AN INTERVIEW WITH CLAUDE AKE

I conducted this interview with Nigerian political scientist, Professor Claude Ake, 10 years ago -- on August 14, 1990 -- at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., where he was a Fellow. I had intended the interview to be part of a series with distinguished African intellectuals but personal extenuating circumstances forced me to abandon the project. Thus, this is the first time it is being published. It may also be Ake's last in-depth, one-on- one, interview. Sad to say, he died in a plane crash near Lagos on November 7, 1996. He was 57.

The interview occurred during two, unrelated, major world events, but which had great impact on Africa: (1) President Mikhail Gorbachev of the then-Soviet Union introduced perestroika (openness or accountability) in the communist system. While the process hastened the collapse of communism and the break-up of the Soviet Union, it earned Gorbachev high praise in the West. The collapse of communism would soon have direct impact on African socialist countries, as well as on Western-backed African dictators, who used communism as a pretext for staying on in power indefinitely. And, (2), South African President Frederik de Klerk, who had released Nelson Mandela from prison, began dismantling the racial system of apartheid, and allowed the formation of non-racial, democratic parties.

These twin events were quickly seized upon by the African masses; and they, too, began to press for the creation of accountable, democratic multiparty governments in their authoritarian countries. Almost suddenly, the days of the African dictators were numbered.

Thus, between the years I interviewed Ake (1990) and his death (1996), Africa experienced a remarkable democratic change, and bloody turmoil. In 1991, for example, military strongman Haile Mariam Mengistu of Ethiopia fled to Zimbabwe, as a coalition of guerrilla fighters were poised to capture the capital city of Addis Ababa. In Zambia that year, President Kenneth Kaunda was voted out of power after being in office for 27 years. In 1994, President Hastings Banda of Malawi, who had ruled the country with an iron fist, was similarly voted out of office during his 30 ^th year in office. That year, 1994, also saw the eruption of genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda. This horrific, monumental event eventually led to the overthrow of President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). Mobutu was a dictator par excellence, a man who is reported to have amassed a personal fortune of $5 billion, thereby bankrupting his country to the point where hospitals sent patients to their homes to die because they lacked medicines. Like Mengistu, he fled. (He died in Morocco in 1997).

Meanwhile, in Ake's own country, Nigeria, the masses were also restless for change after decades of military rule. But the military was not about to transfer power to civilian rule. Thus, when Chief Moshood Abiola was considered the winner of the June 1993 national election, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida annulled the results. However, Babangida himself was forced to withdraw from office by the overwhelming force of public demonstrations that rejected his rule. The Interim National Government that he left in power was also overthrown that year by Gen. Sani Abacha who proceeded to eliminate all democratic institutions. He also imprisoned Chief Abiola; former head of state Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo; and hanged writer Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni political activists in 1995. But in a twist of fate, Gen. Abacha died suddenly, reportedly of a heart attack. His successor, Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar, freed many prisoners including Obasanjo, but not Abiola, who died in prison while negotiations for his release were underway. Obasanjo was allowed to campaign for the presidency, and he won – making him the first Nigerian to hold the office twice.

Professor Ake live through most of these tumultuous events; and it was in this period that he founded the Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS) in Nigeria. Already an author of several books and numerous articles, he wrote many monographs at the Centre. His last book, Democracy and Development in Africa, was published posthumously by the Brookings Institution in 1997.

Claude Ake was one of the great African thinkers of the 20 ^th century. Upon hearing of his death, Prof. David Apter of Yale University, said: "Claude Ake was Africa's leading political scientist – and its most courageous."¹

Prof. Guy Martin of Clark Atlanta University, said: "Claude was arguably one of the most brilliant, original and prolific of the new generation of African political scientists who emerged to prominence in the seventies." Noting that Ake had established "his own Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS) in his native [city] Port Harcourt," Martin added:

"Perhaps better than anything else, this move exemplifies Claude's utmost professional integrity and profound moral rectitude, as well as his total and selfless commitment to the advancement of social science in Africa. Declining many lucrative offers from prestigious academic institutions in the United States and elsewhere – or even occasional offers of lobbying on behalf of discredited African governments – Claude considered it his sacred duty to work in Africa for the development of third generation of African (especially Nigerian) academics. He did so first as a professor, then Dean of the Faculty of social sciences at the University of Port Harcourt, and later as head of CASS. He literally died in their service. Africa has undoubtedly lost one of its intellectual luminaries and a world-class scholar."²

Unfortunately, there have been newer conflicts and scourges in Africa since Prof. Ake's death: a civil war in Sierra Leone; a territorial war between Eritrea and Ethiopia; warlords' clashes in Somalia that have left the country without a central government; famine in the Horn of Africa; and simmering violence in Zimbabwe, where President Robert Mugabe has been in power for 20 years and wants to stay on despite mounting internal opposition. On top of these calamities, Africa is experiencing staggering death rates from AIDS, which has claimed 11 million African lives out of the world's 13 million deaths.

Claude Ake did not live to see these newer problems or their magnitude, but it's unlikely that he would have been surprised at their occurrence, for he attributed much of the continent's problems to African leaders themselves, whom he saw as a "people of limited vision and tyrannical inclinations."

Also, ten years is a reasonably good time to measure the power of a person's ideas. Hence, I wish to note that on May 13, 2000, The Economist magazine published a devastating article on Africa, entitled, "The heart of the matter," (pp. 22-24). In my view, this article truly vindicates what Prof. Ake said 10 years ago about some of the causes of Africa's state of underdevelopment; and, by extension, confirms once again his intellectual powers. In this connection, I ask the reader to note carefully footnotes 4 and 5 at the end of the interview, and to read the Economist article as well.

On a personal note, I became familiar with the name Claude Ake through my readings as a graduate student, and I hoped I'd meet him.³ The opportunity came in the summer of 1990, but long after I had ceased being a student. I was now a freelance journalist. When I read in a local newspaper that Ake was at the Brookings Institution, I phoned him and requested an interview. Truth be told, I expected the wall to go up – the usual thing people suddenly erect when speaking to an unknown newsman. They pose all kinds of questions to put you off: You want an interview, which paper do you work for?...What have you written?...Who else have you contacted?...ad infinitum. But there was none of the sort from him. Indeed, when he learned I was a mere freelance reporter, he was even more obliging to try to help a young African's career. We set the date for August 14.

When I arrived at his office on a brilliant sunny day, he first took me to the cafeteria for lunch. He paid the bill for the both of us. I had expected to meet a big man, of over 6 feet – Nigerians can be very tall – garbed in a Western suit and necktie. But, no. He was of medium build, dressed in a short-sleeved colorful shirt and khaki long trousers. He wore small round glasses, like Mahatma Gandhi's. His sense of simplicity and humility made me respect him even more.

Walusako Mwalilino: Dr. Ake, explain to us your reasons or circumstances for coming to the Brookings Institution, here in Washington, D.C.

Claude Ake: Well, I came here [on] a temporary respite, in a way of getting myself together. I had been teaching in the university in Nigeria -- the University of Port Harcourt -- and I took time off from the university to help in forming one of the [political] parties in preparation for return to civilian rule in Nigeria. But after we had formed the parties and completed, as directed by the government, the military government [under Gen. Ibrahim Babangida] decided to abolish all those parties and form its own parties. And I felt that I could not, in all conscience, participate in those parties at that time. And in the meantime, because I had taken part in politics, however temporarily, I was not allowed anymore to teach in the university and I had to resign. So, those are the circumstances in which I came here; hopefully, temporarily.

WM:I take it that the military government of Nigeria has no constitution right now.

CA: Well, military governments rule mainly by decree. A decree can be passed on any matter.

WM:Did you see any conflict, being an academic, with participating or being part of a [political] party?

CA: Well, no, I didn't see any conflict at all because the tradition had been in the past that you could take a leave of absence from teaching; and as a civil servant, in fact, this had been the tradition in West Africa. You could take a leave of absence and take part in politics. Because, if that did not happen, the field of people available for politics would be very, very small. So this was a way of broadening the social basis of politics; but it has now been narrowed by removing that prerogative. But if that prerogative existed, I'd see no clash at all, because politics is everybody's business, and it should not be made specific to a small, social class, that is defined by a fact that they're able to survive without working. If you didn't allow this kind of [setup], then the social basis of politics would be very narrow. And that has precisely been the problem among the African countries.

