CHIEFS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND POLICIES IN NIGERIA

As reflected in the four preceding quotations, the role and relevance of traditional political institutions in general, and traditional rulership in particular, continue to generate intense, and sometimes, quite acrimonious debates in Nigeria. Heated, bitter and rancorous debates on whether those who preside over indigenous political institutions who are variously designated numerous nomenclature as chiefs, emirs, obas, obis, olus, attahs, aiotse, and so on, should have any formal role in the political affairs of Nigeria elicit a great deal of interest and response both in scholarly writings and on the pages of newspapers and news-magazines. The term, traditional rulers, will be used in this paper to refer to the various political leaders who exercise political power at ethnic or sub-ethnic levels in Nigeria. While the term hints at the common fact these rulers operate outside the formal structures of modern state power in Nigeria, it underestimates the wide disparity in the locus and extent of powers exercised by this class of Nigerian leaders. For example, the Emir of Kano and the Tor Tiv fall into the same classification as traditional rulers. Yet, the Emir of Kano, both in the context of ethnic politics and within the larger purview of Nigerian politics is considerably more influential than the Tor Tiv.

In 1986, President Ibrahim Babangida set up a committee (the Political Bureau) to ascertain the political preferences of Nigerians. The committee organized a series of national debates and invited Nigerians to submit memoranda on their preferred political options. It received many memoranda on the role of traditional rulers. As the committee noted in its report, the issue of traditional rulership was “one of the topics in the debate which generated considerable interest.”^⁵ The framers of Nigeria’s 1979 Constitution thought that they had resolved the debate by denying traditional rulers any formal political role in the new constitution. This was in sharp contrast to the 1963 Constitution which created a legislative chamber in each of the regions for chiefs. Following the practice initiated by the architects of the 1979 Constitution, the framers of the 1989 and 1995 Constitutions did not provide any meaningful political roles for traditional rulers. The dominant sentiment among the architects of these three constitutions was that traditional rulers were irrelevant within the context of a Nigerian democracy that emphasizes achievement rather than ascribed status. The framers of the constitutions also seemed uncomfortable in providing a constitutional role for a set of rulers whose very mode of exercising political power appeared to conflict with the ideal of democratic governance.

The 1979, 1989 and 1995 constitutions attempted to diminish the political significance of traditional rulers by denying them explicit executive, legislative or judicial roles in the constitution. Nonetheless, that attempt and similar efforts to relegate traditional rulers and their indigenous political institutions and practices to the political backwaters of Nigeria have been largely unsuccessful. Not only do the role and relevance of the chief or traditional ruler remain a contested terrain in political discourse in Nigeria, political disputes over particular traditional thrones frequently erupt to create serious socio-political crises in many parts of the country. Chieftaincy disputes over successions to the thrones of traditional rulers have led to violence in many parts of the country. Many Nigerians have lost their lives in such violent protests. For instance, the riots over the Sokoto State government’s appointment of Ibrahim Dasuki over Muhammadu Maccido as the Sultan of Sokoto in November 1988 led to the death of thirteen people in Sokoto city.^⁶ In the same vein, a dispute between two contestants to the throne of the Oluo of Okeoyi in Kwara State, in September 1993, led to rioting that resulted in several deaths and in extensive destruction of property.^⁷ Similarly, in April 1997, several people were killed and thousands of people had their homes looted and/or burnt down in Agila village in Benue State, in an orchestrated attempt to impose a new second-class chief on the people.

Despite the spirited denial of formal political roles to traditional rulers in the four most recent constitutions, traditional rulers continue to exercise enormous power and influence over the lives and well-being of millions of Nigerians. In addition, traditional rulers control substantial economic and financial resources including land and forestry. In many rural areas of the country, the indigenous political institutions are virtually the only institutions of governance. In such places, there is a total absence of the paraphernalia of the modern Nigerian state. Law and order are maintained through traditional political structures. Social services as they exist are provided through various indigenous mechanisms. The virtual collapse of the institutions of the modern Nigerian state within the last few years as a result of military rule, corruption, and privatization has accentuated the importance of indigenous Nigerian political institutions in many rural communities. As Olufemi Vaughan has rightly pointed out, the “apparent limitation of modern state structures at the grassroots has inevitably enhanced the status of paramount chiefs as important actors in a loosely defined ruling coalition at the federal, state and local government levels.”^⁸

Even as the federal and state governments try to diminish the political significance of traditional leaders, they nevertheless continue to rely on them as the link to the people in the rural areas. Thus, ironically, the traditional institutions are still the most effective channel by which the federal and state governments reach the people in the rural areas. Unlike most of the institutions of the modern state in Nigeria which are corrupt, inefficient, high-handed and despised by many Nigerians, traditional political institutions in most cases are held in high esteem. Despite the fact that some traditional rulers are as corrupt and incompetent as their counterparts in the modern state structure, there is still a great deal of reservoir of goodwill for the institution in the minds of many Nigerians. Most Nigerians lack ready access to the institutions of the Nigerian state. The state treats them with contempt and is unresponsive to their needs and aspirations. Apart from being alienated from the state, most Nigerians cannot get government officials to account for their activities. On the other hand, traditional political institutions generally do not have the more obvious failings of the Nigerian state. They are quite accessible to ordinary people. They are more relevant to the daily lives of most Nigerians, particularly those in the rural areas. As a result of their closeness to the people, federal, state and local governments use them as conduits for disseminating government views and for the mobilization of the citizenry.

