NATIONAL SECURITY, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE MENACE OF ETHNIC MILITIAS IN NIGERIA

There were high expectations that shortly after the prolonged military rule in Nigeria and the return to civil rule on May 29, 1999, peace, order and security of lives and properties, as well as adequate provision of infrastructural facilities would be ensured. However, these expectations have remained illusory. Massive repression of the civil society groups by successive military regimes and the failure of the Obasanjo’s government to meet the yearnings and aspirations of the people have made them resort to seeking solace in cultural and ethnic identities. This explains the emergence and activism of ‘ethnic militias’ like Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), Egbesu Boys of Africa, Ijaw Youth Movement, Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Arewa People’s Congress (APC), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Front for Ijaw Survival and Hope (FISH), among others.

Against the backdrop of a dysfunctional state, therefore, this study argues that these groups have not only challenged the monopoly of the state as a primary provider of security and general well being, they have also further problematized the nation’s nascent democracy and overall national security. The Nigerian government is still grappling with the menace which could arguably be assuaged through an effective state performance.

Introduction

An effective government anywhere in the globe is expected to provide justice, order, security and efficient social infrastructures. But Nigeria, like many African states, is found wanting in this regard. The emergence of ‘ethnic militias’ in the 1990s is, therefore, an apt response to the dysfunctional state.

Basically, long years of military rule had not only centralized the apparatus of government and control of resources, it had also stifled ethnic agitations. However, the return to civil rule on May 29, 1999 and the accompanying liberal environment for freedom of expression and association gave way to unprecedented wave of ethnic activism and discharge of political tension across the country. As a result, instead of loyalty to the state, ethnicity became a tremendous social movement and preferred mode of loyalty. It also became a system of ‘social insurance’,2 to the extent that the ‘ethnic militia’ groups that emerged have established institutions and symbols of autonomy of sorts, which are used for defence or offence against other ethnic nationalists that stand against their stated objectives and against the state itself.3

Admittedly, there is a tendency in Nigeria to loosely employ the term ‘ethnic militias’ to cover all sorts of emergence or resurgence of social movements that are formed to address issues of deprivation, marginalization, ethnic emancipation and provision of neighbourhood security (popularly called ‘vigilante services’), especially after the nation’s return to civil rule. In fact, the next section of the study is devoted to this conceptual mix-up. When it first appeared shortly after the return to civil rule, ‘ethnic militia’ groups were seen as a reaction to the bottled-up emotions arising from close to thirty years of military rule. These long years of absolute rule were characterized by all sorts of state induced violence, flagrant disregard for the rule law and appalling human rights violations. But the crisis heightened as a result of the failure of the current civilian government to meet the yearnings and aspirations of the various ethnic groups. Thus, the government has had to face the arduous task of managing or containing the increasing wave of civil violence and reprisals in different parts of the country which have adversely affected the nation’s economy and polity.

From available indications, the kernel of the agitations of these ‘ethnic militias’— from Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) to Egbesu Boys of Africa, Bakassi Boys, Chicoco Movement, Movement for the Actualization for Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Ijaw Youths Movement, Arewa People’s Congress (APC) and lately, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Front for Ijaw Survival and Hope (FISH)—include the need for electoral justice, social justice, provision of social security, protection of human/minority rights, maintenance of the rule of law and a properly run federation.4

Naturally, these are primary duties of the state. However, once the state is seen as derelicting in the discharge of these duties deliberately or inadvertently, people recede into their ethnic cells which in turn remold their psyche and restore their sense of worth. In the words of Richard Joseph: “several decades of misrule have not only undermined the emergence of effective state, they have also driven ethnic and regional communities to develop sub-national conceptions of citizenship”.5

The central thesis of this paper is to critically examine how sub-national identities have been promoted as the basis for the reconfiguration of the Nigerian state and how this has been vigorously contested by the Federal government.6

Conceptual Clarifications

The term ‘national security’ has been used by politicians as a rhetorical catch-phrase. While it is used by military leaders to describe a policy objective, it has also been adopted by social scientists to refer to both an analytical concept and a field of study. Modern social scientists use the concept in terms of ‘the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats’. National security as a field of study, therefore, attempts to analyze the manner in which nations plan, make and evaluate the decisions and policies designed to increase this ability.7 In the United States of America (US), the origin of the concept can be found in different historical formulation of national interest. Walter Lippman was the first to define national security explicitly to mean that a nation is secure to the extent that “it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war”.8 In behavioural study and system analysis, Morton Kaplan showed that national security is one important aspect of the problem of system maintenance.9