WM:In coming here to Washington – or to America -- you are not alone. There are many Nigerians in this country. Does that square well, in your view, with the government at home? Are they pleased with the fact that there are a lot of Nigerians abroad? Or, is that the way they would like things to be?

CA: I don't know that they're happy that there are lots of Nigerians abroad. If anything, I think they are concerned that there are many Nigerians abroad, and there has been a government commission set up to look into this, but I presume it's findings were rather inconclusive. But you know, this sort of problem of going abroad -- migrating from Africa, particularly qualified people -- is a very, very serious African problem. And it's becoming identified even by the multilateral development institutions as a major bottleneck to African development. Qualified people -- agronomists, engineers, even lawyers, people with doctorates -- are driving taxis in Washington and New York; and the best doctors from West Africa are now in Saudi Arabia.

The combination of economic austerity, caused by years of stagnation and regression, and gross civil rights violations -- assaulting people's liberties -- has led to a mass exodus of qualified people from Africa.

We used to complain in the past about the problems of human resource development at the highest levels but, in fact, the problem now is to retain the human resources we have. Because, there's no point in training them at great cost and then being unavailable because they have neither the means to survive economically, nor the space, politically, to make any contribution to national development. That is a serious problem; and the World Bank mentions this specifically in its new report... There are some statistics about the "brain drain" and it is very, very disturbing. And as you know, it's always the cream of the crop that goes away, because these are the first people to be absorbed [in the West]. And I would say that the best in Africa – a very good percentage of the cream of the intelligentsia in Africa – are outside right now; and I think that is very, very tragic.⁴

WM:You mentioned this report by the World Bank. The Bank knows that there are a lot of African intellectuals abroad, and yet it continues to support some of these governments that are behind the exodus of African intellectuals abroad. Doesn't the World Bank see this as a contradiction in its own policy?

CA: Well, it does not necessarily see the contradictions -- at least [not] as sharply as it ought to see them -- because economic austerity is definitely a major contributory cause to the "brain drain". To give you an example: Since a country like Nigeria started its austerity measures under the structural adjustment reforms, I'd say that the Nigerian naira, which used to be at parity with the U.S. dollar, is now eight to a dollar.

CA: This is just about four or five years ago. Five years ago, the naira was at parity [with the dollar] -- one to one. Now it is one-eighth, and in the black market it is one- tenth. So, within less than five years, your purchasing power is only one-tenth of what it used to be. And the result is that the salary of a full professor is now under 200 [American] dollars per a month, and that is an even good salary by African standards, in conditions of austerity. In Uganda...it's about 30 dollars a month. And these [professors] are the people who have to compete, buy books, subscribe to journals, get computer hardware, and keep up with what is going on. So, it's simply impossible. And when you compound economic austerity with political harassments and lack of basic freedoms, it becomes an enormous problem.

So the World Bank needs to be sensitive to that. But of course we cannot expect it to be; because, let's face it: This is one of its least tragic problems of adjustment reforms. What about the effects of adjustment policies on children – when you have a situation in which incomes fall disastrously? For instance, in Zaire – [now the Democratic Republic of Congo] – incomes are less than 6 percent of what they used to be 20 years ago. Or, in moderate cases, where incomes are about 20 percent of what they used to be just five years ago, what does that mean? – in a population in which 40 percent of the people live under levels of absolute poverty. It means that many people will not survive. It's just because they don't die dramatically, like when people are gunned down, but in fact you have silent, incremental, mass death. And this is what's happening; and I think that UNICEF [the United Nations Children's Fund] has complained in its State of the World's Children report about the effects of some of these policies on children.

WM:I just want to quote something from your book, Revolutionary Pressures in Africa, which came out in 1978. We'll tie that in with what's happening today. You said [on page 31] that:

This was in 1978; now it's 1990. I was very struck when I read this, because it doesn't seem to be happening anywhere on the African continent today – the progressive ideology. I mean, as conditions are getting difficult, the African leadership is not utilizing the fervor of the masses to bring about change. To me, it seems things have gone the other way around.