Traditional political institutions, of which traditional rulership constitutes an important element, form the bedrock of the political experience of many Nigerians. These institutions elicit greater confidence and legitimacy in the eyes of many Nigerians than the institutions of the modern Nigerian state. Nigeria’s new political structures are dominated by military officers and their civilian acolytes who maintain themselves in power by restricting access to political participation. Accordingly, autocracy, repression and bribery constitute the mechanism for governance under military rule. The indigenous political institutions on the other hand, provide room for meaningful political participation. A central feature of these institutions is the emphasis which they place on extensive discussion of public issues. In many instances, debates and discussions continue until a consensus is reached.

Wealthy, powerful and well-known Nigerians continue to show considerable interest in traditional rulership by actively contesting to sit on the thrones. In recent years, the list of victorious candidates reads like a who-is-who of Nigeria: Ibrahim Dasuki as Sultan of Sokoto, Oladele Olashore as the Oba of Iloko in Ijeshaland, Omo N’Oba Ereduwa, the Oba of Benin, to name just a few. Some Nigerians even place traditional rulership on a higher pedestal than state governorship or some other leadership position within the top hierarchies of the Nigerian state. As Yakubu Mohammed has noted with respect to the sultanate of Sokoto, “Next to the presidency of this country, the office of the sultan is easily the most exalted and therefore the most coveted. The late Sarduana of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello, once an aspirant to the sultan’s throne, said if he was asked to make a choice between the presidency of this country and the sultanate, he would most willingly and gladly settle for the latter.”^⁹

Both the federal and state governments emphasize the importance of traditional leaders by appointing some of them to prominent roles such as chancellorships of federal and state universities. For example, the Emir of Zaria, Oba of Benin, Emir of Kano, Obi of Onitsha, are chancellors of various universities. In 2003, the Etsu Nupe was appointed by the federal government to chair the local government reform committee. In addition, some of the traditional rulers were appointed as special emissaries of various military governments to help explain government’s stance on various issues to Nigerians both at home and abroad. When the Sani Abacha-led military regime set up the National Constitutional Conference in 1994 to draw up a new constitution for Nigeria, it appointed several prominent traditional rulers as members of the Conference.^¹⁰

The counsel and direct interventions of traditional leaders are frequently sought by federal and state governments in periods of national or local political crises. As Najeem Ade Lawal has rightly noted: “Whenever the policy-makers are overwhelmed by a sense of inadequacy in carrying the masses with them in their programs and dread the consequences of failure, the assistance of traditional rulers is usually sought . . . ”^¹¹ In April 1993 when the failed economic policy of the Babangida regime was exacting a heavy toll on many Nigerians, Ernest Shonekan, the head of the Transitional Government, called an ad hoc meeting of traditional rulers. He met with all the chairmen of the states’ councils of chiefs. During the crisis triggered by the annulment of the June 1993 presidential election, traditional rulers in Lagos, Kano and other major metropolitan areas helped to prevent the total break-down of law and order. Similarly, in the wake of the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other members of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) in November 1995, the federal government hurriedly set up a National Committee of Leaders of Thought and Traditional Rulers as a response to the national and international condemnation of the execution.^¹²

Ebenezer Babatope has noted the prominent role that Yoruba traditional rulers played in an attempt to “harmonize a single memorandum for the Yorubas for the proposed [1994] Constitutional Conference.”^¹³ The Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammadu Maccido, in 1997, appealed to the Sokoto State government to improve the conditions of service of district heads in the state. He argued that this must be done in view of the fact traditional rulers in general and district heads in particular, “help government in maintaining peaceful co-existence.”^¹⁴ He also maintained that district and village heads are the “custodians of farmlands and grazing lands” in the State and deserve improved conditions of service. In response to the Sultan’s appeal, the military administrator, Rasheed Adisa Raji, “assured the sultan that traditional rulers would always be given consideration in the scheme of things in view of their relevance in the administration of the state . . . ”^¹⁵ President Ibrahim Babangida’s regime used traditional rulers in an attempt to restrain some radicals who were implacably opposed to the administration. For example, after the well-known human rights crusader, Gani Fawehinmi, was released from an apparent illegal detention, he was handed-over to the Ooni of Ife who was expected to prevail on him and curtail his opposition to the Babangida regime.

Some members of the elite class continue to use positions within the indigenous political structures as a spring-board to national fame and prominence. Premier Ahmadu Bello and scores of other politicians from then Northern Region acquired their initial political experience from local governance provided by the traditional political system of the emirate system. Politicians such as the Moshood Abiola, who apparently won the 1993 presidential election, recognize the political value of chieftaincy titles. The late Abiola was awarded over 600 honorary chieftaincy titles from all parts of the country. Even though these were essentially honorific titles, their importance in legitimizing the political stature of Abiola or other recipients of such titles cannot be underestimated. Part of the political relevance of traditional rulership, including the honorific variety, comes partly from its use to gain effective access to the machinery of the modern Nigerian state. The acquisition of a chieftaincy title confers some degree of legitimacy on the recipient for his/her achievements in the modern economy. At the same time, the new status as a “chief” helps the recipient in his/her bargaining with colleagues and competitors in the modern sector. As Peter Ekeh has shown:

Military officers conferred importance on traditional rulers by their demonstrated eagerness to pay homage to prominent traditional rulers as soon as they assumed office as military governors. Under military rule, it became a tradition that the first place of call for a newly appointed military governor to any of the thirty-six states was the palace of the leading traditional ruler in the state. Through this open homage to traditional rulers, military governors sought to cloak themselves in the legitimacy which the indigenous political institutions are believed to confer on people. Traditional rulers on their part would pledge their loyalty and the loyalty of their people, to the new regime.