Thus, national security is the measure taken by a state to ensure its survival and safety. It includes the deterrence of attack from within and without as well as the protection and well being of citizens. The measures taken to ensure national security include the following:

After September 11, 2001, the general impression that the US was free from national security threat was challenged. Consequently, national security became a popular theme in the US. The world interest in national security has risen too. For instance, the US administration sees Acquired Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) crisis in Africa as a threat to its national security simply because it can lead to economic collapse and political instability that might need US’s intervention. Al Gore, the former US Vice President, has raised similar fears and that of global warming in a discourse on ‘new security agenda’.11

It is, therefore, inadequate to adopt the Cold War mindset that sees national security only in the most conventional terms. What is now so prominent in Africa is the evident paradigm shift on the meaning of national security away from its traditional conception as highlighted above. There is a focus on ‘human security’—which include protection from threats such as hunger, disease and repression and against sudden and violent disturbances in the way of life. Security now pertains to people rather than territories on the one hand and development rather than military on the other. Now, the notion of security can include the preservation of all that the society considers to be important and valuable. This can be translated to safety of individuals and groups from physical harm, guarantee for conditions of life that is peaceful and satisfying, preservation of the economic and environmental values and protection of individuals or groups from arbitrary and coercive rule. All of these constitute a considerable departure from narrow definitions of security—which focus solely on the use and control of military force by the state.12

A growing threat to national security comes from the failure of nations—the nature of which this paper addresses. This threat emerges from the persistence of destabilizing conditions and weak governance. For instance, if there are no more threat of Communism, nations fall to home-grown warlords; markets vanish as a result of civil wars and as such economic potentials have been endangered; ethnic cleansing goes on unabated in different parts of the world with consequent violation of international law and civilized standard.

Furthermore, the genocidal massacre that took place in Rwanda in the 1990s is as appalling as it commands the attention of national security students; the same way did the tale of millions of lives that were lost during the Afghanistan’s civil war—primarily because of the attendant social dislocation and starvation. Coupled with that are the accumulated effluents from burning rainforests and teeming urban centers in the developing world, hordes of refugees, as well as subversion carried out by international mafias and drug cartels that push aside weak and failing governments.13 It is noteworthy that national security could be threatened even in the absence of missiles and bombers. At this juncture, it is apposite to quote Brian Alwood, the administrator of the US Agency for International Development:

It is instructive to know that today the international community is spending over $4 billion a year on 42 million refugees and displaced persons. This is twice the number from 1980. $5.4 billion was spent in 1993 alone on peacekeeping. That is more than the forty-five previous years combined. Several acres of forest have also been lost as a result of human activities. The world’s population grows by 90 million people every year. By 2015 we will be attempting to manage a world with 2 to 2.5 billion people.15

The summary of the foregoing is that one essence of a nation’s national security is to safeguard its national values. Most fundamental of this value is survival and self preservation. In this, military power is the basic focus. But this notion has to change, in view of daily economic imbalances, environmental degradation, terrorism and weapon proliferation, international health concerns, international migration and shifting demography. Yet, some countries still stick to tired model of national security. Therefore, a redefinition of national security not only requires a mere military projections, it also involves environmental security, economic well being, international health and demography and the totality of good governance.16 It is part of or a combination of these concerns that led to the upsurge in the activities of ‘ethnic militia’ groups in Nigeria.

Having made this clarification on national security, it is worthwhile to define ‘militia’ groups and synchronize it with how it has been employed to describe the Nigerian phenomenon. A ‘militia’ group is a group of citizens organized to provide paramilitary service. It may mean an official ‘reserve army’, composed of non-professional soldiers. It may be the national police forces as in Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the defunct Soviet Union (they are called ‘Militsiya’). It may be the entire able-bodied population of a state, which can be called to arm against an invading enemy, for example, the Kamajors and Kapras in Sierra Leone; or a private or non-governmental force, not necessarily supported or sanctioned by the government.17

In all of this, a ‘militia’ is distinct from a national regular army. It can serve to supplement the regular army, or it can oppose it to resist a military coup. Sometimes, the ‘enemies’ against which a ‘militia’ is mobilized are domestic political opponents of the government e.g. strikers. In many cases, the role or existence of a ‘militia’ is controversial. There is no single definition of how a group qualifies as a ‘militia’. However, the following variables can be considered: a ‘militia’ is a domestic organization with two or more members; the organization must possess and use firearms; the organization must conduct and encourage paramilitary training. Some of them engage in anti-government rhetoric. They are anti-repression because at some level, they see the government as being unlawful at varying levels and engaged in unlawful practices. They protest government policies, advocate violent and non-violent revolution or overthrow of the central government.

