West Africa Review (2001)

ISSN: 1525-4488

CHIEFTAINCY AND POLITICS IN GHANA SINCE 1982

Kwame Boafo-Arthur

Introduction

In pre-colonial times, chieftancy constituted the axis for the exercise of executive, legislative and judicial powers. Since the colonial era, the institution has been linked to the politics of Ghana. Various governments – colonial, civilian or military have in one way or the other tried to influence the role of chiefs in political affairs. There have been significant changes, therefore, in the powers of chiefs both at the local and national levels on account of frequent intervention in the mode of representation and administration in the country by the central government. Consequently, the overall powers and authority of chiefs have experienced ebbs and flows depending on regime preferences and dynamic changes in the chieftancy institution itself.

The point that cannot be glossed over is that chieftancy institutions have served not only as the centerpiece for mobilizing people for communal development but also the effective link between the people and the central administration. I must admit, however, that such a link has become controversial and at times tenuous over the years due largely to the progressive erosion of the power base of chiefs upon the introduction of modern structures of government.

More significantly, the powers of chiefs have come under serious attack as a result of the grassroot political participation that was introduced by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) regime. The constitution explicitly debars chiefs from active political participation. The wisdom of the constitutional framers cannot be faulted, in my view, on the basis of the historical confrontation that has marked the relations between government and chieftancy institutions during the pre-colonial and post-colonial periods. Of great importance for the institution and those who cherish its essence, is the bold attempt by the 1992 Constitution to free the institution from the gridlock of partisan politics and thereby guarantee its sustenance.

The analysis is carried out against the background of the national desire for political stability, democratic consolidation, and development. As such, the following are fully examined with a view to underline the various attempts to influence the place and role of chiefs in both local and national administration. (a) The twists and turns in government-chieftancy relations before 1982. (b) Main features of the relationship between chiefs and the central government during the revolutionary period. (c) The impact of the 1992 constitution on the place and role of the chieftancy institution in Ghanaian politics. Finally, recommendations are made in light of our national struggle for peace, stability and development with the sole objective of enhancing the institution’s adaptation to modern political development.

Chieftancy in Historical Perspective: Challenges and Reactions

It is trite to note that the chieftancy institution has been the embodiment of political power in pre-colonial, colonial, and post- colonial times. It must be admitted, however, that the traditionally unfettered powers of chiefs have undergone transformation as a result of formal colonial rule and the introduction of parliamentary democracy after independence.

However, even though Ghanaian governments lost power in rapid succession on account of, at times, unwarranted military interventions, it is a notorious fact that the chieftancy institution has demonstrated amazing resilience and still remains a key player, not only in local administration, but also in national life. Even though the key role of chiefs as repositories of local political authority has been dented for reasons given below, the institution is still revered, especially in communities where chiefs have carved niches for themselves by spearheading local development.

The nature of challenges to the chieftancy institution over the years are varied and range from colonially crafted mechanisms to break their authority to the imperceptible marginalization of chiefs in political life through constitutional provisions. The imposition of alien cultures through colonial rule equally posed a threat to the sustenance of the institution. K. A. Busia (1951), noted the gradual transformation of the political structures of Ashanti and how the power and authority of chiefs were systematically undermined by the creeping forces of modernization that were expressed, in many instances, by the adoption of Christian values and transient colonial political imperatives.

Chiefs were very prominent in the agitation against colonial rule. Protests against British rule and the treatment given to chiefs came to a head in 1865 when John Aggrey was elected King of Cape Coast. Shortly after his enthronement he clashed with the British by objecting to appeals against the decisions of his court being sent to the British court. He went on to criticize Governor George Maclean for usurping his powers. He sent a delegation of two (Marin and Carr) to England to give evidence before the Select Committee in 1865. In 1866, he sent a petition to Governor Conran in which he expressed his opposition in very strong terms. He noted: “The time has now come for me to record a solemn protest against the perpetual annoyance and insults that you persistently and perseveringly continue to practise on me in my capacity as legally constituted king of Cape Coast” (Webster, Boahen and Tidy (1980:160). King Aggrey petitioned the Colonial Secretary. The responses of colonial officers to such agitations were often swift and devastating. The challenge to the governor’s authority infuriated him to the extent that he had King Aggrey arrested and declared him deposed, and deported him to Sierra Leone. Similar fate was to befall King Prempeh I of Ashanti in the 1900s.

