West Africa Review (2001)
ISSN: 1525-4488
THE RISE OF ETHNIC MILITIAS, DE-LEGITIMISATION OF THE STATE, AND THE THREAT TO NIGERIAN FEDERALISM
West Africa Review (2001)ISSN: 1525-4488THE RISE OF ETHNIC MILITIAS, DE-LEGITIMISATION OF THE STATE, AND THE THREAT TO NIGERIAN FEDERALISM |
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Federalism has been variously defined in political/administrative terms and as a processual understanding that incorporates socio-cultural and behavioural components. (Agbaje, 2000:3). It is also a form of organisation of a state in which there is deconcentration of powers, which are usually constitutionally demarcated among national and sub-national units (Babawale, 2000:45). However, it can be said that the idea of federalism is still an evolving one. Its practice in Nigeria has been a mixed bag of some fidelity to the federal principle (especially during the first republic) and oftentimes a near abandonment of its guiding principles, especially under successive military administrations. Essentially, what can be aggregated from the various definitions is that federalism is a compromise solution in a multi-national state whereby the component units desire a supranational framework of government which guarantees security for all in the nation state while at the same time recognising and affirming the individualities of the component units, all of who seek to retain their individual identities.
Ben Nwabueze had indicated that a federal arrangement should possess certain identifiable characteristics, which are as follows:
The foregoing presupposes that in a federal system, there must necessarily be more that one level of government. Yet, we must emphasize the point made in several scholarly works that federalism is best applied in plural societies where there is a fragmentation of sub-cultures as well as demarcation “ by ethnic, linguistic, religious or other boundaries” (Eckstein, 1966:34).
Nigeria is an archetypal plural society characterised by divergent languages, cultures, ethnic groups and geographic regions. The realisation that a society as diverse as Nigeria may be difficult to manage administratively partly informed the decision to adopt the Lyttelton Constitution of 1954 which formally inaugurated the practice of federalism in Nigeria. Unfortunately, the Nigerian federal structure so inaugurated was and still is an unbalanced and lopsided one in which the northern region emerged as a bigger entity than a combination of the entire populations of the eastern and western regions. The struggle for power sharing was reduced to a struggle for hegemony among the three main ethnic groups namely, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. In the course of this struggle, those who fall outside the three major groups were regarded as minorities who were marginalised not only in the allocation of power but of resources as well. Of the three major ethnic groups already mentioned, the Hausa-Fulani faction became the dominant faction, which controlled the federal power structure for three decades. Consequently, the two other major contenders have had cause to complain of marginalisation too. Indeed, such feelings of marginalisation partly accounted for the civil war that nearly dismembered the country between 1967 and 1970.
Among the minorities; the cry of marginalisation has been louder. Years of military dictatorship have also resulted in an increasing hegemonisation of the dominant Hausa-Fulani faction to the near-exclusion of the other two contenders for power, the Igbo and the Yoruba. Invariably, the Yoruba, Igbo and the minorities groups have been complaining bitterly about their exclusion from power and their marginalisation in allocation of national resources. The southern minorities believe and rightly too, that they deserve to take control of oil revenue, which are largely extracted from their communities instead of the tokenism they receive in form of revenue allocation from the federation account.
The Igbos complain bitterly about their being singled out for punishment and discrimination as a consequence of their secessionist attempt which led to the Nigerian Civil war. The Yorubas felt cheated by the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections which was won by one of their own, Late Chief M.K.O Abiola but who was unjustly denied this victory by a military government which was dominated by the Hausa-Fulani hegemons. For nearly a decade, the feelings of discontent among several groups have grown by the day and the inception of a new civilian administration on May 29, 1999 seemed to have provided the atmosphere for an efflorescence of these expressions of discontent. Although these expressions came to the fore under Late General Sanni Abacha’s brutal dictatorship, they were equally ruthlessly suppressed within that period. It is against this background that the phenomenon of ethnic militias emerged in Nigeria. These militias were meant to be the militant organs of expression of defiance against the oppressive rule of the Nigerian State. Many of them became prominent in the wake of the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections. Such groups include the Oodua Peoples’ Congress (OPC), Arewa Peoples’ Congress (APC), Igbo Peoples’ Congress (IPC); Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB); Egbesu Boys of Africa, Bakassi Boys, etc.
In this presentation, we wish to examine the linkage (if any) between the imperfections of Nigeria’s Federal structure and the emergence of ethnic militias. We would also proffer solutions on how to address the phenomenon of ethnic militias, which at the moment constitutes a mortal threat to the continued survival of Nigeria as a united entity.
