WEST AFRICA REVIEW
ISSN: 1525-4488
Issue 7 (2005)
WEST AFRICA REVIEW ISSN: 1525-4488 Issue 7 (2005) |
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THE MORAL ECONOMY AND PROSPECTS OF ACCUMMULATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: HOW THE IFIs CAN HELP |
The question has been asked severally: Can Africa’s
moral economy, that is, Africa’s present economic situation,
support large scale capital accumulation that can create wealth and
economic prosperity? The answer to this question has never been
simple, nor direct, nor without ambiguity. In the past, the
established position is that African development within its own
cultural and historical antecedents is a mission impossible. Africa
can develop so far as it is willing to adopt “modernization”
which is inherently self - alienating. But the new thesis advanced by
Mkandawire and Soludo (1999) challenges this pessimism and argues
that market capitalism is possible in Africa despite its moral
economy. This paper exposes this debate to new light by taking an
insightful look at the present realities of the moral economy in
Africa, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. This offers the
basis for re-considering the prospects of capitalist accumulation
within the moral economy. Given the interest the moral economy is
recently generating, we deem it necessary to question whether it is
possible for this economy to support capital accumulation, which of
course, is the sine qua non for economic development or is the moral
economy just the refuge of the poor? In the light of these, we will
attempt to reconsider the role of International Financial
Institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, in providing assistance
to this economy to overcome the obstacles to development.
Key words: Moral economy, Africa, Capitalist accumulation, Development,
Institutions, Role of IFIs
One of the primary lessons to be learned from the last century of research in sociology and cultural anthropology is that in the beginning, every economy was a moral economy (Heath, 1999). This is the simple economic system of an indigenous, traditional or pre-industrial society. In the West, the Industrial Revolution catalyzed the process of modernization that transformed the original moral economy into first, a peasant economy, and gradually into the present capitalist economic system. In Africa, this process of social transformation started with the earlier mercantilist capitalism of the 15th century and culminated in later colonial imperialism (Adi, 1997).
Colonialism, with its modernizing ideology, introduced the capitalist economic system into the “pre-capitalist”, moral economic system of most traditional societies in Latin America, Asia and Africa (Onimode, 1988; Ake, 1981, 1996). In places like Africa, the aim was to substitute indigenous institutions with the “modern”, foreign institutions that were deemed to be compatible with capitalism seen from the perspective of the West. Unlike in other regions of the world, in Africa, these new institutions were set up as parallel organs and attempts were not made to graft them on the existing indigenous sociopolitical and economic structures, instead, the latter were allowed to hold their own, the hope being that they would eventually lose out to the more efficient modern institutions and die a natural death. This is the genesis of the dichotomy that has become a perennial paralysis that undermines the quest for peace and development in Africa. Ekeh (1975) and Ake (1981) make a point on the dualistic and asymmetrical nature of post-colonial societies. This dualism is orchestrated in the social and political sphere by what Ekeh (1975) elaborates in his theory of the “two publics”. In the economic sphere, this distortion is manifested in the existence of two separate economic spheres that are variously paired as: modern and traditional; official (documented) and unofficial(undocumented); legal and illegal; real and hidden (or second); formal and informal; etc. This state of affairs is seen as the logical consequence of the skewed nature of modernization in post colonial societies, especially in Africa.
Contrary to the expectation that the traditional institutions with its “moral economy” would be strangulated by the foreign institutions adjudged “superior”, the moral economy has instead become the main sustainer of livelihoods in many parts of Africa. In a typical African country like Nigeria, the informal sector is more than 70% of the entire economy. Especially in the rural areas, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of the moral economy in people’s everyday lives. The resurgence of interest in the moral economy points to its increasing relevance in the livelihood of people. Today, the volume of the moral economy has escalated to the point whereby it can compete, compliment, or undermine the formal economy in its role as the informal economy (Wuyts, 1998; De Soto, 2001).
