WEST AFRICA REVIEW ISSN: 1525-4488 Issue 11 (2007)

Edwin Madunagu

A little under 25-years ago, between Thursday, December 16, and Saturday, December 18, 1982, the Kano State Government under Mohammed Abubakar Rimi, organised and hosted a national seminar on the theme: “Towards a Progressive Nigeria.” Several people, including my spouse and I, attended the seminar from Calabar, and participated very actively. One of the active participants was Dr. Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe who was then teaching Political Science at the University of Calabar.

Citing The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, edited by Alan Bullock and Oliver Stallybrass, Ekwe-Ekwe defined progressives generally as “those who believe in the possibility and desirability of progress, identified here as the socio-economic and moral improvement of the human condition, which predicates on a high optimism about the human nature.” We underline the three concepts in this concise definition: “possibility and desirability of progress,” “improvement of human condition;” and “optimism about the human nature.”

With specific reference to the present stage of human history, Ekwe-Ekwe then elaborated on his definition: “In class societies, progressive politics is geared towards the amelioration of class fact, the abolition or the overthrow of the class character of the oppressor state by the dominated.” At the end of the seminar, a communique titled: The Bagauda Declaration was issued. This title derived from the venue of the event, the Bagauda Lake Hotel.

The communique read in part: “The seminar brought together progressive politicians, intellectuals, students and workers from all over the country and covered such areas as politics, history, economics, law and sociology.” It was the consensus of the gathering that “a progressive movement in the country today can only be anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and anti-fraudalist. It must carry on the struggle for the emancipation of our people from these oppressive forces.” The communique was thus a reinforcement of Ekwe-Ekwe’s definition. That was 25-years ago in Kano, Nigeria.

Taking a long view of history and of historical progress, we can only be concerned here with the general formulation of progress, progressives, and progressive politics. We are not dealing with the specific anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist aspects of Ekwe-Ekwe’s definition or its elaboration in the communique. We are also not dealing with the present phase of globalised capitalist neoliberalism and its main product: mass immiseration and enslavement. We are dealing with general human progress, taking a long view of history.

Proceeding from the simply definition of general human progress and the identification of those that can be regarded as progressives, the question can be posed: How much progress has Nigeria made since October 1, 1960, or since December 1982, or indeed since May 29, 1999? One practical way of considering this seemingly rhetorical question is to pose a concrete one: What actually happened in Nigeria on Tuesday, May 29, 2007? This was in the 94th year of the existence of Nigeria as a single country and almost 47-years after the withdrawal of Britain—which created the country—as a colonial occupier and ruler.

Putting down these numbers it struck me that 1960, the year of Britain’s formal political disengagement from the rulership of Nigeria (called Nigeria’s independence,) is equidistant from (that is, midway between) the date of formal Constitution of Nigeria, that is, 1914 and May 29, 2007. Only a mystic may read a meaning to this mathematical symmetry. For me, it is merely a formula to help remember the date of General Olusegun Obasanjo’s second disengagement from the rulership of Nigeria or the date of Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar ’Adua’s assumption of office as President.

The two numbers (47 and 94) featuring in our political history may be considered either large or small depending on whether you are taking a short view of history or a long one. If you are taking a short view of history, the numbers 47 and 94 are large; but if you are taking a long view of history, they are small numbers. I hasten to add that there is nothing inherently wrong or right, good or bad, in taking a short view of history or a long one. It all depends on the subject of discussion and whether you are looking back, looking forward, or battling with the present. And, of course, your mood.

Back to the question I posed before this digression: What actually happened in Nigeria on Tuesday, May 29, 2007? There cannot be a uniform answer. For us, contemporaries, taking a short view of history, partial answers may be given; partisan answers may also be provided; so are ideological answers. Taking a long view of history, however, more complete answers can be given—answers becoming more complete as time goes on. But all categories of respondents will agree that on that day, the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) renewed and strengthened its political hold on Nigeria through a process which the whole world, including even the imperialist cynics, admitted was fraudulent; a process which was called an election, but which everyone admitted was a mockery of it.

At the level of executive power, the ruling party improved on the dominance it had enjoyed in the eight-year period: May 29, 1999 to May 29, 2007. Its dominance at the level of legislative power has also improved to the point where it can now be called “absolute dominance.” Knowing the true character of PDP, as distinct from what it says of itself; knowing its mission, as distinct from the type of society it says it wants to create; knowing, and in fact, living through its “track record” in all spheres in the past eight-years, as distinct from what it claims as its achievements; and witnessing how it came to power in 1999, strengthened this power in 2003, and consolidated its hold through the April 2007 events, what general progress can we say we have made on the political plane since 1999? I cannot see any.

What progress have we made when the right to peacefully protest against a national political fraud-witnessed and acknowledged by the whole world—is denied through the threat of state violence, and actual employment of state violence? What progress have we made when an “elected” state governor, whose public conduct in the past two-years has been an abuse of both heaven and earth publicly prostrated before a “godfather”—a historical anachronism—after his election? What progress have we made when the parting gift of a Nigerian government to the people was an increase in the price of petrol—an act which immediately and automatically increased the material misery of the poor, the “wretched of the earth” and the totally disinherited?

Perhaps one is too harsh or uncharitable. Let us therefore look at one or two claim of “progress.” Addressing members of his “victorious” party in a public function in Abuja on Monday, May 7, 2007, the former President, General Olusegun Obasanjo, said: “I want to thank God for one thing and I thank Nigerians—those who are disputing and those who are not disputing; this is one election we have had where nobody is talking about North and South, or about ethnicity as a factor. I believe we are making progress and we should take note of that.”

The former President was here pointing to his solution to the national question, to the flashpoints of national disaffection, including the Niger Delta. He was pointing to his solution to the problem of domination, exclusion, marginalisation, mass poverty and disinheritance. To him the “zoning formula” whereby the main presidential contestants came from the North and belonged to the same religion—just as in 1999 when the main contestants came from the South and belonged to the same religion—is the solution to the problem of other country. He took as solution to the profound problems that assail the country, the successful ethno-religious electoral "arrangement" within a very tiny fraction of the “thieving class” that has conquered and imposed internal colonialism on the nation.

General Obasanjo, his PDP, and their imperialist principals also point to some other areas of the country’s public life as spheres where the eight-year regime recorded “progress.” These include anti-corruption campaign; reforms in the spheres of economy and administration; introduction of GSM; rising profile and respect in the comity of nations, otherwise known as the International Community, debt repayments and above all, the fact of transition (transfer of power) from one “elected” civilian government to another.

Every adult Nigerian, except the frontline beneficiaries of the regime, knows that claims of progress in these spheres are either totally false, or exaggerated, or are mere myths. In any case, balance these claims with the deepening poverty and despair across the land; increasing mass unemployment; rising cost of living; worsening state of insecurity; worsening state of public electricity supply; increasing prices of petroleum products, especially petrol; liquidation of national assets through dubious “sales;” and increasingly institutionalised fascist attacks on the Nigerian population.

I ask again: Where is the progress since 1960, since 1982, and since 1999? And beyond this, and more importantly, how do Nigerian progressives defend their roles—before history—in the creation of this historical stagnation, if not historical regression? We have for too long ignored the very simple things we should be doing. And we have for too long failed to see that in this state of political atomisation not even one step can be taken towards historical progress.

Notes and References

Citation Format:

Edwin Madunagu. “Nigeria and Historical Progress” West Africa Review: Issue 11, 2007.

Copyright © 2007 Africa Resource Center, Inc.