Arguably, the Fante Confederacy which agitated for independence for the Fantes was also a reaction, among other factors, to the growing power of the colonizers. In brief, the battle lines between chiefs and central authority were drawn in colonial times although the reasons for the institution’s stormy relations with central administration over the years have varied. The common denominator, however, appears to be the perception by the chiefs of the inscrutable erosion of their power and consequently, their resource base. Indisputably, the chieftancy institution and the role of chiefs have been formalized in most part of Africa. For instance, in Sierra Leone, “the office of paramount chief, although used as an instrument of social control by the central government, has nevertheless been ardently sought because it has represented an important avenue to wealth and social prestige”(Chazan et al 1992:85). Whereas in Nigeria the authority of the powerful emirs were curtailed by the colonial administration, “the advent of local government ensured that the chiefs lost their role as the link between the people and the government, and even their functions as administrators and tax collectors” (cited in Vaughan, 2000:61). In Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah’s attempts to subjugate the chiefs were met with strong resistance. The erosion of the economic base of chiefs, especially in Ashanti was one of the factors that led to their wholesale support for the National Liberation Movement (NLM).1 Assessing the factors that led to this, Dennis Austin (1970:260) notes:

Although deprived of their independence by the British, the chiefs of Ashanti Confederacy had been given considerable powers as a ‘Supreme Native Authority’. They had received generous subsidies from the central government, and acted as deliberate body for the whole of the Confederacy area with substantive law-making powers. The beginning of the end of these privileges had come in 1952 when the Asanteman Council, the Kumasi Native Authority, and Chiefs Councils within each Ashanti Division were pushed aside to make way for the new local authorities with their two-thirds elected membership. Government subsidies were still paid to chiefs, and a State Council Ordinance in 1952 recognised the chief and his traditional advisers as having authority in customary matters, but the substance of their power, including the levying of the local rate, passed to the new urban and local councils (my emphasis).

Ninsin (1989), points out that the CPP government of Kwame Nkrumah adopted several measures aimed at stripping chiefs of the powers to control revenues from land. This attack on the economic base of chiefs and the general anti-chief stance of the party were, among others, influenced by the following factors. First, chiefs were perceived as the staunchest allies of the opposition groups. Second, the government did not favour the control and management of stool land as well as the appropriation of revenues accruing from it. Third, the party wanted to invest land in the people instead of it being controlled by few powerful chiefs at the expense of the masses.

The two-pronged policies adopted by the government aimed at enfeebling the economic base of “the politically most powerful chiefs”, and to appropriate land unto the state. Consequently, measures were taken between 1951 and 1957 to enhance the party’s control over the chiefs and their main economic base. Various local government reforms that at the superficial level could be construed as enhancing local administration were in fact, geared at attaining such political objective of subjugating the chiefs through the control of their economic livelihood—the land. These included the promulgation of the Local Government Ordinance of 1951, the State Council Ordinances of 1952 and the Municipal Council Ordinances of 1953. Under the Local Government Ordinance of 1951, elected local councils replaced native authorities. Powers of chiefs were consequently eroded. To facilitate unobtrusive control of stool lands, the CPP government enacted the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123) and the Concessions Act, 1962 (Act 124). This was after the government had successfully weakened the most powerful chiefs through the enactment of the following laws: The Akim Abuakwa (Stool Revenue) Act, 1958 (Act 8), The Ashanti Stool Act, 1958 (Act 28), the Stool Lands Control Act, 1960 (Act 79). Through these laws, the state assumed powers “to authorize the acquisition and use of such lands for either private or public purposes; and to regulate the collection and use of stool revenue” (Ninsin, 1989:168). These laws, apart from undermining the economic base of the chiefs, created a dependency syndrome whereby most chiefs looked up to the government for economic handouts. To ensure absolute subservience of chiefs, the CPP government had earlier in 1959 enacted The Chiefs (Recognition) Act which empowered the Minister to withdraw recognition of chiefs; direct any chief to refrain from the exercise of his functions; and even prevent the chief from residing in a specific area, if need be.