In an ironic twist, even the frequent government intervention in chieftaincy affairs reflects the importance which various state governments attach to the institution. Intervention in chieftaincy affairs takes place through demotion, deposition, and/or banishment of some traditional rulers. Emir Sanusi of Kano, Olateru Olagbegi, the Olowo of Owo and Ibrahim Dasuki, Sultan of Sokoto, are among prominent traditional rulers who have been deposed by various state governments and were also banished from their kingdoms. During the turbulent era of party politics in the Second Republic, many state governors sought wider powers over chieftaincy matters. The Ogun State House of Assembly passed a bill giving the state governor such powers. There were several clashes between state governors and traditional rulers. As Afriscope magazine pointed out: “within the first two years [of the Second Republic], almost every state has witnessed conflicts of one form or another between its government functionaries and its traditional rulers, leaving a trail of heightened tension in as many as eleven states.”^¹⁸ Governor Jim Nwobodo of Anambra State expressed his displeasure with the Obi of Onitsha, Ofala Okagbue, by dropping him as the state’s representative to the National Council of State. Governor Sam Mbakwe of Imo State ordered that the title, ‘His Royal Highness,’ should be dropped from the names of traditional rulers in Imo. In Kano, Governor Abubakar Rimi issued a query to the Emir of Kano, Ado Bayero, alleging that the Emir had engaged in acts of disrespect to the governorship. The governor’s query to the Emir precipitated violent mob demonstrations which led to the death of the governor’s political adviser, Bala Mohammed. Several government buildings in Kano and the homes of some politicians were also burnt during the fracas.

State governments frequently create new ‘traditional’ thrones. This reflects their continuing interests in the traditional political institutions. The Benue State government, for instance, created several new second-class chiefs in the state in 1997. Although created in the name of customs and traditions, these are brand new institutions that have no precedent in the political experience of the people of Benue State. Interestingly, part of the justification for traditional rulership is that it is a mode of governance indigenously created by Africans long before the continent was colonized by Europeans. As the action of the Benue State in creating new second-class chiefs has shown however, some of these traditional rulership institutions have no connection with the pre-colonial political realities of Africa. Thus, in this context, tradition is merely invoked in response to modern political exigencies. At the federal level, a new institution called the National Council of Traditional Rulers was created. Comprising 74 graded rulers from all the thirty-six states and the Abuja Capital Territory, it was created to “serve as a consultative assembly through which the federal government would feel the pulse of the grassroot communities.”^¹⁹ Government’s interests in the institution can also be deduced from the fact that most state governors have special advisers for chieftaincy affairs.

Traditional Rulers: Fluctuations in Political Fortunes

Even though indigenous political institutions and their traditional leaders, as demonstrated above, have shown a remarkable degree of resiliency, their political fortunes have fluctuated over the years. Constitutional developments in Nigeria over the past sixty years have been key barometers of the ebbs and flows of the powers of traditional rulers. In the pre-colonial era, traditional rulers exercised effective powers in their domains. As Najeem Lawal has pointed out, traditional rulers then “were rulers in every sense of the word as they derived their executive, legislative and judicial functions from traditions long rooted, recognized and revered by the people of their respective areas of authority.”^²⁰ Many of the rulers combined temporal and spiritual powers. While the rulers combined legislative, judicial and executive powers, in reality, most communities established elaborate procedures to ensure that the rulers did not become autocratic or otherwise abuse their powers.^²¹ In his analysis of the restraints imposed on the powers of pre-colonial rulers, A. E. Davies notes that:

The imposition of British colonial rule on Nigeria fundamentally changed the nature of the indigenous governing system. First, with colonial rule, traditional rulers were no longer sovereign. Instead, they were now beholden to the new alien officials. In places where indigenous rulers were not deposed by the colonial rulers, their central role was transformed from serving their people to ensuring colonial exploitation. In many of such places, the traditional rulers were retained in office and through them, Britain ruled in the form of the so-called Indirect Rule system. Bolanle Awe notes that through this system, “British authority as represented by British officials, was superimposed on the traditional system and instruction filtered down to the people from them through the traditional institutions of government i.e. the traditional rulers and chiefs.”^²³Awe contends that the traditional ruler, who became “to all intents and purposes, the agent of colonial rule,” was the principal Nigerian figure in the colonial system of Indirect Rule. And as an organ of the colonial administrative structure, he had to,

Patrick Heinecke, too, notes that under colonial rule, traditional rulers became the instrument for enforcing British colonial policies including such policies as collection of taxes and levies and procurement of able-bodied men for forced labor services.^²⁵ He observes that traditional rulers could only remain in power during colonial rule if they “agreed to act as the docile agents of their new masters [the British imperialists].”^²⁶ In a serious indictment of traditional rulers of the emirate systems of Northern Nigeria, Heinecke argues that:

Some British colonial officials felt so enamored by the system of indirect rule that they even suggested that the emirates and Yoruba chieftainates be granted self-government.^²⁹

While colonialism indeed subordinated African rulers to the dictates of the colonial state, it fortified the rulers’ powers for dealing with their political opponents. For instance, prisons, courts and police institutions were all established for the local rulers. Some of them used their police to arrest their political opponents who were then tried in courts which were presided over by the traditional rulers. Many of such opponents ended up in jail on trumped up charges. In several instances, the repressive character of the colonial state was exemplified by the traditional rulers’ harsh treatment of their political opponents. In other words, it was partly through traditional rulers that the most obnoxious aspects of colonial repression were given expression. Indeed, part of the current opposition to traditional rulers stems from the deep resentment over the role of traditional rulers in helping to enforce repressive colonial policies.

