition. L’accord de Ouagadougou, signé en Mars 2007 entre Gbagbo et Guillaume Soro qui devient premier ministre, pose de nouveaux défis aux opposants.

Keywords: Côte d’Ivoire, Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), Front Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (FPI), Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix (RHDP), Groupe des Sept, Forces Nouvelles, elections, Houphouët, Gbagbo, Marcoussis, Ouattara, Bedie, UN Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)

Nearly twelve years after the death of the nation’s founder, Félix Houphouët Boigny, and in the midst of a tedious and seemingly unending political crisis triggered by the 24 December 1999 coup d’état that unseated his successor, President Henri Konan Bédié, some adherents to Houphouët’s inclusive political ideology and liberal economic policies have put aside their differences and proclaimed themselves Houphouëtistes. As the saying goes, “the fruit does not fall far from the tree.” This new alliance, named the Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix (RHDP), was cobbled together by the presidents of four like-minded opposition parties in order to oust President Laurent Gbagbo and his socialist Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) in the next presidential elections. In the dismal context of civil war, this collaborative effort harkened to better times. It signaled a renewed public commitment to Houphouët’s peace and prosperity rhetoric and the means he used to achieve his goals. The agreement was signed in Paris by each of four party presidents on 18 May 2005. The coalition includes the Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), led by Henri Konan Bédié, the Rassemblement de Républicains (RDR) led by Alassane Ouattara, the Mouvement des Forces d’Avenir (MFA) led by Anaky Kobena, and the Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d’Ivoire (UDPCI) led by Paul Akoto Yao. This paper will examine the content of the agreement and its potential to accomplish its goals.

The protracted civil war in Côte d’Ivoire was aggravated by leaders who focused on maintaining themselves in office more than implementing the many international accords crafted to restore the country as a beacon of political stability and a regional economic power.1 In the years preceding the Houphouët’s death, multiparty politics yielded a wide array of parties as political elites competing for center stage stood for election to local offices and National Assembly seats. In doing so, they positioned themselves as contenders to succeed the aging statesman. By the time of his demise on 7 December 1993, the PDCI, founded nearly fifty years earlier, was straining to maintain the loyalty of its rank-and-file as dissenters peeled away to join new parties. The implementation of multiparty democracy unleashed deeply rooted ethnic and regional divides that Houphouët had managed to control through a patrimonial system anchored by one-party rule, loyalty rewards, and stern reprisals against dissenters. Interestingly, the disintegration of the PDCI and an ironic twist of events opened the way for Houphouët’s most persistent and engaging opponent, Laurent Gbagbo, a socialist and former history professor, to capture the presidency. With France’s support, he managed to cast former PDCI stalwarts aside and show little respect toward expectant opposition leaders with whom he had collaborated before assuming power. Gbagbo’s relationship with the international community has ebbed and flowed as he manipulated youthful militants and paramilitary groups, refused to facilitate acquisition of identity papers for war victims, or register voters—placing a stranglehold on the political process until recently.

It took nearly five years for the PDCI and a few splintered offshoots to find common ground and organize with widespread appeal for the masses and educated elites. By recalling the memory of Houphouët’s mystical leadership, though highly imperfect, the RHDP evoked nostalgia and instilled confidence that Côte d’Ivoire could regain political stability and its former prominence in the region. The idea gained currency; particularly, during a time of increasing fear, lawlessness, economic depravity, despair and state-sponsored terror. Finally, hope for an end to the conflict emerged with the March 4, 2007 Ouagadougou Peace Agreement, following discussions initiated at Gbagbo’s request with Guillaume Soro, spokesperson for the Forces Nouvelles, which took place under the watchful supervision of President Campaore in Burkina Faso. For the moment, the RHDP leaders are working in tandem with Soro, their G7 collaborator and Gbagbo’s chosen Prime Minister, to ready the nation for the next round of national, regional and local elections. As Gbagbo’s strategies for maintaining himself and the FPI in power become clearer, so will the potential for the RHDP leaders to reach their goal of removing him. This work explores the tensions within and challenges for the RHDP alliance.