There are moderate ‘militia’ groups which engage in no criminal activities while there are radical cells which commit violent acts of terrorism. Most of these ‘militia’ groups, to their advantage, are familiar with the local terrain. Their members are dedicated and they are under no obligation to fight ‘by the rules’.18

Some other groups that claim ‘militia’ label will be useful to our analysis in this study. These include paramilitary groups. A paramilitary group could be described as a group of civilians organized in a military fashion (especially to operate in place of or to assist regular troops). It can serve many functions as the following:

There are paramilitary groups as security forces. They are neither police agency nor military organization, but are oriented towards controlling their own population rather than towards the role of a professional military. They are there to suppress anarchy or civil war. They are armed with small arms, wear military uniforms, equipped with tear gas and other non-lethal weapons. Such groups could be under the control of the ruling party or the President (Head of State) personally rather than the government.20/P>

In military terms, paramilitary security forces are typically light infantry. Effectively led, they can stand in defence , especially in cities or urban areas , but are less capable of offensive action or sustained combat operations due to lack of heavy weapon, professional military training and offensive logistic support. There are revolutionary and guerrilla paramilitary groups formed to fight the government of a country or region. It includes rebellions against recognized governments and attacks on occupying forces. They engage in warfare against an established and stronger force. The other paramilitary groups are ‘commandos’ that are usually small and highly trained e.g. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Israel’s Intelligence Service (MOSSAD). Paramilitary groups as ‘mercenaries’ are private armies e.g. Executive Outcomes—a mercenary outcome that operated in Africa in the 1990s. It is usually made up of military personnel.21

The non-combat paramilitary organizations refer to the organization, not the purpose for a group. For instance, some groups could be called paramilitary whose purpose is not to fight but adopt some aspect of military culture or discipline. They are lacking in military courtesy and strict hierarchy. In wartime, groups like these may be pressed into combat because they have necessary discipline and organization e.g. cadet corps, the Hitler Youth, the US Air Patrol and the US Coast Guards Auxiliary.

In some situations, where the state or military/political apparatus is weak or absent, they can act with large degree of practical independence, having their own command structures and benefiting from private sponsors such as land owners, regional authorities, local interest groups, former victims of revolutionary paramilitary forces, warlords, druglords or foreign interests. These forces ostensibly operate to enforce the law, but may act without regard for the law or at cross-purposes to the existing civilian or military authorities, which may lead to confrontation if the resulting discrepancies are significant enough.

Depending on the level of their political and financial autonomy, the relationship between these paramilitary forces and official institutions can be one of tolerance, or incidental alliances rather than direct oversight and cooperation. Some of these forces have violated laws of war and have committed other heinous atrocities.22 The Nigerian ‘ethnic militia’ groups readily fit into this kind of description, although they may not be perfect examples of ‘militias’ and it is not all of them that have ethnic motivation behind their establishment.

Certainly some ‘militia’ groups are a fall-out of ethnicization of politics in Nigeria and as such, ethnicity merits a theoretical review here as well. According to Eghosa Osaghae,23 ethnicity is a derivative of ethnic group marked by language, culture, territory and political organization. It occurs in situations involving more than one group and identifies with a clear “us” and “they” differentiation. Furthermore, ethnic demands in the words of Solofo Randrianja: “are usually and simply a manifestation of a form of resistance against a predatory and overbearing state.24” Both in historical and comparative terms, ethnicity is a process of negotiating identity within groups as well as between groups within a much larger body, which transcends, but simultaneously maintains ethnic difference. Not only that, ethnicity is a socially creative act which conditions the political organization of a group, its language, culture and so on, in an awareness of a common identity. It must also be stated that the relationship between politicized ethnicity and solidarities based on the ties of kinship developed by rural communities is one of the reasons for its effectiveness.