Another notable change which colonialism wrought in the traditional political systems was the relegation of women to subsidiary roles. In pre-colonial times, women in several communities in what later became the nation of Nigeria, played prominent political roles. As A. C. J. Nweke has argued, women such as Queen Amina of Zazzau, Queen Owani of Ilesha, Princess Inikpi of Idah and Princess Moremi of Ife “played crucial and decisive roles in the politics of their societies...All these women exhibited valor and dynamism matched with solid achievements in their times.”^³⁰

Colonialism also removed or curtailed the people’s entrenched mechanisms for removing or disciplining errant rulers. Unlike the pre-colonial practice whereby rulers governed through customarily established rules and procedures, traditional rulers now ruled under letters of appointment spelling out their powers and functions as colonial underlings. So long as they carried out the wishes of their colonial overlords and did not threaten the process of colonial exploitation, they could retain their power. It should also be recalled that in places where British imperial officials could find no ready-made political institutions to ease the process of colonial exploitation, they created new ones. For instance, warrant chiefs through whom Britain could exercise political power were appointed in Eastern Nigeria. For the most part, Eastern Nigeria did not have the well-established system of administration over which the Indirect Rule mode of governance was anchored.

Formal constitutional roles were granted to traditional rulers in the North in the Richards Constitution of 1945. The House of Chiefs for the Northern Region which the Constitution created was composed of the all first class chiefs and no less than ten second class chiefs. It had the highest British official in the region---the Chief Commissioner-- as its president. It was a legislative assembly.^³¹ The Macpherson Constitution which was promulgated in 1951 extended the idea of a chiefs’ legislative assembly to the Western Region by creating a Western House of Chiefs. Composed of the Lieutenant-Governor as president, it had no more than 50 chiefs and three colonial officials as members. Thus, under the Macpherson Constitution, two out of the three regions in the country had legislative assemblies for chiefs. There were 37 second class chiefs and one adviser on Islamic law in the Northern House of Chiefs under this constitution. In addition, all the first class chiefs in the region were members. Three colonial officials and the region’s lieutenant-governor who served as the president of the House completed the roster of members.

Continuing the trend begun by the 1945 constitution, the 1963 Republican Constitution gave constitutional status to traditional rulers by retaining the Houses of Chiefs for the North and West and creating one for the Eastern Region. The Houses of Chiefs were the upper chambers in the bicameral legislative system of the three regions. When the Mid-Western Region was created from the Western Region in 1964, its own House of Chiefs was created.

While some traditional rulers such as Emir Sanusi of Kano who clashed with leaders of the regional governments were removed from power, the institution of traditional rulership itself was not threatened in the post-independence era. In addition to their legislative roles, some first-class chiefs were appointed into the cabinet positions in the regional governments as ministers without portfolio. But as Olufemi Vaughan has aptly observed:

Military Rule, Constitutionalism and Traditional Rulers

Military rule wrought several changes in the role and importance of traditional rulers. While their counsel was sought by the new military rulers, they lost their erstwhile formal political roles as enshrined under the 1963 constitution. Many traditional rulers were appointed by military administrators to boards of parastatals and other public institutions. Some rulers saw a substantial increase in their personal perquisites of office. However, several political changes implemented in the wake of military governance of the country had substantial adverse impact on the power and influence of traditional rulers. For instance, the federal and state government take-over of the local police, prisons and native courts in 1968 constituted a significant blow to the power and influence of many traditional rulers in the northern part of the country. Similarly, the Land Use Decree of 1978 reduced the power of traditional rulers over lands in urban areas. Secondly, the creation of new states and new local governments drastically reduced the geographical domain of many of the large emirates in the North.^³³ Thirdly, the introduction of local government reforms by the military further reduced the administrative and legislative roles of traditional rulers. Under the 1976 local government reforms, local administration was removed from traditional rulers and was placed instead in the newly created local government councils. From his analysis of the impact of the 1976 local government reforms on traditional rulers, Joseph Egwurube concludes that it:

Under the 1976 reforms, a new structure known as the Traditional or Emirate Council was created in each local government area. Among other functions, the Traditional/Emirate Council was charged with:

Despite the close association cultivated between military administrators and traditional rulers, the 1979 Constitution which was promulgated by the military, excluded traditional rulers from any formal legislative role. Instead, the Constitution made provisions for the establishment of a Council of Chiefs at the state level. Only limited advisory roles were provided for the Council of Chiefs. As the Constitution says: The Council shall have power to advise the governor on any matter relating to customary law or cultural affairs, inter-communal relations and chieftaincy matters. The Council shall also have power to advise the Governor whenever requested to do so on: (a) the maintenance of public order within the State or any part thereof; and (b) such other matters as the Governor may direct.