Background

The path leading to the creation of the RHDP was paved with the casualties of war—both human and institutional. Bédié, as President of the National Assembly, was the constitutionally designated successor to serve through the remaining years of Houphouët’s mandate (Constitution, Article 11). Although Bédié had the incumbent advantage in the 1995 presidential elections, he took measures to alienate the public from the last prime minister appointed by Houphouët. At the time, Alassane Ouattara, a Malinké (whose mother hailed from Odienné in northwestern Côte d’Ivoire) boasted a nascent political base in the RDR--a national party led by experienced cadres and technocrats that challenged the PDCI old guard. In fact, the RDR proposed Ouattara as their presidential candidate in the 1995 elections. Bédié’s fears led to a campaign of xenophobia against Ivoirians of northern descent, with the aim of building a wave of antagonism against Ouattara whom he charged with Burkinabe descent. Bédié initiated a policy called Ivoirité to sort out “true” Ivoirians from others and also targeted migrant workers from neighboring countries to the north—namely Mali and Burkina Faso. Under Houphouët’s one-party regime, these workers voted for slates of candidates proposed by the PDCI. Ultimately, Bédié demanded that the Supreme Court deny Ouattara a place on the 1995 presidential ballot based on his absence from the country in the years preceding the elections, when Ouattara had returned to the International Monetary Fund. He also oversaw revisions in the electoral code to prevent guest workers from voting in national and regional elections and argued for a referendum on the Constitution to eliminate from the presidency anyone whose parents were not native-born Ivoirians, as well as any candidate who might have benefited from another nationality or held a foreign passport (Constitution, Article 35).

The international community missed several opportunities for stern diplomatic intervention as Côte d’Ivoire’s leadership lost its direction. While Bédié battled for political hegemony, a disgruntled group of young military officers deprived of compensation for ECOMOG service planned and carried out the 1999 coup that ushered in a junta ruled by General Robert Gueï (ret.). The General’s failure to follow through with promises of free and fair presidential elections in October 2000 resulted in his exile when he suspended the Independent Electoral Commission charged with elections monitoring and tallying ballots. During the chaos that followed, Laurent Gbagbo—the only other candidate with a viable political base allowed to run--declared himself President, at the behest of the socialist government in France, the former colonial power. Although the United States had been demanding transparent elections, at this critical moment the U.S. and the international community gave in to the French Socialists, denying Ivoirians freedom of expression and, possibly, more stable leadership.

Gbagbo’s administration continued the xenophobic policy against northerners begun under Bédié. Human rights reports indicated that death squads linked to Simone Gbagbo, the president’s wife, preyed on opposition party members nightly in the streets of Abidjan and its suburbs, while provincial militias wreaked havoc in the countryside, specifically in the fragile zones of the West where a precarious state of security prevailed in the aftermath of the Liberian civil war. The Jeunes Patriotes, the youth wing of the FPI, mobilized thousands to support Gbagbo’s regime and made anti-French and anti-northern sentiment the centerpiece of their protests. They engaged in violent physical confrontations with opposition parties and the French military.2

On September 19, 2002 several hundred dissatisfied military personnel that had been recruited by Guëi mutinied just prior to their anticipated dismissal due to the government’s lack of sufficient funds to pay their salaries. A coalition of rebel armies, later called the Forces Nouvelles (FN), occupied and maintained control of the northern regions of the country. The French military launched Operation Licorne to halt the rebels’ march on the south, stem the bloodshed, and protect the expatriate community. A massive evacuation of French citizens followed and, four years later, French soldiers were still engaged in enforcing the cease fire along a line of demarcation running from east to west, dividing Côte d’Ivoire in half. The French troops and United Nations peacekeepers (UNOCI—UN Operations in CI) —nearly 10,000 in all— have also carried out peace keeping duties in Abidjan and provided personal security services for top opposition officials.

Although the French, the international community, and African heads of state are committed to finding a peaceful solution to the political struggles in Côte d’Ivoire, their efforts to impose transparent presidential elections by 2005 have been thwarted by Gbagbo’s tenacious hold on the Constitution.3 Gbagbo remained in office for the second extended 12-month mandate (expired 31 October 2007) as proposed by the African Union and approved by the UN Security Council.4 After the French mediation effort at Marcoussis in 2003 where all major parties presented their grievances, the international community imposed a reconciliation government first led by Prime Minister Seydou Diarra, an experienced international diplomat and public servant. Charles Konan Banny, an economist and former director of the Bank of West African States (BCEAO) with presidential ambitions, replaced Diarra in October 2005 and was conferred additional budgetary powers and responsibilities to move the country towards unification, including the required demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of national and rebel armed forces.5 Both men were hamstrung in their efforts by Gbagbo’s interference in the daily operations of government as he continued to mobilize public support, while fostering international ambivalence, for his strict interpretation of the Constitution and powers of the presidency.6 The creation of the RHDP occurred in the midst of these persistent violations of human rights, hundreds of deaths, destruction of infrastructure, and decline of public services.