CA: Well, actually there's a change there, because towards the end of the book there's a different kind of analysis, in which I am predicting that there will actually be more of a trend towards fascism, which is more accurate with what's happening today.

I agree; [African leaders] are not actually being populist; except that the people themselves are now asserting themselves. It's not the leaders; you're correct. [Here, to buttress his point, Dr Ake took hold of his book, Revolutionary Pressures in Africa, and read from it, on page 107]:

That is actually more or less what has now been happening, because this combination of protracted stagnation without any revolutionary impulse is an area that we seem to have fallen into. It's sad; and that [situation] can drag on. One should not assume that it will lead to a revolution; that's the whole point. It can drag on, and on, inconclusively.

WM:Which brings me also to the issue of the African intellectuals today. Are they playing a role that they should be playing? Or, have they been cowed into submission? Are they afraid? – if you can compare them to intellectuals of other countries.

CA: African intellectuals have to be seen also in the context of the history. They are not separate from the historical context, and they're playing a role but with limitations. The harshness of the conditions of their existence has to be taken account of. In some countries such as Nigeria, Senegal, Botswana, there is still enough room for expression, for creative work, and for making a substantial input into a national life; and some people in these countries are doing so. And you can see that in Nigeria, for instance, the intellectuals have been a catalyst; and the alliance formed between the intellectuals – that is, the Academic Staff Union of Universities, what is called ASUU, [and] the students and the trade unions of the country – has been the vanguard of change and national progressive consciousness in the last five years. Of course, the government has battled this. But in many instances they were the only voice -- like in the debate about the structural adjustment programs and about the place of military rule, and so on.

But in many other countries in Africa it has not been possible simply because...repression was too harsh. The little liberties we enjoy in Nigeria would certainly bring death in many African countries, such as Zaire and Malawi. And in a lot of these countries, the extent of political repression and the capacity of those in power for brutality, is such that the only realistic option is flight. And this is why, when you have been forced out of the place, or forced into your grave, then you cannot play the meaningful historical role that the intelligentsia is supposed to play.

So I think that assessing the role of the African intelligentsia should not be done abstractly; it should not be dissociated from the historical realities. It is a part of history. When we put it in this context, the role is just as it ought to be in the circumstances.

WM:I was thinking in terms of people like Lenin, who, when they fled [Czarist] Russia, they went to Europe and organized themselves and then went back. In Cuba, you had [Fidel] Castro; he was a law student. And then Che Guevara [from Argentina], who was a medical student at the time; [the two] met in Mexico and they were able to go back [to Cuba].

I have seen this trend also in colonial Africa, where educated Africans were able to go back and fight for freedom – Nkrumah [in Ghana], Banda [in Malawi], Mondlane [in] Mozambique.

But after Africa became independent, we don't see the same thing happening. There seems to be a different kind of role that the [current] African intellectuals are playing, as opposed to those of the colonial times. And I'm wondering why this is so. Or maybe the conditions are tougher now?

CA: Well, I don't know if they're tougher, but they're certainly different. And I agree with you that people have not given enough credit to the people who led the nationalist movement. Looking back, it was something of a golden age for us because there was consciousness, there was a unity of purpose, and there was a high seriousness that you don't have today. People determined – intent on a goal and willing to sacrifice for it, and quite willing to challenge the State and its coercive apparatus. I think that was something.

But right after independence, it seems that we were not able to quite recover the same kind of high seriousness. I don't know whether it is because of the internalization of the struggle – that is, because the external enemy was removed – and then we had to internalize struggles, so that it was easy to exploit differences of our exceptional nature and so on.

And also, I think [the] international environment [has been] far more reactionary than [it] was in the age of decolonization, where there was a lot of sympathy [for Africa], even in the non-colonial world after the Second World War, and a lot of collaboration from socialist and progressive countries all over the world, including the colonizing countries: Britain, France, etcetera. There were a lot of things workers, socialist organizations, and parties [did] that supported the [colonial] struggles.