By application, the Nigerian state, right from 1960 when it obtained independence, has been confronted with strident agitations bordering on marginalization. For instance, the minority oil bearing communities feel deprived by reason of not having a fair share from the oil proceeds which accrue to the federation account from their land. At the very extreme state of the feeling of marginalization, the oil bearing communities, e.g., Southern Minorities Forum comprising ethnic movements from Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Rivers and Bayelsa states, submitted a memorandum to the Constitutional Conference initiated by the late General Sani Abacha in 1994. In their submission:

Some Igbo are of the opinion that the issues that led to the civil war of 1967 to 1970 are yet to be addressed by those at the helm of affairs in the country. This partly explains the formation of the Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra in the 1990s. The Yoruba felt cheated by the arbitrary manner with which the June 12, 1993 presidential elections won by late Chief M. K. O. Abiola—a Yoruba man from the South-West, was annulled by General Ibrahim Babangida—a military ruler from the North.26

Scholars like Henry Glickman, Eghosa Osaghae, Okwudiba Nnoli and Zerich Kay Smith.27 have argued that the ruling elites, in competition for the state apparatus, to gratify their personal aggrandizement, have used ethnicity as a bargaining chip. Hence, ethnicity is instrumental rather than being primordial, and not only that, ethnic activism has been intensified with the advent of democratization. In another breath, R. T. Akinyele28 sees the resurgence of ‘ethnic militias’ as a fall-out of self-determination.

However, it is our contention that the emergence or resurgence of these ‘militia’ groups can be attributed to the erosion of the power of the state, especially in the on-going democratic dispensation. Within the context of crises, these ‘militia’ groups have attracted to themselves some measure of allegiance and social relevance that are supposed to wholly belong to the state at large. Kola Olufemi aptly describes this situation as that which involved the ‘disengagement’ or withdrawal of the people from formal economic and state arenas into communal ‘containers’ with minimal linkages to the central political structure.29

An Overview Of The Origin Of ‘Ethnic Militias’ In Nigeria

It is no longer news to say that the Nigerian police are ill-equipped, ill-trained, ill-motivated, poorly funded and poorly staffed.30 This has made it difficult for them to meet up with the challenges of providing adequate security in the present day Nigeria. There are dismal records of failure of the Nigerian police in combating crime relating to armed robbery, assassination, kidnapping, ritual killing, cross-border theft and vandalization of public and private properties. So also are the loss of policemen’s lives and arms to robbers.31 Hence, the police had lost the confidence of the public in providing security and safety of lives and properties. As a fall out, civil defence and ‘vigilante’ groups have been formed and they exist in almost all the major cities in the country. In another breath, there is the emergence of youth movements concerned with political and economic liberation of their respective ethnic groups.

Furthermore, since the return to civil rule, the government has come under serious challenge in relation to the provision of basic needs for its citizenry. In the process, the people have sought all forms of identities and established all sorts of organizations in order to achieve self-actualization both individually and collectively. Let us now consider some of these organizations:

On the whole, lack of social justice, social security and fairness are partly responsible for the formation of the ‘ethnic militias’ and this is a pointer to the failure of the Nigerian state in the discharge of its fundamental responsibilities.

An Appraisal Of The Challenges Posed By The ‘Ethnic Militias’ To The Nigerian State

The paradox of the Nigerian state (as most other African states) is that it is strong in areas in which it ought to be weak (i.e., repression), but weak where it ought to be strong (i.e., popular mobilization, responsiveness and fairness). There is a considerable erosion of the state power because it could not build an adequate political structure or framework that could dampen ethnic or social anomie.39

On this, President Olusegun Obasanjo’s inaugural speech is quite revealing when he promised in 1999 to halt the decline in Nigeria’s human development indices while working for medium and long term solutions to the problems.40 He minced no words in condemning the maximum rule of late General Sani Abacha, which he eventually succeeded, by saying that “government officials became progressively indifferent to propriety of conduct and showed little commitment to promoting the general welfare of the people and the public good.41” He said further that “our infrastructures—NEPA (National Electric Power Authority), NITEL (Nigerian Telecommunication Company), roads, railways, education, housing, and other social services were allowed to decay and collapse. Our country has thus been through one of its darkest periods.42”.