The Group of Seven

In light of this deplorable state of affairs, the opposition built a platform for consensus to oust the Gbagbo regime. The four opposition parties that later formed the RHDP committed themselves in the first phase after the Marcoussis meetings of January 2003 to collaboration with the three rebel groups in the north, and called the coalition the Group of Seven (G7). The three rebel groups, known collectively as the Forces Nouvelles (FN), include: 1) an opposition movement--the Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI)—founded by Guillaume Soro who also serves as spokesperson for the FN, 2) a rebel army situated in the western region bordering Liberia, the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO), and 3) a second rebel army occupying the north, the Mouvement de la Justice et de la Paix (MJP). The mutineers sought to avenge the 19 September 2002 assassination of General Guëi.7 Alphonse Djedje Mady, a PDCI member, was elected to head the G7 Steering Committee.

In fact, the text of the G7 Declaration of 31 December 2004, was a precursor to the RHDP coalition platform.8 Following Gbagbo’s aggressive violation of the 2003 agreements ending the war including the ceasefire (March 2004), President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa attempted to mediate the conflict at a meeting in Pretoria, 2-5 December 2004. Tiring of the lack of pressure from the international community on Gbagbo to vigorously enforce previous agreements and road maps, the G7 prepared its own statement on the resolution of conflict for presentation at the January 2005 African Union summit meeting in Libreville, Gabon. The G7 Declaration supported all previous initiatives of the international community, including the Marcoussis Agreement (2003), the Accra II and III Agreements, UN Resolutions no. 1572 (2004) and Mbeki’s mediation (2004). Their strategy for resolving the conflict demanded action on issues raised in these previous agreements; such as the modification of Article 35 of the Constitution either by the National Assembly or the UN Security Council to allow all political leaders to stand for office, legislation facilitating access to identity cards and naturalization procedures, opposition participation on the Independent Electoral Commission, campaign finance reform, independent appointments to the Human Rights Commission, reparations for victims of war, new appointments to the Constitutional Commission, access to television and print medias, and DDR implementation. The G7 Declaration included a timeline for implementation.

Houphouëtism

In addition to the procedures laid out in the G7 Declaration, the four opposition parties reflected on the successes of the first thirty years of independence under Houphouët and the regime in which most were educated, had matured and entered into public life. The parties forming the RHDP did not include the Forces Nouvelles, choosing instead to focus on civilian responsibilities to the citizenry.9 According to the platform preamble, the idea to consolidate the opposition germinated during the Accra III discussions in July 2004 among the leaders of the RDR, UDPCI and MFA (all PDCI spin-offs) who decided to invite Henri Konan Bédié, to head up a unification effort with the PDCI. In overcoming their differences, the four parties agreed to put the past behind them and present a united front to resolve the last five years of conflict. Together they hoped to search for new models of political action, conflict resolution, execution of authority and national sovereignty.

The RHDP rolled out its platform at the June 2005 meeting in Pretoria.10 It was a reasoned reflection on the successes of the first thirty years of independence and Houphouët’s administration. In the spirit of the nation’s founder, the statement embraced tolerance and forgiveness, dialogue and a concerted search for compromise, invoking an often-repeated quotation from Houphouët, “Peace is not simply a word, but a way of life.”11 In the platform, Houphouëtism was defined as a coherent system of ideas that served as a foundation for the nation-state, as well as a guide for domestic and international affairs. Its adherents committed themselves to balanced and reasonable pragmatism in affairs of state so as to manage crises, show flexibility, engage in negotiation, and seek consensus. Anchored in national and continental African realities, the platform rejected ideological extremes in favor of pragmatic, middle-of-the-road approaches to governance. Recalling the national motto established by Houphouët—Unity, Discipline, Labor—the platform highlighted his perception of national development as a mutually beneficial effort engaged openly by peoples and nations. The signing parties, inspired by Houphouët’s “invaluable contribution” pledged to “build a future for new generations and to expand his legacy in order to get Côte d’Ivoire on track towards the fulfillment of its regional and international destiny.”12