But I think that in the context of the Cold War, the West became very reactionary, and its only concern in Third World countries, certainly in Africa, was simply in finding allies for waging the Cold War. And so if any African leader -- however fascist, however bloodthirsty – was willing to submit to satellization, they were willing to give him any amount of support. And not only give him support, but prevent other people from shaking him [down]. And so, while people make fun of Africa's dictators, they're certainly partly of a creation of the cynical Cold War politics of the Great Powers.

So I think that the reactionary environment, which has persisted just until very recently, has definitely been a factor. And you can see how the winding down of the Cold War is already beginning to affect matters, at least in a verbal way. The West is now talking more about human rights, about democratization, about acting in a more principled way in its relations with the Third World. So the objective conditions that were responsible for this very reactionary environment -- that quite drastically constrained the kinds of effervescence that intellectuals would have been able to create in Africa -- is lifting, I think, and there might be new opportunities in this present, historical conjuncture.

WM:What's going to be the impact of this new U.S.-U.S.S.R. friendship on Africa? During the Cold War or towards the end of it, before Gorbachev and Reagan became very close -- and that relationship is now extending to Bush – countries like Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, all the so-called African socialist countries, were able to extract a lot from the Soviet Union. But now that there's strong relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, how is that going to affect African countries, particularly the socialist countries, if they still want to go that route? I mean, they can just easily be crushed by the United States.

CA: First, we'll get less, generally. But let me take you back, because the problem goes beyond the rapprochement of this post-Cold War era. There has actually been a process of economic marginalization of Africa caused by advances in technology and science, which have changed the world economy. For instance, from the production of goods to the production of services; from industries of material intensity, such as the manufacture of automobiles, to industries of knowledge intensity, such as computers -- what we call the "de-materialization revolution". And then the development of all kinds of synthetic products that are much more flexible for use. The result is that primary producers have become far less important, and people have in fact talked of the de- linking of the primary economies of Africa from that of the advanced capitalist countries. That preceded these political changes; and so reduced economic significance.

So, even if the Cold War was still raging, the process of marginalization -- already objectified in this – would have made a change in what we're able to extract from the industrialized world.

Now, of course, the winding down of the Cold War has thrown in the marginalization of the strategic significance of Africa to the Super Powers. The United States does not now have to worry that Russia would move in to Liberia. So it will wait for the Liberians to kill themselves, and when the last Liberian remains, the last Liberian will be loyal still [to America]. And there's no longer, really, any need to buy anybody.

What the people are now saying – and it's the conventional wisdom – is that Africa has become less important both to the Super Powers, particularly the West, that used to give substantial aid to Africa. Now Poland and Hungary get 10 times as much aid per capita from [Western] Europe than sub-Sahara Africa. And Latin American countries get 34 times as much aid per capita than Africa gets, because of their proximity to the United States and their strategic significance. Investment has dropped off, trade of Africa with Western Europe has declined quite substantially, and so on. So these are all the things that people are now lamenting: That Africa will not be getting resource flows from the industrialized world.

But I think that all that is correct. What I just want to say is that, that is only one side of the equation. I think there's something else to consider: We also see that the same circumstances have meant that the West and the Super Powers can deal with Africa on principle. So it means that they'd at least be less inclined to support dictatorships and gross human rights abuse. And this is why...the Western news on Africa is now dominated by the issues of democratization, because the West now is freed to act more on principle. I think that is important; because, even if we're getting less aid, if the whole question of participation can be helped along – because I feel that that has been the greatest drag on development, not the amount of aid; somebody else is not going to develop you – the fact that the people themselves have been assaulted in the name of development, brutalized by coercion, completely denied freedom, completely marginalized, and completely unavailable to donate their energies and commitment to development – I think that this is the main drag. And if we now can rediscover participation through the connection to the popular struggles for democracy going on in Africa, plus the sympathy of an industrialized world that is now a little freer to act on principle, I think that this will be a great step forward.

Not only that: I think that the whole process of being now forced to ourselves, these realities would mean that, for once, the self-reliance that we have always talked about would now confront us as an inevitable reality. And once we confront self-reliance as an inevitable reality we will also discover the masses in its true sense, because the whole way that you're going to conduct self-reliance development is if the people had the end and the means of development.