To emphasize the standpoint on the alleged neglect of his predecessor (s), some of the things prioritized by his administration at inception in 1999 include:

Expectedly, such a regime ought to address the same concerns that were said to be neglected. However, eight years after, the rot is still as it were in the beginning. As a result of this disappointment, many groups and individuals resort to violence especially when they fear losing their resources base and self-esteem.44 While some of these ‘ethnic militias’ have focused on fighting for their legitimate rights, facilitated by armies of unemployed youths, others have assembled themselves to provide vigilante/security services for their community—which have earned them social acceptance. Therefore, it has remained difficult for the government to proscribe them. For instance, the OPC has become a parallel security outfit to the states’ by putting vigilante services in place and confronting criminal gangs. In its wake, it had clashed with the state police and other ethnic groups in different parts of the South-western Nigeria45 that is predominantly inhabited by the Yorubas—the ethnic group whose interest it was established to protect and promote. Its activities have undoubtedly been violent, involving arson and trepidation, which in turn is an affront on the monopoly of the state in the provision of security and order. On a particular occasion, while Mr. Tafa Balogun—the former Inspector General of Police was issuing a statement on the 2003 general elections, that “my men are given strict instruction to fight violence, and there will be no sacred cow… police will go to the source of the thugs”,46 Fredrick Fasheun, the leader of OPC issued his, saying “If any politician attempts to derail the path of peace, we will teach such a politician a lesson”.47 In another instance, he was also determining which aspirant should or should not campaign in a particular part of the country and the reason for such order.48 This was at a time the Federal government had outlawed the organization.

The Egbesu Boys of Africa has its own area of operation in the waters of the oil-rich Niger Delta. The ‘boys’ claim to be fighting against environmental spoliation of their land by the oil prospecting firms and non-payment of due compensation to the affected communities. In the process, they kidnap oil workers either for ransom or kill them outrightly. In November 1999, twelve of the policemen sent to the area to quell riot were allegedly kidnapped and murdered by Egbesu boys, thereby forcing President Olusegun Obasanjo to order a massive military operation against Odi town of Bayelsa state believed to be the stronghold of the ‘militia’ group. The presidential order was judged49 as unfair and undemocratic, simply because he was indifferent to the allegations of the atrocities perpetrated by the soldiers and policemen there, prior to the kidnapping and killing. It is worth mentioning that the Ijaws are the fourth largest ethnic nationality in Nigeria. Yet, like other oil bearing communities in the Niger Delta, they have often accused the state and the oil prospecting firms of deprivation, brutalization and marginalization.

Ike Okonta—an environmentalist and human rights activist alleged that instead of addressing the issue of social injustice meted out by the state, the Nigerian government is pretending that ‘oil bunkering’ and ‘security threat’ are the reasons for clamping down on the Ijaw Youths in the Niger Delta. To him, this government’s campaign of calumny and outright repression of the oil producing communities is supported by the London based Financial Times and the Washington based think-tank—Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) as well as Shell oil prospecting firm.50

Okonta justified the essence of the activities of these youths but regretted that the state and oil companies in the Niger Delta are loath to accommodate their demands; hence the state’s response is to call it ‘security threat’. Okonta further argued that:

He summed up that the Ijaw militants are not warmongers that are simply willing to experiment with their newly acquired skills on lethal capabilities, but it is the Royal Dutch Shell and other oil prospecting firms operating in the area, in collaboration with the state that have militarized the region with all sorts of sophisticated weapons placed in the hands of the security agents to clamp down on the people clamoring for their legitimate rights.

One point that is common to all of these ‘ethnic militias’ is that, in recognition of their importance either in the provision of security services in the states where they operate or in vigorously challenging the decay in the Nigerian body polity, some state governments seek their legitimation52 while the Federal government is keen on proscribing them.53 The latter refers to them as ‘terrorist movements’ in order to justify their proscription.

It is also pertinent to know that there is mass poverty and unemployment in the land which create alienation of the people from the government and there is general insecurity of lives and properties. For instance, with all the macro and micro indices that the economy presents, most Nigerians still live below the poverty line.54 Certainly, a host of Nigerians are living under unbearable economic hardship.55 There is hyper inflationary rate and warehouses are replete with unsold products, hence, manufacturers’ capacity to absorb the unemployed diminished considerably.56 The country’s per capital income is just $250 while in other oil producing countries, the least per capital is $2,000. About 80 per cent of Nigerians live below poverty level of less than a $2 per day.57 The Federal Ministry of Education put the figure of school drop-outs at 12 million; out of this figure, United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) disclosed that about eight million are exploited in child labour.58 Many are either apprentices or street children hawking petty goods for sustenance. Nigeria is rated the 26th poorest nation by the UN and 146 out of 162 on the UN Human Development index of social indicators.59

Interestingly, the above rendition is accurately captured in the words of President Olusegun Obasanjo himself as follows:

Therefore, in the face of crippling poverty and government’s dereliction in the discharge of its primary responsibilities, the citizens have thereby found solace in the establishment of ‘militia’ groups. It is against this backdrop that we submit that meanwhile, no amount of legislation could stem the tide. This is because in spite of outlawing these ‘militia’ groups by the Federal government, their activities still flourish. In fact, the ‘militia’ groups that could easily go into extinction are only those with tenuous ethno-cultural base and support such as MASSOB, APC and the Bakassi Boys.61 That is said against the background of unsatisfactory performance of the state in meeting the basic needs of its populace. However, since deep ethnicity is not the catalyst for the rise of ‘ethnic militia’ groups, an alternative argument that could leapfrog the earlier standpoint and serve as a panacea to the menace is to see the state rising to its responsibilities and delivering basic infrastructures to the people. There is no doubting the fact that the people are sure that the state has the capacity to deliver62 but its functionaries are either neglecting them or exempting them from the state’s priorities or they are so blind-folded by personal gains, unabashed corruption and high politics.

Concluding Remarks

Evidently, the issues bordering on national security are no longer only on the conventional military matters any more. It is now all-embracing; the one addressed in this study is the menace of ‘ethnic militias’ which could no longer be glossed over by the Nigerian state. Though their methodologies are a subject of controversy, their social relevance is no longer in doubt as they challenge the essence of the state as the primary provider of security, order and justice. For instance, Iyabo Obasanjo-Bello—the former Ogun State Commissioner for Health63 proposed that she may hire OPC if that will guarantee security of lives and equipment in government-owned hospitals. This was meant to arrest the spate of burglary of scanning machines, generating plants and so on at the state’s government hospitals—leading to estimated loss of about N10 million.64 This is the same outfit that President Obasanjo, her father, issued a ‘shoot-on-sight’ order against. Also in their areas of operation, the OPC, Bakassi Boys, etc have been able to apprehend and deal with notorious robbers, fraudsters, ritualists and kidnappers. They have also curbed reckless driving by the motorcyclists and ‘indecent dressing’ by both sexes. They are even contemplating forming a joint security patrols beyond their immediate respective domains,65 In spite of the attempt by the Federal authority to clampdown on them, they continue to operate. Hence, as Okwudiba Nnoli rightly observes:

Therefore, the solution to ethnic motivated conflicts is not in building bridges to assuage or harmonize cultural differences among the various ethnic groups as advocated in the need to establish ‘People’s Committee’,67 or merely in institutional arrangement such as President Olusegun Obasanjo’s establishment of Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPRC).68 Rather, it lies in making the state itself to be more responsive to the social and security needs of its citizens. Through this, the citizens will work towards the realization of the ‘Nigerian project’ thereby sustain the democratic process and enhance national security.

The ‘ethnic militia’ groups have been criticized that most of their members are school drop-outs, unemployed youths and those drawn from low income families and class.69 There are also wide allegations of indiscriminate arrest, detention and torture, persecution, summary execution, arbitrary destruction of properties, victimization of opponents and extra judicial killings. One of such cases that was recently reported involved the death of thirty-two detainees of the Bakassi Boys.70 The Federal government appears set to curb the excesses of the groups with arrest and trial of their leaders.71

But beyond the penchant to arrest the leaders of these ‘militia’ groups by the Nigerian government, it is much more fundamental as it is imperative for national security that the government should decisively tackle the problem of mass unemployment, mass poverty, and underdevelopment of the productive forces. It also has to be very alert to the security of lives and properties of its citizenry which is currently in a precarious state.

If we say that safeguarding the sovereign independence and integrity of the state is central to national security; also if national security is an integral part of system maintenance, then, the armies of unemployed youths that dominate the membership of these ‘ethnic militia’ groups, who have at sundry occasions abducted expatriates and tampered with oil installations in the Niger Delta region,72 should be taken care of—by way of providing gainful employment for them. Furthermore, these unemployed youths could be engaged to collaborate with foreigners to destabilize the government through sectarian violence. They may also engage in activities that are detrimental to the nation’s economy e. g. smuggling, stifling the investment environment—which can easily dissuade foreign investors etc. So, as a matter of national security imperative, the government must increase its employment creation drive in order to gainfully absorb the mass of unemployed youths, while at the same time, nip the menace of the ‘ethnic militia’ groups in the bud.73