The goal of this paper is to take a critical look at the defining characteristics of the moral economy in Africa, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. This will enable us consider the prospects of accumulation within the moral economy. Given the interest the moral economy is recently attracting, we deem it necessary to question whether it is possible for this economy to support capital accumulation, which of course, is the sine qua non for economic development or is the moral economy just providing merely a survival basis for livelihood in a situation of last resort? In the light of these, we will attempt to consider the role of International Financial Institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, in providing assistance to this economy to overcome the obstacles to development. The rest of the paper is divided into three sections. The next section tackles the concept of the moral economy and attempts to outline the peculiar traits of this economy in the case of Africa. Section three of the paper considers the prospects of accumulation in the moral economy of Africa. The last section, followed by the conclusion examines the role of International Financial Institutions.
Although the moral economy is the original state of all economies prior to modernization, it was Adam Smith and the Scottish social philosophers that first provided the conceptual sketch. Contrary to the strictly utilitarian view of economics usually ascribed to him, the vision he had of the market was one based on the mechanism of sympathy - where friendship and mutuality constituted the basis of civil markets. In this moral economy, the raw selfishness and individualism of capitalism were to be tempered by mutual regard, competition and a moral order. Against the neoclassical interpretation of laissez-faire, Adam Smith did not envisage the methodological individualism of the rational choice theory as much of contemporary economic thinking would have us believe (Smith, 1976). Scott (1976) sees it as one in which a subsistence ethos guarantees at least minimal provisioning to all households. This community sharing re-echoes Smith’s view that both the coercive State and the Hobbesian theory of “raw nature” would be transcended as people began to live as interdependent individuals. In this setting, people put themselves “in the situation of the other,” and are aware of that other’s distress and suffering (Smith, 1976).
Under the moral economy of a simple pre-industrial society, most economic activities are organized through direct normative integration. Role allocation in productive and other activities is done according to age and sex. Distribution can also be handled by directly specifying who is entitled to what portion of the cooperative surplus. As a result, the economy does not form a separable component of the social structure. Everyone lives under a set of rules that specify, with varying degrees of detail, who you can marry, how to prepare your food, and how you greet your elders, but also, what hunting party you are assigned to, which plot of land you are supposed to farm, how much grain you are entitled to receive, and so on. These rules allow people to avoid a wide range of collective action problems, and so escape from the “nasty, poor, brutish and short” lives that the unconstrained pursuit of self-interest would guarantee them. At this juncture, we may well ask: Is today’s Africa’s economy truly moral in the sense captured above?
The “moral” economy is often contrasted against the “rational” economy in a way that would suggest that the major distinguishing feature between the two is the former’s lack of compliance with the basic axioms of rationality - completeness, reflexivity, and transitivity. A rational economy on the other hand, is one in which these axioms of rationality are said to characterize individual choices and preferences. This somehow implies that in a moral economy, it might well be that individual preferences are “intransitive” or circular.
The distinction between “moral” and “rational” economy as above is helpful only for the sake of economic theory and analysis. But in practice, things may well be different. Studies of risk coping strategies have shown that in some cases, certain moral aspects of traditional societies - not only African - such as the preponderance of solidarity networks etc., are actually rational strategies by which individuals and groups strive to cope or ameliorate both covariate and idiosyncratic risks. Game theory has also been used to explain some aspects of moral behaviors of individuals in societies where rule enforcement could be costly due to poor institutionalization.
In the case of Africa, the moral economy is the realm of traditional or indigenous institutions which often coincides with the so-called “informal” sector. Modernization theorists contend that the moral economy represents a passing phase in the evolution of market capitalism. It is a major distinguishing feature of pre-industrial societies characterized by simple production relations, communal ownership of means of production and forms of social collectivism. In today’s Africa, the moral economy is particularly identifiable with the rural peasantry which shares the following characteristics according to Shanin (1976):
In addition to these, interdependent living, which seriously curtails individual privacy, is another feature of the moral economy in Africa. Individual members of the community know each other on very personal basis and usually rally in solidarity to each other as the need arises. The sense of communalism guaranteed by the close kinship ties ensures that not only are individuals facing hard economic times are attended to by the larger community, but also are given protection when faced with external threats. This explains why it is sometimes difficult for the state to apprehend offenders that are given protection by their community.