The 1979 Constitution also established a Council of State at the federal level. Among the membership of this body is “one person from each State who shall, as respects that State, be appointed by the Council of Chiefs of the State from among themselves.” With respect to the constitutional role of traditional rulers, there is no difference between the 1979 and the 1989 constitutions. The wording of the 1989 Constitution with respect to the Council of Chiefs is exactly the same as in the 1979 Constitution. It should be recalled that the Political Bureau which the Babangida regime set up in 1986 as part of the steps that led to the 1989 Constitution had emphatically recommended that no formal constitutional role be established for traditional rulers under that constitution. Among the reasons advanced by the Bureau for the exclusion of traditional rulers from constitutional role was the claim that:

The wording in the 1995 draft Constitution concerning chiefs is the same as in the two preceding constitutions. The 1995 draft Constitution added a new role for the Council of Chiefs to the effect that: The consent of the State Council of Chiefs shall be sought in matters of creating new chieftaincy or upgrading of any chief or making of any law which may improve the security of tenure or dignity of traditional institutions.^³⁷ The draft Constitution qualifies this new role by asserting that the role shall not be “construed as conferring any legislative, executive or judicial function on the Council.” The 1999 Constitution does not make any provision for traditional rulers to exercise any political power. Under the 1999 Constitution, traditional rulers are not even represented in the Council of State. Thus, with respect to traditional rulership, the 1999 Constitution is the most radical in completely eschewing chiefs from exercising any formal political power.

The Case Against Formal Constitutional Roles for Traditional Rulers

The political difficulties of traditional leadership in Nigeria have been compounded by implacable opposition of some Nigerians to the existence of the institution. As the Badejo and Ogunyemi quotation at the beginning of this paper shows, some Nigerians want the institution dismantled on the ground that it is a relic of a by-gone period. Opposition to the institution also reflects resentment in some parts of Nigeria, particularly in some parts of the emirates, that the institution reinforces Hausa/Fulani hegemony over minority ethnic groups. This feeling that the institution is nothing more than a device to perpetuate ‘alien’ Hausa/Fulani ‘imperialistic’ hegemony over non-Hausa/Fulanis is particularly strong in Southern Zaria, parts of Plateau and parts of Taraba states. It is this sentiment that Nagiari Vakude vividly captures in his write-up in The Punch over the decision of the Mambilla Traditional Council to rename the traditional ruler, Lamido. Vakude demands that “the Mambilla Traditional Council must be indigenized. The Council must be “Mambilla Traditional Council” and not Sarduana as there is no tribe or place by that name historically on the Mambilla Plateau. There can be no room for medieval feudalism in the twentieth century.”^³⁸ Part of the Zango-Kataf mayhem in 1992 in which over 1700 people were killed was the resentment that the ‘indigenous’ Katafs felt over being ruled by Fulani rulers who were hand-picked by the far-away Emir of Zaria. The belief that Islamic conquest during the religious jihad of the nineteenth century entrenched the emirate system under ‘alien’ Fulani/Hausa rule is quite strong in many of the ethnic minority communities in the northern states. It is this belief that fuels much of the opposition to Hausa/Fulani traditional leadership in these areas–and hence, general antagonism to the institution of traditional rulership.

Some Nigerians have advocated the abolition of traditional rulership altogether because of some traditional leaders’ role as “exploiters” during the colonial period. As Ejembi Unobe contends: “The alliance between the chiefs and the colonialists placed them (the chiefs) in a position of exploiters. This was particularly the case with regard to land relations. Now, under indigenous system, land was not alienable, it was communally owned. The colonial authority changed all that by introducing policies which made land a commodity to be owned by individuals.”^³⁹ It is argued that many traditional rulers continue to use their positions to amass wealth at the expense of ordinary people. Along this vein, Yohanna Madaki argues that:

Yet some critics of the institution charge that it should have no role in modern Nigeria because it is patently undemocratic. It is argued for instance, that the institution entrenches patriarchy since it provides no scope for women’s participation as rulers. It is also argued that the institution is undemocratic because succession to the throne is done through ascription rather than popular election, achievement or ability. Yet others contend that it should be abolished because it competes for attention, supremacy, loyalty, and patriotism with the Nigerian state. It is also charged that many traditional rulers aid and abet all sorts of crimes, engage in acts of corruption and serve as fronts for multinational corporations.

New Roles for Traditional Rulers?

William F. S. Miles has explored various ways in which the traditional rulership systems in Nigeria, Niger and Vanuatu can be more fruitfully incorporated into the modern administrative structures of the three countries.^⁴¹ Miles identified five specific roles. First, chiefs, Miles argues, can broker in-coming projects and deals for local economic development. Next, he contends that chiefs can boost the authority of state leaders by ennobling them on regular occasions with sundry traditional titles. Chiefs, he contends, can help to police the hinterland, overseeing “low-level” conflict resolution. The fourth role that Miles envisages for traditional rulers is as ombudsmen between their communities and the state bureaucracy. Finally, Miles suggests that traditional rulers can rouse community solidarity and provide administrative services in situations where central governments are ineffectual or even disintegrating. Victor Ayeni argues that the institutionalization of traditional rulership as ombudsman will allow traditional rulers to intercede between the “common man” and the labyrinth of modern bureaucracy. In addition, he contends that the role will be beneficial to the traditional rulership because it will insure the sanctity of the institution.^⁴²

Through written memoranda to the Political Bureau and other public agencies, traditional rulers themselves have identified the political roles that they want to play.^⁴³ Some of them have demanded that Nigeria should return to the bicameral legislative system of the First Republic in which traditional rulers had legislative functions in the regional houses of chiefs. Others have suggested full participation in the governance of the country. Yet, other chiefs request that the state councils of chiefs should be given more power. For instance, it has been suggested that the council in each state should be given the authority to determine land matters in the rural areas. According to the Political Bureau, some traditional rulers demand the total abrogation of the Land Use Decree. Finally, some traditional rulers have requested the restoration of the judicial powers that traditional rulers enjoyed in the past.