In any country where there are divergences of language and of nationality - particularly of language - a unitary constitution is always a source of bitterness and hostility on the part of linguistic or national minority groups. On the other hand, as soon as a federal constitution is introduced in which each linguistic or national group is recognised and accorded regional autonomy, any bitterness and hostility against that constitutional arrangement as such disappear. (Awolowo. 1966:48)
While it may be said that Awolowo’s statement cited above may be unduly optimistic, there is no denying the fact that a federal system works better in situations where there are divergences of language and nationality. Conversely, when a supposedly federal state - consisting of divergent groups - begins to move in the direction of unitarism as Nigeria did under military rule since 1966, there are bound to be latent and open disaffection and discontent by groups within the state.
The background to the emergence of ethnic militias was the manipulation of ethnicity by the governing elite across the various regions especially as a means of bargaining for power in the post-independence era. Numerous scholars have discussed ethnicity as a bargaining tool in the struggle for primitive accumulation. (Nnoli, 1980:30; Osaghae, 1994:9). This view agrees with the position canvassed by Glickman which states that ethnicity in Africa is instrumental as opposed to primordial. (Glickman, 1995:3; Smith, 2000:22). Studies have shown further that there is a greater likelihood for an increase in ethnic conflicts in the immediate wake of political liberalisation. (Smith, 2000:3). Indeed, Ndegwa argues that “in some African countries, democratic openings have intensified ethnic competition” (Ndegwa, 1997:599).
In the Nigerian instance, the inception of the new democratic dispensation coincided with the outbreak of ethnic conflicts and the proliferation of ethnic militias. This becomes understandable when one appreciates the fact that political liberalisation allows for open expression of dissent even in unusual forms. The beauty of a democratic environment is that it allows for a negotiated resolution of conflicts either ethnic or otherwise.
What then is ethnicity and what is the relationship between ethnicity and the emergence of ethnic militias in Nigeria? Ethnicity, according to Nnoli, is characterised by a common consciousness of being one in relation to the other relevant ethnic groups (Nnoli, 1989:8). However, ethnic boundaries do change over time especially when there are competitions for scarce resources. Nnoli contends further that ethnicity is “a socio-political phenomenon associated with interactions among members of a society, consisting of diverse ethnic groups, characterised by cultural and linguistic similarities, values and common consciousness” (Nnoli, 1980:5). The foregoing definitions suggest that ethnic differences are natural and should not necessarily lead to conflicts of a negative nature.
As admitted by Onigu Otite, “social conflicts generated through ethnicity are natural indications of the imperfections of the existential conditions of plural societies” (Otite, 2001:8) when such conflicts are viewed as necessary outcomes of inter-group interactions, they are easily amenable to resolution. But when we demonise such conflicts, we move further away from the point of resolution. The ethnic groups that are so demonised would look for alternative ways of expressing their grievances. The option of violence becomes attractive and inevitable.
The ethnic militias referred to earlier were formed as a consequence of the mismanagement of ethnic grievances by the Nigerian state and its agents. (Anifowose, 2000; Akinboye, 2001; Akinyele, 2001).
Since May 1999, the spectre of violence perpetrated by ethnic militias has been haunting many of Nigeria’s urban communities. Indeed, these communities are fast becoming huge theatres of violence. In the south-western part of the country, the OPC has literally become a parallel security outfit with its involvement in vigilante services and its running battle with criminal gangs. In the course of prosecuting its self-assigned crusade, it has been in confrontation with the Nigerian Police. In the southern-eastern part of Nigeria the exploits of the Bakassi Boys, another ethno-militant outfit, has become legendary. It is known to have apprehended and summarily executed suspected criminals in Aba (Abia State) and Onitsha (Anambra State). The OPC and Bakassi Boys have had open confrontations with police leaving casualties on all sides. In some cases, the militias were able to overrun the police. Ironically, state and federal security agencies have not been able to effectively face the challenge posed by these ethnic militias.
The origin of the Bakassi Boys has been traced to the determination of traders in Aba in south-eastern Nigeria to stamp out the menace of armed robbers who for months made life unbearable for traders in Anambra and Abia States. They emerged as a resistance army to the criminal activities of armed robbers and hoodlums. Originally, they were funded by the traders themselves and some form of assistance from the state government and “well-meaning” individuals. Bakassi Boys initially comprised about 500 youths and middle-aged persons but has since increased its numerical strength. Expenses on wages, investigations and operations are sourced from the monthly contributions of traders and voluntary donations. This militia has become so generally accepted by the people that the Governor of Anambra State, Chinwoke Mbadiniju has integrated it into the state’s security network with the legal imprimatur of the state House of Assembly. It has since had its name changed to “Anambra Vigilante Services”.
Nonetheless, critical observers are worried by the limitless powers enjoyed by this militia and its indiscriminate execution of suspected criminals with scant regards for the due process of law. In its recklessness, it executed a well-known prophet and a local party Chairman of All People’s Party (APP). In one instance, early in the year (2001), 36 suspected criminals were publicly executed.