So I think that behind all the tragedies about not being available for courtship with economic rewards, and the tragedy of being neglected, I see some new hope that Africa will really begin, for once, to move forward.

WM:The Organization of African Unity. Do you think it's playing a role that it should be playing, in view of all the problems you have enumerated so far?

CA: No, it's not playing a role that it should be playing because of its nature. It is a club of governments, and it will reflect the character of its members. And these are people of limited vision, and tyrannical inclinations, hanging on desperately to power without legitimacy. And the OAU cannot transcend this; and so it is immobilized. Since nobody's house is in order, nobody can tell the other person to put their house in order. All of them are in a state of siege – completely involved with survival in their own countries because they're alienated from their people. And they have unleashed so many hostile forces by their coerciveness and their indifference to sharing the resources of their countries with some equity. So they're operating in a state of siege. They are not available for any collective endeavors. On the contrary, they oppress by nervousness; so they cannot enter into any ventures that would even tolerate the slightest surrender of sovereignty for the common good.

And they have no concept of either "national good" or "continental good", because they have to survive first before they can have those kinds of senses. And they're completely absorbed in this. So I think that all these things are related: internal problems, quality of leadership, and so on. And all these [things] are part of the change that must be made to get us out of the circle of regression. The OAU can only reflect the internal contradictions that have been deepening underdevelopment in our own countries.

WM:One facet of African politics that was not really talked about during the [independence period in the] Sixties was the role of religion, especially between Christianity and Islam. These two religions seem to have found a fertile ground in Africa today – especially in your country, Nigeria. It's a big issue there –

WM:What's going to take for these two forces – these two religions – to be put where they should be, in the sense that they should NOT be at the center of Nigerian politics, or African politics?...There have been some killings, especially in northern Nigeria, between Moslems and Christians. Even in Kenya the politics is tied into this somewhat. What do you see on the horizon between the role of Christianity and Islam in Africa?

CA: Well, I see that this will continue to be a problem. As long as an elite has no confidence in itself, as long as it has completely failed – they have completely failed to carry through the development project, and that is no longer just an ideal judgment. I mean, over the last 10 years, the growth rate in Africa has been minus 2.2 percent, and incomes have been falling for 10 years at the rate of 4.2 percent for black Africa. So this is a total failure, marching into regression. Many important African indicators are worse off now than they were 20 years ago, in a world that is rapidly making progress by the second, virtually.

So these people totally lack legitimacy, and have mucked up the people's ideas and people's lives. And they try to hang on and find any superstition that would allow them to cling on. And this is why all these parochialisms are going to continue to exist until we get rid of this demoralized and cynical leadership that [has] completely failed and [is] looking for symbols to manipulate. They are going to appeal to religion, they're going to appeal to ethnicity, because those are the only kinds of things that are going to give them a spurious, common cause with the people that they have failed and mistreated. So it is inevitable; and the more they are threatened, the more [vicious they become]. And they cannot appeal on a class basis because there isn't any, anyway. They cannot appeal on any other rational basis.

WM:Coming back to the United States, let's talk about African Americans vis-a-vis Africans. What's your assessment of their reactions towards Africa? Are they playing a positive role regarding what's happening in Africa today? I bring this up in view of the repeated [anti-apartheid] demonstrations in front of the South African Embassy, for instance. But right now, where there have been a lot of killings in Liberia and many other African countries, the African American voice is very muted towards these happenings in African countries. Why do you think that is so? Or, am I expecting too much from them?

CA: Well, I think so, because you have to look at the matter in its historical context. African Americans are doing their best in the circumstances. I think that if they could do better, they would. I do not believe...the kinds of contradictions people think...exist, [really] exist. You have to look at this whole thing in terms of the general situation of oppressed people. We are oppressed people, both Africans and African Americans. And it is much more difficult for the weak and oppressed to rally in their own defense than for the strong and the privileged to organize their own defense. That is part of the very definition of being weak.