Issues in Constitutional Roles for Traditional Rulers

Several issues must be examined critically as we contemplate constitutional provisions for Nigeria’s traditional political institutions. First, we must raise and answer a number of questions in order to be clear about the value of the chieftaincy institution to Nigerian democracy. What values underpin the institution and how relevant are those values to Nigeria’s attempt to establish an enduring political system? Can values such as accountability, morality, public debates, popular participation, responsiveness to aspirations, possibility of alternation of ruling families, sanctions and the rotational system which underpinned many of the traditional political systems of the past still be recreated within the existing traditional systems? What is the secret of the political stability of the system and the longevity in office of some of the rulers?

Second, it is important to avoid the narrow and /or confusing definition of traditional rulership.^⁴⁴ Traditional rulership is often narrowly defined in terms of the traditional ruler only. In reality, the traditional ruler is merely at the apex of an entire panoply of a network of indigenous governing systems which include a council of elders, titled men/women, age-grade or other similar associations. It is the combination of these and other institutions that make up the totality of the indigenous political systems. In designing new roles in the constitution or elsewhere for traditional rulership, it is this broader conceptualization that must be borne in mind.

Third, whatever political engineering we decide to undertake, it is imperative to avoid designing a uniform system of traditional rulership for the country. Each community must be allowed to experiment as much as it wishes, provided the institutions and processes designed do not infringe upon fundamental human rights.

Fourth, traditional rulership can be meaningful only if we integrate it into popular participation at the local level. In this connection, there is no reason why village and township administrations cannot be structured on the basis of the indigenous governing system. Already, in most rural areas, those traditional structures function as the de facto governing structures. The only requirement would be to ensure that the structure permits participation as broadly as possible. Where the traditional structures do not provide scope and opportunities for women’s participation, they must be re-designed.

Fifth, any community that wishes to have its own traditional leadership must be permitted to do so. However, such communities must bear the costs of such systems themselves. Additionally, nobody should be compelled to provide tributes or labor services for the private interest of such established traditional ruler.

Six, it must be recognized that in most rural areas, this institution of governance is quite vibrant and commands greater legitimacy than the institutions of the so-called modern political systems. The institution constitutes an important political reality that cannot be ignored. It continues to be a major icon in the Nigerian political landscape. Its persistence must force us to rethink the glib assumption of Modernization theory that all indigenous African institutions will collapse in the face of ‘superior’ institutions imposed by colonial rule.

Seven, in deciding to incorporate the indigenous political system into the constitutional framework, it is important to ensure that when traditional practices conflict with constitutional guarantees of freedom, it is the traditional practice that must give way to constitutional freedom—failure which will jeopardize the stability of democracy.

Finally, democratization in Nigeria must take into account, Nigerian traditions, social and cultural values and indigenous institutions in a manner that anticipates complementarity of both systems. Traditional political institutions can serve as a focus for local autonomy. Whatever institutional arrangements we make must be relevant to the present to avoid fetishism of tradition. The key challenge is not to glorify tradition for the sake of tradition but to use these institutions to extend popular political participation to the local level. In addition, such institutions must be able to deal with the tasks of governance.

Learning From the Experience of Other Countries

The experience of other states in dealing with these institutions may be instructive for Nigeria. It should be noted that the constitutional experience with respect to the monarchy of fairly homogenous societies such as Japan may not be directly relevant to Nigeria given Nigeria’s cultural diversity and the wide array of chieftaincy institutions in Nigeria. The Independence Constitution of Botswana in 1966 created a House of Chiefs. It serves as a consultative body in respect of “tribal matters.” In Japan, the emperor performs ceremonial functions. The Japanese Constitution designates the emperor as the “symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.” Succession to the throne is dynastic on the basis of Imperial House Law passed by the parliament. The powers of the emperor are greatly circumscribed by the constitution. For instance the constitution says that the “advice and consent of the Cabinet shall be required for all acts of the Emperor in matters of state, and the Cabinet shall be responsible thereof.” It also states emphatically that “He shall not have powers related to government.” Specific powers granted to the emperor include appointing the prime minister and the chief judge as designated by the parliament and the Cabinet respectively; convocating the parliament; dissolving the House of Representatives; proclaiming general election; attestation of the appointment, dismissal of ministers of state and other officials; attestation of general and special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve and restoration of rights. Others include awarding of honors; attestation of instruments of ratification and other diplomatic documents and receiving of foreign ambassadors and ministers. To guard against misuse of the emperorship, the constitution specifies that “no property can be given to, or received by, the Imperial House, nor can any gifts be made therefrom, without the authority of the Diet.”

Malaysia’s Constitution provides specific roles for the country’s traditional rulers. Under the Constitution, there is a Conference of Rulers (Majlis Raja-Raja). The Conference is composed of all royal highnesses, the rulers of Yang di-Pertuan-Yang di-Pertuan Negeri of states not having a ruler. The functions of the conference include

The Conference may also deliberate questions of national policy (for example changes in immigration policy) and any other matter that it thinks fit.^⁴⁵

Ghana’s Constitution emphatically states that the “institution of chieftaincy, together with its traditional councils as established by customary law and usage, is hereby guaranteed.”^⁴⁶ It defines a chiefs as a “person, who, hailing from the appropriate family or lineage, has been validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned or installed as a chief or queenmother in accordance with the relevant customary law and usage.”^⁴⁷ The Constitution mandates the establishment of a house of chiefs in each region and it sets up a National House of Chiefs. Each regional house of chiefs elects five “paramount chiefs” to represent the region in the National House of Chiefs.