Without doubt, the policies of the CPP regime never endeared them to the hard line chiefs whose economic livelihood in the form of land and the revenues that accrued thereon had been seriously eroded. Chiefs, therefore, complained after the overthrow of the CPP government about the loss of their traditional revenue sources as well as several traditional functions. Concerning the later, Pinkney (1972:95) notes: “The gong-gong, which was used to summon the people, was often beaten by a party official, party rallies competed with traditional durbars, party drumming groups competed with those in the chiefs’ courts, and village development committees were chaired by party officials.”

For sure, the tone was set for chiefs to adopt survival strategies and this took the form of aligning with the government of the day to maintain certain perks. As argued by Pinkney (p.96), “chieftancy in Ghana has always shown considerable resilience by trimming its sails to different political winds without either capitulating to higher authorities or trying to meet them head-on.”

Perhaps, to overturn some of the measures taken by the First Republic to deprive chiefs of their livelihood through orchestrated attempts to deprive them of land, the 1969 Constitution vested all stool lands in the appropriate stools. Article 164 (1) of that Constitution provided that “all stool lands in Ghana shall be vested in the appropriate Stool on behalf of, and in trust for, the subjects of the Stool”. Article 18 (1) of the Constitution provided that “no property of any description shall be compulsorily taken possession of, and no interest in or right over property of any description shall be compulsorily acquired by the State…” The two articles, in juxtaposition, underline the importance accorded to communal lands by the government of the day. Such commitment was further enhanced by the establishment of a Stool Lands Account that aimed at protecting “the interest of chiefs against encroachment by the state.”

The only exception was in the Northern Region where lands were vested in the state. The colonial law that made this possible had then not been expunged from the statute books. However, upon representations by the “Chiefs and Peoples” of the Northern regions to the SMC, the Alhassan Committee was set up to look into the matter. The Committee favoured the restoration of land to its allodial owners. Consequently, the framers of the 1979 constitution gave due cognizance to this. The 1979 Constitution, therefore, restored stool lands in the Northern regions to its original owners. The relevant article emphatically stated:

For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that all lands in the Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana which immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution were vested in the Government of Ghana are not public lands…all lands…shall vest in any such person who was the owner of any such land before any such vesting or in the appropriate skin …(See Article 188 (3&4).

In sum, chiefs have had to contend with various governmental legislations aimed at regulating stool lands, its acquisition, and the proprietary ownership. Whereas in some instances, some chiefs clashed with governments, the fact cannot be overlooked that some aspects of legislations were well intentioned and not geared solely at depriving the chiefs of their sources of revenue but to ensure sanity in land administration and minimize litigations over land that were assuming monstrous dimensions. For instance, the PNDC promulgated the Land Title Registration Law 1986 (PNDCL 152), among other reasons, “to give certainty to land titles and to facilitate the proof thereof and also to render the dealing with land more simple and economical”(See the memorandum accompanying PNDCL 152).

The Chieftancy Act (Act 370) of 1971 assented to by the Parliament of the Second Republic under the Progress Party government of K.A. Busia, repealed the Chieftancy Act, 1961 (Act 81) and the subsequent amendments to the Act including the Chieftancy (Amendment) Decree, 1967 (NLCD 128). The overriding motive for Act 370 was “to amend the statute law on chieftancy in order to bring it into conformity with the provisions of the Constitution and to make other provisions relating to chieftancy”(See the Preamble of Act 370). Thus among other provisions, it created the National House of Chiefs in addition to the already existing Regional Houses of Chiefs and the Traditional Councils. In conformity with Article 154 (3) (a) of the 1969 Constitution and to enhance the adjudication of chieftancy matters, the Act created the judicial committees to hear and determine any “cause or matter affecting Chieftancy”. Clause 22 (1) of Act 370 states:

The National House of Chiefs shall have appellate jurisdiction in any matter relating to chieftancy which has been determined by the House of Chiefs in a Region from which appellate jurisdiction there shall be an appeal with the leave of the Supreme Court or the National House of Chiefs to the Supreme Court.