The moral economy in Africa is composed of a complex web of interdependent relationships of solidarity and mutuality that most often shape economic decisions. Most times, the sense of group loyalty and solidarity overrides the need to conform to rational economic principles. Economic exchanges are often, not underwritten in monetary terms and transactions are not always motivated by profit. Payments for certain goods and services are made, not in cash but in kind - a situation that creates enormous problems for quantitative analysis. Political economists usually refer to the combination of these features as the lack of complete monetization of the economy. This is why this economy is also negatively characterized as patrimonialism (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994), prebendalism (Joseph, 1987), economy of affection (Hyden, 1980), politics of the belly (Bayart, 1993), and the instrumentalization of informal politics (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). These practices are articulated in the theory of indigeneity which attributes the dynamism of the moral economy to the resilience of indigenous African norms of social organization, namely the norms of (organic) group solidarity and mutual self-help which are expressed in the practices of sharing and community as opposed to individual welfare. Although these norms are often presented as “naturally” African, historical evidence suggests that they evolved and became significant following the failure of pristine states to protect the interests of ordinary people in the pre-colonial era and to defend them in times of adversity.
A major drawback of the moral economy in Africa is its incomplete institutionalization or the inability of its institutions to enforce societal norms. This failure has led to the reliance on very personalistic, idiosyncratic and nontransparent methods of arbitration and justice which often create room for the proliferation of occult systems of justice and vengeance that draw from nefarious traditional fetish practices (such as juju). Probably because of its occult nature, the impact of this practice on the moral economy has not received sufficient treatment in current literature and research. To illustrate, in West Africa especially, belief in occult practices play a great role in people’s everyday lives. This may sound a little awkward, but it is something that strikes at the core of the moral economy. The belief in the ability of occult or spiritual forces to influence events in real life is so pervasive that for many, every decision be it economic or political, must be first conferred with the “spirits”. Ordinary life circumstances such as hard luck, failure, inability to succeed in life venture, success and even death are sometimes attributed to the evil machinations of one’s adversaries. This has engendered a society that is fraught with rancor, malice, acrimony, and all sorts of occult-inspired deaths and unexplainable diseases that defy modern medicine. Successful young people often find it very difficult to even visit the countryside for fear of being killed, maimed or “jinxed” by evil minded people. As a matter of fact, occult practices that make or mar individual efforts are rife in West Africa to the extent that one cannot underestimate its impact in the development of the society. Many successful young persons have been known to have been eliminated in their prime by some others who do not take kindly to their success through these occult channels. This partly accounts for the proliferation of all sorts and manners of religion as individuals seek to guard against these malicious forces.
Much has been written on the dichotomy that afflicts post-colonial African socio-political and economic structure (Ekeh, 1975; Ake, 1985; Azarya, 1988; Davidson, 1992; Ihonvbere, 1984). Most people interested in the study of African society are aware that it is very difficult to proceed without a first stop at the legacy of European colonization. Many indict colonialism as the source of the present constellation of social, political and economic forces at work in contemporary Africa. The neo-Marxist Dependency theorists (Frank, 1967; Rodney, 1972; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Ake, 1981) were the first to attempt to link the distortion of the African state to colonialism. Ekeh (1975) developed the hypothesis into the popular “two publics” theory. It posits that post colonial society in Africa is essentially characterized by dualism: the formal and the informal, the modern and the traditional, the rational and the moral, the urban and the rural, the state and the ethnic nation, etc. The conflict between these often opposing forces is the bane of African society and economy. The set of categories captured in formal, modern, rational, and state institutions are colonial importations; whereas the informal, traditional, moral, rural and ethnic-nation categories refer more or less to indigenous African institutions. Because colonialism ushered in the set of institutions that contradicted the historically established patterns of livelihood, many analysts hold it culpable for the dilemma of the post colonial state in Africa.