The OPC began as a militant resistance movement to the marginalisation of the Yoruba in the Nigerian power structure by the Hausa-Fulani faction of the Nigerian governing elite. Its origin dates back to 1994 when a group of Yoruba elite decided to form a grassroots based organisation to actualise the annulled mandate of Chief M.K.O Abiola (a Yoruba) who was widely believed to have won the presidential election of June 12, 1993.
According to its founding president, Dr. Frederick Fasehun, the OPC was formed to “defend the rights of every Yoruba person on earth” (Newswatch, 2000:6). Following some disagreements in 1999, a faction of the group led by Ganiyu Adams broke away from the main group. The OPC, especially the more militant Adams’ faction has been engaged in a running battle with the Police. The catalogue of the militia’s clashes with the police shows that the police establishment has incurred substantial losses of men and material during these confrontations. In October 1999, clashes were reported between the police and OPC members in Ilesa, Osun State. Other clashes took place in the same month in the Ajegunle area of Lagos State where 23 people reportedly died. Earlier in July 1999, a clash between the OPC and Hausa settlers in Shagamu, Ogun State, left 50 people dead. A retaliatory strike by the Hausa against Yorubas in Kano resulted in the death of over 100 people.
Another clash between the OPC and Hausa traders in the mile 12 area of Lagos State resulted in the death of about 114 people. In October 2000, there were also violent clashes between the OPC and the Hausas in Apapa, Agege, Oworonshoki and several other parts of Lagos resulting in the death of over 100 people. Earlier in January 2000, a clash between the police and OPC members led to the death of the Divisional Police Officer (DPO) for Bariga area in Lagos, Mr. Afolabi Amoo.
The story of the ethnic militias is not all about violence. Some good deeds have been credited to the OPC and Bakassi Boys especially in the area of combating crime. The general perception is that the police are corrupt, inefficient, ill equipped and unreliable while the militias are incorruptible and efficient. In June 2001, the Governor of Lagos State, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, publicly announced his willingness to invite the OPC to assist the state to combat criminals who seemed to have overwhelmed the Police in Lagos State.
This announcement was greeted with applause and approbation by the residents of Lagos who have had to sleep in their houses for months with their eyes wide open because of constant harassment by armed bandits. The general public seems to hold the view that the Police can no longer discharge its constitutionally assigned functions effectively.
The Arewa Peoples’ Congress and the Igbo Peoples’ Congress were formed in response to the activities of the OPC. Apart from the issuance of occasional threats of counter-violence, not much is known about the activities of these two groups. The APC is led by a retired army Captain Sagir Mohammed who in January 2000 declared that the objective of the organisation is “safeguarding and protection of Northern interest, wherever it is. And to respond to further attacks on Northerners in any part of the country, particularly Lagos State where the OPC is unleashing terror on innocent and defenceless citizens from other parts of the country” (The News 2000:17).
The Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) appears to be one of the most vocal ethnic militias. The organisation campaigns for a separate state of Biafra for the Igbo nation and the Leader Chief Ralph Nwazurike made an unsuccessful attempt to declare a state of Biafra on 27th May, 2000. Since the beginning of the year, MASSOB has been in regular collision with the police. Some of its members, including the leader, have been arrested and detained at one time or the other. Recently, the movement designed a separatist flag and “national” symbol while promising to launch a Radio station by December 2001.
The Egbesu Boys of Africa represents the militant wing of the Ijaw youth movements that have been resisting the exploitation of the mineral resources (oil) of the Niger Delta by the Nigerian State and oil multinationals. They were reported to have sabotaged oil installations, kidnapped oil workers, and attacked police stations in their bid to free the Delta communities from the ecological degradation of their towns and villages and the pillage of the oil resources by the Nigerian state.
In their confrontation with the Nigerian State, members of the Nigerian armed forces destroyed entire communities such as Umuechem and Odi. It is important to emphasize the fact that these agitations by the militias were largely borne out of frustration with the failure of the Nigerian state to promote equity among its component units; ensure equal representation of the units in national institutions, and compensate these communities for the degradation of their environment.
True federalism can only be practiced in a society where the component units have a sense of belonging and a sense of identity with the federal state. The crisis of identity is, therefore, partly responsible for the emergence of the ethnic militia phenomenon. So also is the problem traceable to the failure of the Nigerian state.
The Nigerian state is a product of colonialism. In spite of independence, it retains the character and structure of the colonial state, which was repressive and meant to extract domestic surpluses for the overriding purpose of servicing metropolitan needs.