In addition to the functions enumerated above, the Constitution also confers appellate jurisdiction in “any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy which has been determined by the Regional House of Chiefs in a region” on the National House of Chiefs. A Judicial Committee of the National House of Chiefs composed of five members can also exercise original jurisdiction on matters affecting chieftaincy “which cannot otherwise be dealt with by a Regional House of Chiefs,” or which is not “properly within the jurisdiction of a Regional House of Chiefs,” or which “lies within the competence of two or more Regional Houses of Chiefs.”^⁴⁹

Each Regional House of Chiefs under the Ghana Constitution has authority to “hear and determine appeals from the traditional councils within the region in respect of the nomination, election, selection, installation or deposition of a person as a chief.” It also has power to “undertake the compilation of the customary laws and lines of succession applicable to each stool or skin in the region.” The resolution of chieftaincy disputes as well as original jurisdiction in “all matters relating to a paramount stool or skin or the occupant of a paramount stool or skin, including a queenmother to a paramount stool or skin,” are also powers granted by the Constitution to each regional House of Chiefs.^⁵⁰ The regional houses of chiefs can also perform other functions conferred on them by acts of Parliament.

In an apparent attempt to insulate chiefs from partisan politics, the Ghanaian constitution expressly prohibits them from taking part in “active party politics.” It requires any chief who wishes to engage in active party politics or who wishes to contest election to Parliament to “abdicate his stool or skin.”

Malawi’s Constitution also provides specific roles for Malawi’s traditional rulers.^⁵¹ It mandates the election of twenty-four chiefs to its eighty-member national senate. Each of the twenty-four chiefs is “elected by a caucus of all the chiefs of the District in secret ballot within thirty days of each local government-election.”^⁵² Among other things, the Senate receives, scrutinizes and amends bills passed by the National Assembly. It can pass motions to confirm or reject bills passed by the National Assembly and it has authority to deliberate on any matter.

As in Nigeria, Ugandan traditional rulers have experienced wide fluctuations in their political power. The status of the four kingdoms of Uganda was constitutionally established under the 1962 Constitution. However, five years later, the soured relationship between President Milton Obote and the Kabaka of Buganda led to the constitutional abolition of the four kingdoms. Uganda’s new (1995) Constitution restores constitutional status to traditional rulership.^⁵³ As the Constitution explicitly states: “the institution of traditional leader or cultural leader may exist in any area of Uganda in accordance with the culture, customs and traditions or wishes and aspirations of the people to whom it applies.”^⁵⁴ It provides an explicit definition of persons who can be designated traditional or cultural leaders. Thus, a traditional or cultural leader “means a king or similar traditional leader or cultural leader by whatever name called, who derives allegiance from the fact of birth or descent in accordance with the customs, traditions, usage or consent of the people led by that traditional or cultural leader.”^⁵⁵

The Ugandan Constitution empowers the national parliament to prescribe methods for resolving outstanding chieftaincy disputes. It also permits the traditional or cultural leader to enjoy “privileges and benefits as conferred by Government or local government or as that leader may be entitled to under culture, custom and tradition.”^⁵⁶ No person, according to the Constitution, “shall be compelled to pay allegiance or contribute to the cost of maintaining a traditional leader or cultural leader.”^⁵⁷ Traditional and cultural leaders are expressly prohibited by the Constitution from participating in politics and they cannot exercise “any administrative, legislative or executive powers of Government or local government.”^⁵⁸

To ensure that traditional customary practices do not impinge on fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Ugandan Constitution, the Constitution reiterates that “any custom, practice, usage or tradition relating to any traditional leader or cultural leader which detracts from the rights of any person as guaranteed by this Constitution, shall be taken to be prohibited under that article.” ^⁵⁹

As in Uganda, the 1985 Zimbabwean Constitution provides constitutional status for Zimbabwe’s traditional rulers. In the words of the Constitution, “there shall be Chiefs to preside over tribespeople of Zimbabwe.”^⁶⁰ It empowers the president to appoint chiefs in “accordance with an Act of Parliament.” However, the Constitution notes that “an Act of Parliament shall provide that in appointing a Chief the President shall give due consideration to the customary principles of succession of the tribespeople over which the Chief will preside . . .”^⁶¹

A Council of Chiefs composed of elected chiefs from “each of the various areas of Communal Land,” was also created under the 1985 Zimbabwean Constitution. Under the Constitution, it is the Parliament that prescribes qualifications and disqualifications of candidates for election to the Council of Chiefs. The tenure of office as members of the Council of Chiefs is also determined by Parliament.

In South Africa, despite the fact many chiefs cooperated with the racist government during the era of apartheid, the new constitution provides constitutional safeguards for traditional rulers. Tshidiso Maloka has argued that “multi-party negotiations resulted in chieftaincy being recognized and protected; and there are also constitutional provisions for the establishment of Houses of Traditional Leaders at the provincial level, and a 20-member Council of Chiefs at the national level.”^⁶² Under Article 183 of the 1993 Constitution, a provincial house of traditional leaders “shall be entitled to advise and make proposals to the provincial legislature or government in respect of matters relating to traditional authorities, indigenous law or the traditions and customs of traditional communities within the province.”^⁶³ The Constitution also specifies that any provincial bill pertaining to traditional authorities, indigenous law or such traditions and customs shall be referred to the provincial house of traditional leaders before the bill is passed by the provincial legislature.