Now, African Americans suffer discrimination, they are marginalized, they have no serious access to the media, particularly television. They have some marginal influence over some rather obscure radio stations, but no major network. They have no control over any major national newspaper. They have no control over any chain of corporations. It is only recently that they have had a governorship [of Douglas Wilder in the State of Virginia]. So their general condition, under the admission of The New York Times and in some of the surveys that have been done and published recently, they have been losing ground. Their health condition has deteriorated to that of the people in Bangladesh. And it has come to the point where, a newspaper like The New York Times, is writing about the young black male being an endangered species; of many more [black] people being in prisons than in universities. And so the years of reaction have meant a loss of even some of the marginal gains they have made.

So these are people under pressure – under tremendous amount of pressure by a system that is not only not yet given them their due, but is actually conspiring in their regression. So they're struggling to hang on against all these disadvantages in a society in which you have to have the strength to stand for yourself or nobody will stand for you. And you can see how this frustration is internalized in violence within the black community.

Yet, in spite of all this, they take interest in Africa as much as they can. Those of them who have a little leverage, like Jesse Jackson -- without minding the consequences of this [to] their political fortunes here in the United States, and on occasions where they could focus their energies profitably, as in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa -- they have done so admirably. And the visit of [Nelson] Mandela [in June 1990] was an incredible display of solidarity. So I think that we should give them credit.

Of course, compared with what other people do here for the groups in other parts of the world from which they come – for instance, like the support for Israel [by Jewish Americans] – Africa is very far from getting that kind of support. You cannot really compare. I mean, given the disadvantages [of African Americans], I really think that it is superficial to blame somebody who is marginalized, struggling in regression, that they are not doing [enough]. They are doing within the circumstances.

Now you also have to consider the other side: Africans, too, have an obligation to do for black Americans. It is not a one-way street. And Africa has not done anything for black Americans. Because, the prestige of black Americans – their ability to walk erect here – depends also partly on what we do in Africa. And what we have done in Africa in 30 years [since the independence period] is to fumble our opportunities. Instead of helping African Americans to stand erect, we are making them ashamed to be like us. And I think that a very important part of this equation is to straighten ourselves in Africa; and, in the process of doing so, try also to support the African Americans. So, it should not be a matter of one person trying to distance himself from the other or become an embarrassment, but one of recognizing our common cause, disadvantages and our marginality, and knowing that whatever any of us achieves helps the other person to have greater self-esteem, to be better respected by others, and to move forward collectively.

CA: African leaders can assist black Americans, first of all, by stopping fumbling! The African Americans don't need people sending them distraught news from Africa; they need good news from Africa. That is the first thing. That would be enough! They want to read about good news, of good examples, of people who are trying hard, of people who are confronting difficulties with courage and dignity and intelligence.

We need more examples of the Botswanas and their [economic] experiments, of progress, of prudence in management, of humanitarian concerns.

Let us give them good news so that they can be proud of the places they have come from. And when they're proud of themselves and their history, their sense of efficacy here [in the United States] will be enhanced. The material connections can come later. What they need is good news from Africa: that we should help ourselves and strengthen ourselves. Nobody likes to come from a background in which you are ashamed. And part of the reason why they can be put down here, so decisively, is precisely because we are creating a background of shame [for them].

WM:If you have to make a quick guess, let's say five or ten years from today, concerning the cry for a multiparty system in Africa, what's your guess? What's going to happen?

WM:Some countries seem to have made some headway – I don't know if I can even call them "headway" right now – or, at least whispers, for instance in Zaire; and [President] Kaunda [of Zambia] said something to this effect, after the crisis he just had recently – [that there will be a multiparty system]. What's going to happen five or ten years from today?

CA: I really think that there's going to be some political renewal, some progress on the political front. There's a beginning of hope, of moving towards pluralism and more participation.

The fact is that the idea has taken root; and the first step in changing the critical assumptions in a situation is the legitimacy of an idea. And the idea now that democratization and participation are absolutely necessary has taken root in Africa. There's no doubt about it and people are struggling for it. And even the people who have a vested interest in containing these ideas are beginning to accept them. The last OAU summit had to make a concession to this, that – the declaration that they passed – said something to the effect that democratization is necessary for development and it should be pursued, and [there should be] accountability, and so on.