The RHDP’s objectives, similar to the G7 Declaration, focused on victory in the next round of presidential elections, restoration of sovereignty, reestablishment of democracy, and respect for human rights. While recognizing the explicit autonomy of each of the signing parties, the elections strategy allows each party to present a candidate in the first round, and then all will rally in the run off to support the RHDP member party whose candidate wins the most votes. Together, members proposed to develop a strategy to control the majority of seats in the National Assembly and propose a common list of candidates for municipal posts. Other objectives included efforts to maintain the integrity of the state and its institutions, implement good governance and fight against the deployment of children in military affairs, as well as seek constitutional and legislative measures that ensure transparent and fair elections. The platform endorsed a socially responsible but liberal economy and proposed to support the agricultural sector, national education, public health, and security. In response to setbacks in civil service and private sector appointments that favor FPI supporters, the text promoted professional and social mobility. To stem the rise in hate crimes, it advocated a neutral and impartial use of state media services.

The platform based the RHDP “conquest of state power” on practices rooted in democracy and the rule of law--beginning with the enforcement of “the spirit and letter” of all international agreements. The members pledged to seek an expansion of the mobile courts that Gbagbo had condemned in September 2006 so that citizens could acquire national identity cards and collaborate on the development of new electoral lists and voter files. They committed themselves to defend the right to vote for all Ivoirians wherever they reside within national borders and rejected any inclination toward partial elections. The parties pledged to stand together against death squads, paramilitary forces and militias. They demanded the restoration of security in the interest of free trade and unimpeded circulation of persons and goods. In addition to these and other iterations similar to the G7 Declaration, the concluding statement professed loyalty, good faith and solidarity among members and invited other parties willing to accept its principles to join the RHDP.

In reaction to the RHDP initiative, several parties and associations close to the FPI also created an umbrella group, the Congrès National de la Resistance pour la Démocratie (CNRD), with author Bernard Dadié as president. One of their first actions was to prepare a 24 October 2006 declaration contesting a counter proposal from France to reinforce the powers of the appointed Prime Minister Banny as an integral part of the African Union proposal allowing Gbagbo a second extension.

The Future of the RHDP

The formation of the RHDP elicits several questions and raises many concerns. First, the selection of Bédié as the leader of the Houphouëtists simply because he is president of the largest opposition party undermines the sincerity of the RHDP platform; especially, in light of his role in compromising national unity for personal gain. Despite his admission during the Forum discussions (a national dialogue presided over by Seydou Diarra--September 2001 through May 2002) of having plunged the fragile nation into turmoil by invoking ethnic exclusion to rally the public against Ouattara, Bédié emerged as head of the PDCI. Even after several months in exile, he trumped his opponents within the party, who scattered to existing opposition parties or submitted to his hegemony. Yet, the RHDP placed its hopes in the Pretoria “handshake” that committed Ouattara and Bédié to the platform.

Second, the absence of platform guidelines for the youth wings of the associated parties raises concerns. The formation of the coalition automatically implicated the youth wing of each party resulting in the creation of the Jeunesse RHDP. If RHDP youth leaders Kouadio Konan Bertin (PDCI), Blé Guirao (UDPCI), Karamoko Yayoro (RDR), and Kpangni Siméon (MFA) follow their elders in practicing Houphouët’s ideology of peace and dialogue, they are expected to renounce violence and disruption as means of political action. Historically, youth wings have been in the forefront of radical political change, just as the Jeunesse du Rassemblement Démocratique Africain de Côte d’Ivoire (JRDACI) had been in the years leading up to independence from France. Many of JRDACI leaders, were affiliated with African youth activists in France, and the International Union of Students, largely communist, and found themselves at odds with Houphouët and the moderate PDCI stalwarts interested in collaboration with France as members of the French Community. Youth leaders were forced to submit to party authority in order to receive operating funds and their sections were attached to local PDCI branches sometimes controlled by traditional chiefs loyal to Houphouët.13 The more recent model of mass activism set by the Jeunes Patriotes, the FPI youth wing led by Blé Goudé, proved the capacity of youth activists to force the international community to yield to Gbagbo’s demands. It is unclear whether the opposition youth wings can be contained within the RHDP coalition, and even less clear whether the RHDP can rely on leaders within any one party to enforce coalition principles among its youth, especially if they are provoked.14