Africa was not the only part of the world that fell to colonial powers. In fact, Latin America and every country in Asia was either de facto (e.g. China) or de jure a colony except Japan and Thailand, and of course even Japan was occupied by the United States and its constitution and governing structures redone by the Americans. But these countries have made a success of their colonial history and today compete favorably with their past colonizers. Notable examples are South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. The former two were colonies of Japan and the latter two were those of the United Kingdom. The question that has been asked severally is why these countries have succeeded where Africa has recorded a monumental failure, still ill-at-ease with its colonial legacy? In what ways has the colonial legacy been uniquely pernicious in the African case? The response is certainly that though Asia was colonized, the colonial powers to a greater or lesser degree preserved something of the indigenous power structures and tried to integrate indigenous institutions. Postcolonial government in these countries also worked hard to reconcile the modern colonial institutions and the traditional, indigenous ones. And the boundaries they left behind them do not seem to have done the violence to the pre-existing ethnic and political map that the boundary drawing in Africa has (Murphy, 2002).
In the African case too, indigenous institutions were completely expurgated: the formal, modern bureaucratic institution brought in by colonialism was disconnected from the indigenous from the start. Postcolonial governments in Africa, unlike their Asian counterparts, continued to encourage and sustain this bifurcation leading to the present preponderance of the underdeveloped, moral economy. The view propagated by colonialism and later, subscribed to, by both African governments and the Bretton Woods institutions, is that the indigenous institutions which undergird the moral economy in Africa are not compatible with the capitalist system and therefore, require to be supplanted by new institutions. This alienation of the indigenous institutional structure meant that the state itself achieved but a measured success in its objective of building new institutions and this in turn, further alienated society and strengthened the moral economy.
The major question we are trying to answer in this paper is whether it is possible for the moral economy in Africa to generate economic development. In order to answer this question we will first look at the opposing views with regard to the prospects of development under the moral economy of Africa. Later we will try to consider, based on empirical evidence from current reality, whether the moral economy can spearhead economic development. Based on the moral basis of indigenous African economies, many writers have been quick to dismiss its potential for economic development. Hayden is perhaps, one of the major proponents of this point of view. According to him, “. . . the economy of affection is an underestimated threat to the macro-economic ambitions of either capitalism or socialism in Africa. Derived from a mode of production in which the structural interdependence of the various production units is minimal or nil it has no provision from a systemic superstructure to keep it together. Instead, the economy of affection is a myriad of invisible microeconomic networks which, if allowed to penetrate society, gradually wear down the macro-economic structures, and eventually the whole system. The threat of the affective networks stems from their invisibility and intractability” (Hyden, 1983). Hayden’s view articulates the mainstream thinking which holds that informal organizations and institutions can support commerce and trade, but they cannot support large-scale industrial capital. In order for the economy to prosper, it is argued that the traditional institutions must be reformed and adapted to suit the process of capitalist accumulation. Hernando de Soto, in his Mystery of Capital, also holds the preponderance of informal networks of institutions without formalized system of property rights responsible for the poverty and misery of the developing world.
On the other hand, Mkandawire and Soludo (1999) have the faith that the moral economy of Africa as it were, is capable of generating the surplus that can lead to capital deepening necessary for large scale economic development. Whether or not the moral or informal economy is capable of generating economic development, the fact of the matter is that it is the mainstay of the livelihoods of most households, both rural and urban. The issue at stake now is whether the increased reliance of households on multiple and mutually reinforcing income generating sources, drawing from both formal and informal (moral) economy, is no more than a defense mechanism to alleviate poverty in a context of secular decline or whether it is a manifestation of a different growth momentum, with or without much potential for sustained development? To answer the above question we need to consider the arguments advanced to explain the growth and dynamism of the moral economy. On the one hand, there is the argument that holds that the key mechanism which explains the dynamics of the moral economy is its dependence on the domestic formal economy as the only exogenous source of demand for the goods and services it produces. In other words, the moral economy produces necessities (basic consumer goods) in response to demand originating from formal sector employment (expenditures out of wages, especially by low-income earners) and to its own demand which itself depends on income from the moral economy.