Indubitably, this was a revolutionary step aimed at recognizing the essence of chiefs in judicial matters affecting chieftancy. This was in contradistinction to earlier enactments that did not recognize the capabilities of chiefs to deal with matters affecting their own institution. It is not surprising therefore that Act 370 has stood the test of time and thus remains the basic law on chieftancy up to date.

The National Redemption Council (NRC) that overthrew the Busia regime initially courted the chiefs to stabilize it usurpation of power but that did not blind it to the perennial problems of who controls the land and the revenues that accrue from land. Further, the polarizing nature of land litigation came to the fore and the NRC which later became the Supreme Military Council (SMC) never hesitated to enact the necessary legislation to check this canker. Thus, to ensure security to land titles, the government enacted the Limitations Decree 1972, NRCD 54 and the Conveyancing Decree 1973, NRCD 175. Whilst the former decree aimed at ending or, at least, minimize the costly and avoidable litigations over land, the latter streamlined the modalities for the transfer of interest in land.

It is clear then that chiefs have been fighting to maintain not only their regal status but also the economic source of their livelihood which is land. Act 370 of 1971 and some provisions of the 1979 Constitution made sure of that. More significantly, the 1979 constitution safeguarded the chieftancy institution, guaranteed its existence, and also restored its economic basis. Article 177 (1) emphatically stated that “the institution of chieftancy together with its traditional councils as established by customary law and usage is hereby guaranteed”. In pursuant of this, subsection 2 stated, “Parliament shall have no power to enact any legislation:

  1. which confers on any person or authority the right to accord or withdraw recognition to or from a chief; or
  2. which in any way detracts or derogates from the honour and dignity of the institution of chieftancy.”

In addition, chiefs were represented on the district councils and the Lands Commission (See Articles 183 and 189).

In a nutshell, unlike the First Republic during which every conceivable effort was expended by the government to cut the chiefs to size, the swing of the political pendulum later favoured the chieftancy institution. Some of the succeeding governments recognised the status, role, and economic base of the institution. This recognition was not gained on a silver platter. It was the culmination of astute political brinkmanship by leading chiefs, and the wish of most subjects to let the age-long institution remain intact. Nonetheless, the institution also had to take into consideration the dynamic nature of society in general and the need to adapt to changing societal circumstances.

However, the seemingly tranquil state of the chieftancy institution which the 1979 constitution guaranteed was given a violent jolt by the 1981 revolution that brought the then Flt.Lt. Rawlings into the centre stage of Ghanaian politics for the second time. What were the implications of the revolution for the chieftancy institution? How did chiefs cope with the cannons of the revolution that to all intent and purposes set the so-called downtrodden of the earth against the societal elites, including the chiefs?

The 1981 Revolution and Chieftancy

The relationship that was to evolve between chiefs and the central government was influenced by various societal dynamics. Of great importance was the revolution declared by Flt. Lt. Rawlings when he burst unto the political scene for the second time. In a broadcast on radio and television on 31st December 1981, he noted, among others, “I ask for nothing less than a revolution, something that would transform the social and economic order of this country” (my emphasis). The call for a revolution set the parameters for the social, political and economic restructuring embarked upon by the PNDC. Calling for a fundamental restructuring in the political principles and institutions of the nation was bound to impact on such traditional modes of governance as embodied in chieftancy.

The creation of new organs of popular power or people’s power was meant to effect the societal transformation envisaged by the revolutionaries. As Hansen argued, “…if one accepted the postulate that the people were to be the main instruments of the transformation process and the architects of their own destinies, then it was necessary to create certain structures and institutions through which their collective energies could be mobilized and channeled into social action in accordance with the dynamics of the transformation process” (Hansen, 1991). The creation of institutions such as Workers Defence Committees (WDCs), the Peoples Defence Committees (PDCs), the National Defence Committee (NDC), the Citizens Vetting Committee (CVC), the National Investigative Committee (NIC) and the Public Tribunals was to ensure parallel state institutions to counter existing ones. However, so far as the chieftancy institution is concerned, it was the PDCs, later re-christened Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) that threatened the traditional power base of chiefs. By virtue of being at the grassroot, in towns and villages, the PDCs challenged chiefly authority. Whilst initially the membership of the new institutions was limited to workers, peasants and the revolutionary intellectuals, other classes were allowed to join the revolutionary organs later. But that could not stop occasional clashes with chiefs, especially over land and the disbursement of revenues that accrued therefrom. As noted earlier, it was the Convention Peoples’ Party’s (CPP) attempt to deprive chiefs of their economic livelihood that brought it into direct conflict with the chieftancy institution, expecially in Ashanti.