Third, the platform does not address preexisting problems and fissures in the national political landscape that predate Houphouët’s death and are underlying causes for the current crisis. Houphouët also violated human rights and held political prisoners intermittently during his three decades of rule.15 Although the past boasts many positive examples, the RHDP platform does not interrogate Houphouët’s strategies for achieving ethnic diversity, national unity, and regional economic and political stability in the twenty-first century. For instance, the platform ignores the 4 million guest workers (mostly Burkinabe), nearly 25% of the population, whose labor and commerce have contributed to the nation’s economic prosperity; half of them have been displaced by the civil war. Will the Houphouëtists lead in convincing Ivoirian nationals to overcome their xenophobia in order to allow guest workers, especially those born in Côte d’Ivoire, to become naturalized citizens, attend schools, vote and thrive in positions of leadership and authority? In fact, Houphouët’s rise to national acclaim began in 1944 with the formation of the Syndicat Agricole Africain, a coffee and cocoa growers union that collaborated with northern traditional chiefs to gain access to migrant labor. The PDCI grew out of the union’s base and cast a wide net that embraced Ivoirian ethnics as well as the Mossi and Africans from surrounding French colonies.16 Houphouët proved early on that an ethnically diverse team could be avantageous for Côte d’Ivoire, as shown in the August 1945 elections to the Abidjan Municipal Council where he organized the Bloc Africain (an all-African slate, composed of “8 Ivoiriens, 6 Senegalese, 2 Dahomeyans, and 2 Guineans”) and won the overwhelming majority of votes cast.17 Moreover, the so-called Ivoirian “miracle” that characterized the coterie of economic and social advances during the first two decades of independence was led by the Big Four—PDCI loyalists that controled the ministries of Economy and Finance (Bédié), Foreign Affairs (Assouan Usher), Planning (Mohamed Diawara), and Agriculture (Abdoulaye Sawadogo). Diawara hailed from Mali and Sawadogo claimed Voltaic origins.

Fourth, in the interest of building national unity, the RHDP should contemplate which types of political and electoral systems might best accommodate ethnic and political realities. As a short-term resolution to the current crisis, the Marcoussis Agreement required a reconciliation government composed of members of the FPI and opposition parties; the RHDP should indicate how future leadership might formalize shared governance in the executive cabinet. Côte d’Ivoire has been a single-party majority rule system, but the RHDP should propose a power-sharing system attractive to players throughout the territory that takes into account the history of regional participation in Côte d’Ivoire’s political and economic advancement. The RHDP might also consider a proportional representation electoral system for the National Assembly and suggest the bases for inclusion (i.e., ethnicity, region, religion, gender, occupation).18

Lastly, the RHDP platform does not prepare its followers for a potentially long duration as an opposition in case they should fail in their ability to unseat Gbagbo. The results of a survey carried out by UN Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) as reported by the FPI newspaper, Notre Voie, suggests that Gbagbo’s increasing popularity throughout the country may position him for a victory if presidential elections are held in the near future. According to the article, the survey took place in July 2006 among a random sample of 900 to 1200 people nation wide with all levels of education (non-literate through college), ages 18 years and above, who were given a list a names and asked to select the person they most respected. Gbagbo gained 39.3% to Ouattara’s 9.4% with Banny at 7.0% and Bédié a mere 4.7%.19 As expected, Ouattara was more popular than others in the north, but fell far behind Gbagbo in the south. Surprisingly, Gbagbo emerged with greater popularity than Bédié in the southern regions and Abidjan. Overall, Bédié’s results were quite dismal, questioning again the wisdom of PDCI stalwarts in continuing to select Bédié as PDCI president.

The selection of Soro as Gbagbo’s Prime Minister bodes well for the RHDP. In the negotiations leading to his acceptance to serve in this capacity, Soro demanded that Gbagbo accept a program of action reflecting several aspects of the G7 Declaration. As G7 collaborators, the RHDP leaders can expect to engage their platform within a favorable national environment. They have made public statements in support of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement and Soro’s appointment.20

Whether Gbagbo wins or loses the next round of presidential elections, the RHDP must reevaluate Houphouët’s policies and strategies and, above all, refrain from romanticizing the past if it truly intends to recapture the body politic after six years of chaos, violence, and other infractions compromising human rights, the rule of law and democracy. The opposition platform must be strengthened and the RHDP leadership held accountable to the populations it hopes to lead. As written, the RHDP platform has limited use unless its adherents work to reinforce it with viable alternative models of governance and power sharing capable of withstanding challenges to equity and fairness in electoral politics.

Notes and References

Citation Format:

Jeanne Maddox Toungara. “Houphouëtism: Building a Coalition among Opposition Parties in Côte d’Ivoire” West Africa Review: Issue 10, 2007.

Copyright © 2007 Africa Resource Center, Inc.