And every forum you go in, in Africa – like that mammoth meeting of 500 organizations representing NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations] in Arusha, Tanzania – that declaration – it was a charter for democratization. All the Western media have applauded the new trends in the new World Bank report, From Crisis to Sustainable Growth -- calling for political renewal and democratization, even though the sincerity of the Bank in mouthing these things is suspect.⁵ But the point is that: The legitimacy of this part of [the] movement is established. And the struggle is on. The struggle is on the ground; it's no longer a matter of imagination. And I think that, come five to ten years from now, we are going to find an important transition in Africa from political monolithism to more participation, which will be very useful. Not only in terms of creating political space – for a more humanitarian society – but also for getting the development project back on course.

WM:Something we haven't touched on, and usually we don't even read about it, [is] the role of women. Right now there's no African woman President on the African continent. What should [the] African woman do to assert herself? Or, can we speak for the African woman since we are men?

CA: We cannot speak for them, but I think that progressive people should be concerned. Progressive men should be concerned about the role of the African woman. Because, in some ways, it [their condition] is now worse than what it used to be in some traditional societies, where they had, by virtue of their importance to the household economy, a certain standard that is no longer quite available now.

So I think it is important that progressive people should speak up and be supportive of anything that would change this [situation] for several reasons: One, that in a continent in which life is very harsh for everybody, life is harsher still for the woman. The incredible task that the African peasant woman has to perform in a day – including the distances they have to walk to fetch water, to farm, to get firewood, and all the effort to bring up babies, and put food on the table – and given the limitations of the [health] facilities, and even the calorie intake – how they are able to perform all these tasks is something incredible.

The point is that: Their conditions are harsher still. So, if only for humanitarian purposes, something needs to be done to ease their burden.

And the other point is simply that: The African is typically a woman. There are more women than men. And if we're developing Africa that would mean, above all, developing the women. So, you cannot meaningfully talk about development when the majority of your people are not really part of the equation. And these are the people also at the critical level of the most intimate contact with the young, and the fundamentals of the socialization process. I think that there has been a failure here; not only in terms of leadership – because you don't really expect much from Africa's current crop of leaders – but even progressive organizations in Africa. Even the intelligentsia – our record in regard to gender issues – has not been good, to say the least.

And I think the whole question of doing something about women is really urgent, because the burdens of the crises are really basically pushed onto women, and children.


	Guy Martin, "Claude Ake," ASA News, Vol. XXX, No. 1, January/March 1997, pp. 4-5. See also, Victor Adebola O. Adetula, ed., Claude Ake and Democracy in Africa: A Tribute (Jos, Nigeria: Africa Centre for Democratic Governance, 1997).


	These personal recollections are excerpted, with minor changes, from an Internet article; see, W.A. Mwalilino, "Claude Ake, in memorium: response," November 1996.


	In an editorial of May 31, 2000, The Washington Post said that Africa's immense problems are now "driving about 20,000 African professionals to desert the continent annually." (See, "Africa's Hidden Hope," p. A26).


	In April 2000, hundreds of people protested against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C., for "exploiting" developing countries and burdening them with insurmountable debts. See, for example, Caryle Murphy, "Joining Hands for Debt Relief," The Washington Post, April 10, 2000, p. B1 and B4; David Montgomery and Arthur Santana, "Protesters, Authorities Move Into Next Stage," The Washington Post, p. B1 and B5; Allan H. Meltzer and Adam Lerrick, "What the World Bank Ought to Be Doing," The Washington Post, April 11, 2000, p. A23; John Burgess, "Embattled Staffers Wonder `Why Us?', "The Washington Post, April 13, 2000, p. A1, A25 and A26. For an incisive background report, see William Finnegan, "After Seattle," The New Yorker, April 17, 2000, pp. 40- 51.

West Africa Review (2000)

ISSN: 1525-4488

AN INTERVIEW WITH CLAUDE AKE

INTRODUCTION


	See, David Wiley, "Claude Ake, in memoriam," November 15, 1996.