Notes and References

2 Since the state is found wanting in the discharge of its primary responsibilities, the people have resorted to ethnic politics not only as a primordial means of identification, it has also been used as an instrument to agitate and secure the ‘essentials’ which the state had allegedly abandoned, neglected or incapable of providing for them. In the process, the people have found easy attachment in ethnicity when other means, like educational qualification, social class and technical criteria, amongst others, have failed them in getting what they want—mainly because of overpoliticization of issues. Hence, ethnicity has become a badge to be worn openly. Ethnic agitation has gained social acceptance and as such, the government has found it arduous to tackle the menace. For more on this, see Daniel Bell (1996), “Ethnicity and Social Change”, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Ethnicity, Oxford, Oxford University Press. PP. 138 – 146.

3 Ibrahim Babangida (2002), “Ethnic Nationalities and the Nigerian State” ---excerpts from a lecture delivered at National Institute for Policy and Strategic Study, Kuru, Jos. (Published on the Website by www.Niger Delta Congress.com). PP. 4 – 5.

4 Kole Omotosho (1991), “The Nigerian Federation in the Nigerian Novel”, Publius: Journal of Federalism, Vol. 21 (Fall); Obi Ifeanyi (2007), “The Igbos in the Nigerian Federation”, Daily Sun, March 5, P. 15; Jeremy White (1981), Central Administration in Nigeria 1914 – 1948: The Problem of Polarity, London, Frank Cass; Peter P. Ekeh (2001), “Urhobo and the Nigerian Federation: Whither Nigeria?”—text of a guest lecture presented at Urhobo National Assembly’s Seminar on “Whither Nigeria? : The Position of the Urhobo ”—at Petroleum Training Institute, Effurun, Delta State, Nigeria, October 27. (available online at http://www.waado.org/Organizatns/UNA/Guest Lecture_Ekeh.html) (date accessed 09/04/07); The Guardian (1993), “Shonekan resigns Abacha takes over”, The Guardian, (Lagos, Nigeria), November 18. P. 1; Waziri Adio (1998), “Abacha Era: Years of the Locust”, Liberty (a publication of the Civil Liberties Organization) (Lagos, Nigeria) April to July. PP. 27 – 28; Kunle Amuwo (2001), “Transition as Democratic Regression” in Kunle Amuwo, Daniel C. Bach and Yann Lebeau (eds.), Nigeria during the Abacha Years (1993 – 1998): The Domestic and International Politics of Democratization, Ibadan, French Institute for Research in Africa.

13 J. Brian Alwood (1995), “Towards a New Definition of National Security: The New Strategic Threats”, Current History, Vol. 62, No. 5, Dec. 15— text of an address to the Conference titled “New Directions in US Foreign Policy” at University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, Nov. 2.

25 The Guardian (1994) June 1, P. 29 cited in Adefemi Isumonah (2001), “Oil-bearing Minorities’ Struggles in Nigeria: Towards an Alternative Constitutional Framework”, Journal of the Indian Law Institute, Volume 43, No. 2. P. 176.

27 Henry Glickman (ed.) (1995), Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa, Atlanta; African Studies Association Press; Eghosa Osaghae (1994), Ethnicity and Its Management in Africa: The Democratization Link, Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd.; Okwudiba Nnoli (1980), Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu, Fourth Dimension Publishers; and Zerich Kay Smith (2000), “The Impact of Political Liberalization and Democratization on Ethnic Conflict in Africa: An Empirical Test of Common Assumptions”, Journal of Modern African Studies, Volume 38, No. 1.

29 Kola Olufemi (2000), “Social and National Questions: The Crisis of the State in Africa” in Adele Jinadu (ed.), The Political Economy of Peace and Security in Africa (Ethno-cultural and Economic Perspectives), Zimbabwe, APPS Books. P. 120.

30 Frank Odita (2000), “Security Challenges in a Diverse Ethno-Religious Cosmopolitan Population – Case Study of Lagos State”—text of a paper presented at the Security Management Conference on the theme “Grassroots Security Initiative” Lagos, 18 to 19 October.

32 Some put the date that the OPC was formed at 1995. Details in Amadu Sesay, (et. al.) (eds.) (2003), Ethnic Militias and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria, Ile-Ife, Obafemi Awolowo University, P. 2 and PP. 27 – 60.