The implication of this view is that fluctuations in the official economy, particularly those affecting employment and real wages, will be directly transmitted to the moral economy through fluctuations in demand for its goods and services. In other words, the ups and downs in the second economy will mirror those in the formal economy and, hence, it cannot really compensate for crisis or decline in the formal economy (Jamal and Weeks, 1993).
On the other hand, there is the perspective that the moral economy actually runs parallel to the official (formal) economy. It is not constrained by the demand emanating from the latter, but instead has a dynamism of its own as a self-contained system propelled by its own exports (as the autonomous component of expenditure), producing for own consumption, and relying on its own imports. Hence, it is depicted as existing side by side but not interdependent with the official economy (Sarris and van den Brink, 1993). Rather than seem contradictory, these two perspectives on the dynamism of the moral economy actually reflect different sides of a more complex reality which came to be referred to as the second (or hidden) economy which all describe the persistent, pristine moral economy. Common to both is that these activities tend to fall outside the range of official statistics, and hence are at best only partially recorded in national income accounting. Broadly speaking, the second economy refers to “economic activities that are unregistered and exist outside state regulations” (Engberg-Pedersen et al., 1996). On the one hand, there is the informal sector proper which consists of a multitude of “small-scale producers and their employees, together with self-employed working in the production of goods, plus those engaged in commerce, transport and the provision of services” (Thomas, 1992). In the Nigerian context, these activities include small-scale off-farm production, commerce, transport and services, apart form urban small-scale activities. On the other hand, there are what Thomas (1992:4) refers to as “irregular” activities which all involve some illegality, such as tax evasion or the avoidance of regulations (for example, minimum wage and employment legislation).
In spite of the fact that the moral economy supports the livelihood of most households in Africa, evidence shows that the economy is not robust enough to generate wide-spread accumulation. According to our findings from a 2002 survey, the moral economy is characterized by very small producers, barely surviving on the edges, and in extreme circumstances are unable to meet even the basic necessities of life. It was also discovered that wealth is concentrated at the hands of few individuals giving rise to a Gini coefficient of 9, similar to what has been discovered in many other rural communities in Latin America and Africa (Adi, 2003). In many cases, it was found that households’ economic activities are driven by constraints imposed by limited economic possibilities which obviously negate prospects of accumulation.
This section is more about considering new and innovative ways in which the World Bank, IMF and other IFIs can begin to reconceptualize African economic problems if any headway is to be made in setting the foundation for economic development rather than an evaluation of the actions of these institutions till date. The fact that the role of these institutions in economic policy prescription to African countries has been marred by failure is a long over-flogged issue, we only need to make a short work of it here.
Previously, the World Bank and other international development organizations, operating on the neoclassical economic framework of the Washington Consensus had written off indigenous institutions. In fact, due to the prevalence of these institutions in Africa and the attendant distortion on the economic structure, the possibility of an African developmental state was denied (Mkandawire, 1998). It is only recently that these development organizations are beginning to realize that institutions do indeed, matter for development. But in realizing that, efforts towards assisting African countries in growing their institutions or in understanding the interface between traditional institutions and the market, lag behind the rhetoric. These organizations seem not to fully appreciate the disjunctive nature of the state in Africa. As Chinua Achebe rightly pointed out, the state lacks “vital inner links.” Development instigated by these institutions at the level of the state, in most cases, achieve a relatively measured success in trickling down to the wider society because of this disconnect between state and society. It makes but little sense to continue to prescribe macroeconomic policies for many African states when it increasingly becomes obvious that the legitimacy of these states are contested and that they are not grounded in indigenous institutions resulting in what Dia (1996) refers to as the “African institutional crises.”
In the new era of new institutionalism and social capital, understanding traditional institutions and the dynamics of their transition to the market have become the center of development research and policy. The 2002 World Development Report, “Building Institutions for the Market” makes the case that income growth and poverty reduction have been achieved only by countries with efficient and inclusive markets. Attaining these goals, according to this report, is by developing “market-enhancing institutions, which perform three essential functions: reduce information asymmetries; reduce the costs of dispute resolution/contract enforcement and enhance competition in markets” (World Bank, 2002). Valid as this observation is, the question many researchers are asking is: Which institutions? As Bardhan (2005) summarily puts it, “institutions matter, but which ones?”