In areas where there were economic assets the PDCs had head-on collision with not only the chiefs but also the bourgeoisie whom the chiefs had empowered to exploit the resources. A classic case is the conflict that erupted between the PDC of Ada and the chiefs over the Songor Lagoon Salt industry. The PDCs condemned the mechanisms some chiefs and elders of the Ada Traditional Area used to parcel out portions of the Songor-Lagoon-a source of high quality salt, to W.G. Nartey and K.M. Apenteng and “their foreign collaborators”. In line with the general revolutionary fervour and pronouncement by the PNDC, the PDCs of Ada district called for the nationalization of these assets. The position of the Ada PDC highlights the nature of various conflicts between chiefs and the revolutionaries on the ownership of economic assets. In a rather strident tone and in line with the revolutionary tenor of the times, the Ada PDCs argued:

Historically the lagoon—a common property of all Ada Citizens-held in trust for the people by the Ada chiefs was such that all the people could freely mine the salt any time that it caked up. But what we see today is a betrayal of this trust by the decadent, traditional authority who, for want of personal wealth, dubiously and treacherously sold the Lagoon for peanuts. In like manner the people of Apam and Ningo lost similar holdings but with the swiftness and effectiveness of the PDCs, today the people of Apam and Ningo are proud inheritors of their natural endowment. In the same light the PDCs/ WDCs of Ada are calling on the PNDC to accept our proposals to Nationalize the salt Industries of Pambros and Vacuum Salt and work out with the area WDCs and PDCs suitable method of administration based on the principles of popular and cooperative mangagement (cited in Hansen, 1991:74-75).

Calling for nationalization implied depriving the chiefs of their source of revenue and was bound to stir the ire of the chiefs concerned and heighten the existing conflict.

The populism of the people based on class realignment was set to be conflictual, especially where the chiefs were construed as part of the ruling class. The class connotations of the era could only mean the existence of a latent conflict between chiefs and those in support of the revolution, especially members of the PDCs. The militants understood the class dimensions of the revolution and this explains some of the conflicts that emerged between them and the chiefs.

Specific steps were taken by those in authority to deprive chiefs of their livelihood in certain parts of the country during the revolutionary era. It appears that members of the PDCs and other organs of the revolution had the power and authority to take any action for and on behalf of the central government. The most common form of attack on chiefs was to terminate the payment of royalties to them. In March 1982, for instance, the Western Regional Secretary announced the setting up of a Peoples’ Emergency Development Fund into which all stool revenues such as royalties paid on land, minerals, timber and other natural resources were to be paid (Hansen, 1991).

At Daboya, the chief and the PDCs clashed over whether a bridge should be constructed or not and at Zebilla in the Upper West, there was a power struggle between the chief (who was a rich entrepreneur) and the PDCs. Nugent (1995:76) notes: “Whereas the chief regarded his opponents as mere upstarts, they saw the chief as the embodiment of the arrogance associated with traditional power.”

Reminiscent of the CPP era where the party chiefs at various levels wielded a lot of influence and rivaled the chief, the early revolutionary years equally witnessed the erosion of the powers of some chiefs as PDC members arrogated to themselves the judiciary powers formerly enjoyed by the chiefs. Field reports gathered in the Central Region indicated that the PDCs and later CDRs set up their own arbitration centers where quasi-judicial powers were exercised.2 They came into conflict with chiefs who opposed their arbitrary usurpation of powers belonging traditionally to chiefs as well as their excesses in dishing out punishment to alleged offenders. The revolutionary zeal and its allied excesses were checked, to some extent, in the urban centres by the Chairman of the PNDC. This was to create an enabling climate for foreign investment. However, the organs in rural areas still held sway.3

It is instructive to note also that in some areas the chiefs spearheaded the formation of PDCs when the call was made by the Chairman of the PNDC. Some chiefs therefore “adopted more conciliatory measures” (Hansen, 1991) but the chiefly class, as Hansen calls them, were kept at bay. The guidelines for the PDCs and WDCs banned chiefs, clan heads, money-lenders and capitalist farmers from membership of the PDCs (Zaya Yebo, 1991).