34 Abdul Raufu Mustapha (1998), “Identity, Boundaries, Ethnicity and National Integration in Nigeria” in Okwudiba Nnoli (ed.), Ethnic Conflict in Africa, Dakar, Council for Social Science Research in Africa. PP. 27 – 52; R. T. Akinyele, op. cit, PP. 623 – 640 and Tunde Babawale, op. cit., P. 4.

39 Siegmar Schmidt (1997) “Africa before the Millennium: Between Democracy and Chaos?”—text of a paper presented for the Second International Meeting, German Society for Tropical Surgery (Surgery adapted to Developing Nations Experiences and Perspectives) Wolfratshausen. October 2 – 4. P. 11.

49 The Guardian (Editorial) (1999), “Blunder in Bayelsa” November 22; Tell (1999), “Fire for Fire: Aso Rock Cracks Down on OPC, Ijaw Militants” December 13. Following another round of bloodletting between the Ijaw Youths and OPC in Lagos, President Olusegun Obasanjo also ordered the law enforcement agents to ‘shoot on sight’ members of these ‘ethnic militias’.

52 In July 2001 Governor Lucky Igbinedion of Edo State sent a bill to the State House of Assembly to establish a Vigilante Service. The same in October 2001, Adamawa State House of Assembly passed into law a bill establishing a Neighbourhood Watch Organization (Details in Amadu Sesay, (et. al.) op. cit. P. 19). Also Governor Ahmed Tinubu of Lagos State announced that OPC would be co-opted to combat crime in the state, just as the Niger State Governor Abdulkadir Kure announced his intention to establish an OPC-like organ meant to combat the spate of crime in the state. (Details in Tunde Babawale op. cit; and UN OCHA op. cit.).

53 Thambo Mophuthing and Micel Schnehnge (2002), Pazambouka (South African Magazine) (Online), April 11, P. 4. It is on President Olusegun Obasanjo seeking Parliamentary approval to ban ‘ethnic militias’—under a bill titled ‘The Prohibition of Certain Associations Act’.

55 Tayo Odunlami (2004), “Escaping by Suicide: More Nigerians take their own lives to escape the harsh economic situation inflicted by the 66-month old Obasanjo – PDP – government”, The News, November. P. 17; and Michael Mukwuzi (2004), “The Suicide Squad: Faced with unending economic woes, more Nigerians find solace in hara-kiri”, The News, Nov. 22. P. 20.

60 Olusegun Obasanjo (2000), “Political Stability and Economic Growth”—text of a speech delivered at the inauguration of the National Economic Council (NEC), Abuja, July 27, cited in Ad’ Obe Obe (ed.) (2001), A New Dawn (Vol. 2): A Collection of Speeches of President Olusegun Obasanjo, Ibadan, Spectrum Books Ltd. P. 61.

62 There is a strong belief among Nigerians that the country is now richer than any other time in its history as a result of oil windfalls it has been enjoying due to the Persian Gulf crisis and the attendant boost in global oil prices. Unfortunately, the petrodollars occasioned by the unprecedented oil windfalls are not directed into productive use that could regenerate wealth, rehabilitate broken down infrastructures and empower the populace at large. For more, see Ogbonnaya Onu (2004), “It is time to stand for something”—text of a speech presented by Ogbonnaya Onu, elected Governor of Abia state and 1999 Presidential flagbearer of the then All Peoples Party (APP), now All Nigeria People’s Party, to the Lagos state House of Assembly , Ikeja. Lagos. December 2004, cited in The Comet, Tuesday, December, 21. P. 13; and Tony Momoh (2007), “Nigeria needs fixing, Buhari can do it”—excerpts of an interview of Tony Momoh, former Nigerian Minister of Information and Director of the Media Arm of the Buhari’s campaign organization, with Tunji Ola and Naomi Musa of the Newswatch newsmagazine, cited in Newswatch, January 29. P. 31.

68 Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) was established as a parastatal of the Ministry of Co-operation and Integration in Africa. It works with Non Governmental Organizations and other peace-keeping initiatives to manage internal conflict. (Details in Alliances for Africa (2002), “Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria”, (Online Bulletin), No. 11, October 16. P. 2.

71 Adekunle Yussuf (2005), “The caging of militia men”, Tell, November 7. P. 41; Friday Ekeoba, Gboyega Adeoye & Lanre Adewole (2005), “Gani Adams, Fasheun’s murder trial begins today”, Nigerian Tribune, October 27. PP. 1 & 4 and Kayode Joseph (2005), “Owazurike moved to Abuja”, Daily Champion, October 27, P 1.