Even the indigenous ruling elite that took over governance of the state lacked the vision to forge a united entity out of the mosaic of nationalities welded together by British colonialism. Instead of protecting national interests, the elite concentrated on sectional interests in order to perpetually legitimise their privatisation of national resources under the pretence of representing their peoples’ interest. The Nigerian state has consequently not been able “to build an appreciable degree of confidence among Nigerians, ensure discipline within the ranks of the elite, manage the economy in the interest of the people or construct the much needed platforms of inclusion, tolerance and participation”, (Ihonvbere, 2000:76).
The Nigerian people generally relate to the Nigerian state as an uncaring and illegitimate institution. Their loyalties are easily shifted to ethnic unions and even militias. The militarisation of the Nigerian state since 1966 has led to the subversion of federalism and the exclusion of several groups and individuals from the decision making process.
The formation of ethnic militias represents a form of reaction to the failure of the Nigerian state, the lack of equity in its distribution of power resources and the absence of social justice in its relationship with its constituents. The formation of ethnic militias constitutes a vote of no confidence in the Nigerian state.
The state’s current militant and combative reaction to the militia cannot restore that confidence. It will be recalled that in December 1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo read the riot act to all militia groups when he pronounced a blanket ban on their activities and even ordered that all identified OPC members be shot on sight.
This reaction has driven the militias underground and has not reduced the scale of violence they perpetrate. Despite the fact that the Nigerian Police declared Ganiyu Adams, OPC factional leader, a wanted man, he moved round the south-west like a conquistador, addressing rallies, holding meetings and granting press interviews.
Luck however ran out on him when the Police arrested him on August 20, 2001, in the Ikorodu area of Lagos State. Adams has since been remanded in custody.
It is yet to be seen whether Adams’ arrest would result in a tempering of the OPC’s activities. What remains clear is that unless the problems that brought the militias into existence are addressed, we may not have seen the end of the phenomenon and the threat it poses to the unity and survival of a federal Nigeria.
Federalism no doubt allows for the plurality of viewpoints but when groups take up arms against themselves or the state, the unifying essence of a federal state is subverted and even defeated.
As mentioned before, the militias were formed in response to specific injustices visited on their communities by the Nigerian state. To restore stability to the nation and guarantee its survival, a new power-sharing arrangement that would open up opportunities to disadvantaged communities ought to be devised. All nationalities, religious, social and cultural groups ought to be given equal opportunities to manage the affairs of the nation. No group must be seen to be dominating the power structure perpetually to the exclusion of other groups. A genuine democratic system must be enthroned in order to create an inclusive government. The Nigerian state must benefit from this democratisation in a way that will make it shed the toga of a violent and uncaring institution. The legitimacy of the Nigerian state can only be restored when it begins to care more about the welfare of the people by attending to their existential needs. To achieve these objectives, the present democratic government should intensify its anti-corruption crusade in order to stop the mindless looting of public funds, the mismanagement of public services and the inefficiency of the bureaucracy.
With greater accountability, more resources will be available to attend to the developmental needs of disadvantaged communities. A reconstructed and more humane Nigerian state will command greater loyalty and earn the support of the people.
The phenomenon of ethnic militias is a logical derivative of the process of de-federalisation, which Nigeria has experienced since 1966. The consequence has been an explosion in the negative use of ethnicity across the broad spectrum of society. If measures are taken to re-federalise Nigeria, ethnic militias will lose their appeal and become redundant.
Re-federalisation will involve the following:
Although Nigeria has witnessed a transition from military to civilian rule since 1999, it has not been able to resolve the numerous inter-ethnic conflicts that have contributed in no small measure to the subversion of the goals of nationhood.
The proliferation of ethnic militias under the new civilian dispensation suggests that so many things are wrong with Nigeria’s federalism. Ethnicity is a fact of nature and ethnic diversity is a reality that Nigeria must learn to manage effectively.
This can be done by the re-structuring of current power sharing arrangement and the commencement of a re-federalisation process that will give all nationalities and communities greater autonomy in the management of their affairs and resources. Such nationalities will enjoy a greater sense of belonging and show loyalty instead of hostility to the Nigerian project.
Ethnic militias will then begin to lose their appeal and clientele because ethnicity would in a truly democratic and federal Nigeria be used positively to check the excesses of elected officials; mobilise people for mass political participation and also enhance greater community development.
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Copyright 2001 Africa Resource Center, Inc.
Citation Format
Babawale, Tunde (2001). THE RISE OF ETHNIC MILITIAS, DE-LEGITIMISATION OF THE STATE, AND THE THREAT TO NIGERIAN FEDERALISM. West Africa Review: 3, 1.
** Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Ethnicity and the Phenomenon…
2.1. Late Chief Obafemi Awolowo, one…
3. The Militias in Perspective
3.1. The Bakassi Boys
3.2. The Oodua Peoples’ Congress (opc)
4. The Nigerian State and Ethnic Militias
5. Ethnic Militias and the Future…
6. Conclusion
7. References