Several of the provinces in South Africa have, in accordance with the constitutional provisions, set up their houses of traditional leaders. Maloka notes that:

At the national level, the Constitution, under Article 184, provides for a Council of Traditional Leaders. Made up of a chairman and “19 representatives elected by traditional authorities in the Republic,” the Council advises the government on indigenous law, traditions and customs and other issues that affect chieftainship. In addition, the Council may at the request of the president of the South Africa, “advise him or her on any matter of national interest.”

An interesting feature in the South African Constitution is the fact that Article 182 makes a “traditional leader of a community observing a system of indigenous law residing on land within the area of jurisdiction of an elected government an ex-officio member of the local government. Such a traditional leader is also “eligible to be elected to any office of such local government.” Consequently, to the extent that Nigeria desires to retain the institutions of traditional leadership and cultures within the framework of constitutional democracy, she must ensure that both systems complement each other to avoid trampling on the freedoms and values of democratic practice that is at the root of existing democratic transitions.

Notes and References

1 Babafemi A. Badejo and S. A. Ogunyemi, “Integrating the Past With the Present: A Futile Exercise?” in John A. A. Ayoade and Adigun A. B. Agbaje (eds.), African Traditional Political Thought and Institutions (Lagos: Center for Black and African Arts and Civilization, 1989), p. 183.

2 Iyortange Igoil, “The Evolution of Political Institutions Among the Tiv of Nigeria and the Question of Relevance,” in Ayoade and Agbaje (eds.), African Traditional Political Thought and Institutions, ibid, p. 173.

3 See Text of an Address by General Sani Abacha, Head of State, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, on the Inauguration of the National Constitutional Conference, Abuja, June 27^th, 1994.

7 Rioting over the chieftaincy tussle was caused by the apparent manipulation of the selection process by officials of the Kwara State government. On September 1993, Joshua Alao, one of the main contestants was publicly announced as the new Oluo. The following day, Mallam Isa Akano, another contestant was appointed the Oluo. See African Concord International, November 8, 1993, pp.18-19.

10 Traditional rulers nominated by the federal government as members of the Conference included Y. M. Danyaya (Emir of Ningi), A. Ajene Okpabi (Otse’Idoma), O. Egwunwoke (Eze-Oha of Ihiteoha Uratta), S.Y. Abarshi (Emir of Yauri), A. Tejuoso (Osile of Oke-Ona) and S. Woluchem (Eze Apara of Rebisi)

11 Najeem Ade Lawal, “The Position of Chiefs,” in Yusufu Bala Usman (ed.), Nigeria Since Independence: The First 25 Years: Volume 1: The Society (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1989), p. 83.

16 Peter P. Ekeh, “The Scope of Culture in Nigeria,” in Peter P. Ekeh and Garba Ashiwaju (eds.), Nigeria Since Independence: The First 25 Years: Volume VII Culture (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1989), p. 15.

21 For scholarly analyses of the role of pre-colonial indigenous rulers, see Michael Crowther and Obaro Ikime (eds.), West African Chiefs: Their Changing Status Under Colonial Rule and Independence (Ile-Ife, University of Ife Press, 1970).

23 Bolanle Awe, “Nation-Building and Cultural Identity: The Colonial Experience,” in Peter P. Ekeh and Garba Ashiwaju (eds.), Nigeria Since Independence: The First 25 Years, Volume VII, Culture (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1989), p. 19.

30 A. C. J. Nweke, “Female Participation in Politics: The Case of the 1990 Local Government Council Elections in the Northern Zone,” Nigerian Journal of Elections and Political Behavior, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1992.

33 It should, however, be noted that the creation of states and local governments enhanced the power and stature of some traditional rulers. For instance, some second class chiefs were automatically promoted to first class chiefs in new states that found themselves without any first class chiefs.

34 J. O. Egwurube, “Traditional Rulers and Modern Local Government in Nigeria-Where the Problem Lies,” Paper presented at the International Conference on Local Government in West Africa, Ile-Ife, University of Ife, February 1982.

35 For a full analysis of the 1976 reforms, see Najeem Ade Lawal, “The Position of Chiefs,” op. cit. Also see Pius C. Akpan, Modern Local Administration in Nigeria (Kaduna: Baraka Press, 1984).

41 William F. S. Miles, “Traditional Rulers and Development Administration: Chieftaincy in Niger, Nigeria, and Vanuatu,” Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 28, No.3, Fall, 1993, pp. 31-50.

42 Victor Ayeni, “Traditional Rulers as Ombudsmen: In Search of a Role for Natural Rulers in Contemporary Nigeria,” Indian Journal of Public Administration, vol. xxx1, No. 4, October-December 1985, pp. 1319-1330.

44 For example, The National Conference of Traditional Rulers defines a traditional ruler as: “the person who by virtue of his ancestry occupies the throne or stool of an area and who has been appointed to it in accordance with the customs and traditions of the area and whose throne has been in existence before the advent of the British in Nigeria. The area over which he and his forebears have ruled or reigned must have at least a Native Authority created for it in 1910 or the date of the introduction of the Native Authority to the area concerned provided that in the case of the former Eastern Region of Nigeria, traditional stools established according to the customs and traditions of the people and recognized by the Governments in those areas and occupied at the date of this resolution will not by virtue of this definitions be disqualified, provided also that in respect of other parts of the Federation of Nigeria, traditional stools similarly established prior to the 1st of October 1979, will not by virtue of this definition be disqualified.”

62 Tshidiso Maloka, “Populism and the Politics of Chieftaincy and Nation-Building in the New South Africa,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies, vol. 14, No. 2, July 1996.

Pita Ogaba Agbese. “Chiefs, Constitutions, and Policies in Nigeria,” West Africa Review: Issue 6, 2004.