Just as African institutions are fragmented, the approaches that have been taken by most international development organizations have been fragmented in tandem. As it were, three approaches are distinguishable in the way the World Bank and other international organizations are engaging with institutions in both developing and transition countries in general. At one level are those that target or engage the state, and seek to promote good governance, effective bureaucracy and “institutional strengthening.” In this sense, institutional crisis of the state is seen in the lack of effective state capacity to manage and execute its functions. The measures advocated are therefore, those that seek to “repair” a “broken” administrative apparatus of the state. Also included in this package are approaches that urge the state to establish and protect property rights (de Soto, 2001).
These state-targeted measures deal with the state (especially in Africa) as given. Largely ignored is the fact that the nature of the state itself is fundamental to the institutional question in Africa. Discussions about defining and redefining rights to property for instance, do not usually consider the state itself as a property that requires definition. For example, Japan is one of the countries usually cited in the examples of countries where property rights redefinition achieved tremendous success in triggering off rapid economic development. However, not usually mentioned is the fact that, as mentioned earlier, the Americans, after World War II, not only established liberal market institutions including secure property rights but also had to remake the Japanese constitution in order for those reforms to be effective. Risking lack of other empirical evidence, it is possible to argue that the state itself is the principal property whose definition is a fundamental precondition for the definition and security of other property within the state. Granted that this is a sensitive and political question, but in Africa as well as in many other developing and transition countries, there is but a thin line between economics and politics. Answers to the question of defining the property that is the state in Africa must be found before any sustainable transition to the market can happen.
At the second level are approaches that seek to bridge the gap between the state (as given) and traditional institutions that operate at the grassroots level. The theoretical frame for this approach was set in the World Bank’s AM90s project (Dia, 1996). The more recent Africa Commission report also stresses the point of reconciling indigenous and transplanted institutions. In line with this, various studies have identified traditional or local institutions that have grassroots participation. However, an operationalizable model of how to reconcile the state and the traditional institutions is yet to emerge.
The last set of approaches target indigenous, community-based institutions. This has seen an unprecedented increase in the flow of funds and technical support to many traditional and community-based organizations in the last decade. The height of it came with the World Bank’s $30 million grant to the Asantehene of Ghana to promote community based development. Traditional institutions have been found to be closer to the people and have wider participation rate. In many cases, projects have better chances of local buy-in, citizen participation, and higher rates of success if they are initiated and managed by traditional or community based institutions (Francis, 1996). However, it is worth pointing out that the status of most traditional institutions in the organization of the state is not clearly defined within the present state structure in many African countries. In some cases, they operate as parallel institutions and are accountable to neither the government (of the state) nor the citizens. Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the advent of the postcolonial state has watered down the power of most of these institutions and in some cases, rendered them obsolete. While some of these institutions are democratic, most are the remnants of the monarchic and tyrannical past in need of modernization. So, in addition to issues of accountability, the risk of further encouraging administrative parallelism in the provision and management of public goods are some of the reasons why international development organizations need to exercise caution in dealing directly with local institutions, “over-head” the state. The conclusion in this paper is that what is at stake in the ongoing African institutional rebuilding project as a solution to the institutional crisis is the evolution of a model of state that specifies in clear terms, the status of indigenous institutions and defines their authority within a consensus state. This is a huge task, but unless a theoretical framework of such a state is formulated, there is little hope that the fragmented approach to institution building in Africa will improve African management or governance in this century. This is clearly where the World Bank and other International Financial Institutions need to concentrate effort to assist African countries, and it must be pointed out that many African countries, left alone, lack the capacity to instigate such radical reforms.
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Citation Format:
Bongo Adi. “The Moral Economy and Prospects of Accumulation in Sub-Saharan Africa: How the IFIs Can Help,” West Africa Review: Issue 7, 2005.
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