In light of prevailing circumstances, however, the PNDC changed course and the chiefs who were originally seen as opponents of the revolution were treated differently. Zaya Yebo (1991: 180) notes:

In the dawn broadcast of 6 March 1983, Rawlings launched his policy of ‘reconciliation’ in which he called on ‘the professionals, men and women of religion, chiefs, the lodges and everyone to break out of their insulating walls and shells and give the national effort a push’. In the address he accused the PDCs and WDCs of exercising ‘power without authority’. To Rawlings, ‘the character and commitment of the individual is more important than the class from which he or she comes or the position one holds’.

It is quite revealing that barely a month after this broadcast the government reached an agreement with the IMF/WB. It could be deduced then that the seeming conciliatory broadcast may have been one of the conditions dictated by the international financial institutions for the granting of assistance. The government had to assure the international community of its readiness to mend fences and thereby get the support of all for national development as opposed to the polarizing pace of the early revolutionary period.

Consequently, the secretariat of the National Democratic Committee was reconsitituted with a chief as a member. Zaya Yeebo argues further that “if there had been any lingering doubts about the class character of the regime and its political orientation, the inclusion of chiefs, businessmen, and corrupt retired army officers in the PNDC and other organs more than confirmed the PNDC’s determination to win the ‘good boy’ image from western imperialism” (Zaya Yebo, 1991:181). This change in orientation explains why Naa Polkuu Konkuu Chiiri II, the Nandom Na, Nana Akuoko Sarpong and E. G. Tanoh “held series of portfolios…” (Nugent, 1995:127).

Chiefs have amazing resilience. Their ability to survive attempts at cowing them dates back to colonial times. The PNDC era was no exception. Nugent (1995:76) argues that such resilience is attributable in part to acute factionalism in several rural communities. The readiness of young men to rally behind their factional candidates in chieftancy disputes tends to sustain the institution. Furthermore, “because traditional authorities did not share in the prerogatives of the post-colonial state, they also did not suffer from the fall-out associated with state decay.”

On the contrary, one can argue that where acute factionalism persists, chieftancy is paralysed and its ability to contain external or internal onslaught greatly undermined. Thus, a more compelling reason should be assigned to the survival of chieftancy in light of longstanding attempts during colonial and post colonial times to not only stifle their role but in some instances to abolish the institution. Whether chiefly authority is constrained or not, one cannot deny the fact that it is a revered institution. Added to that is the fact that chieftancy is the nucleus around which micro-administration of the Ghanaian society is effectively carried out. Its resilience could, therefore, be attributed, in part, to the overwhelming support for the institution by the generality of the people as well as its ability to adapt to changing situations.

Indisputably, setting up the modern court system, the tribunal systems of latter-day reformers, and local government administration have effectively deprived chiefs of their powers. Nonetheless, there are many instances, at the rural level, where societal conflicts are referred, first and foremost, to the traditional ruler for arbitration. In most cases, it is where parties are not satisfied by the judgement of the traditional arbitration system that the case is taken to court. The delays associated with the court system have equally made the role of the chiefs in traditional arbitration indispensable. In short, the chief may not be rich due to serious erosion of his economic power, but if he is a respectable chief, he may still wield tremendous influence in settling disputes. More importantly, their influence and power over their subjects are still overwhelming. This explains why ruling governments and opposition parties try to win the support of chiefs at all times. A chief who commands immense respect in his community could sway a lot of his subject to follow a particular party.

One area that has not been spared the vicissitudes of modern day politics is the role of chiefs in local government administration. This has been the case because of the desire of politicians to either woo chiefs or to curb their traditional powers and influence. The question to be answered then is: what has been the nature of the relationship between chiefs and local administration?

The Changing Roles of Chiefs in Local Administration

From a historical perspective there has been very little consistency in the roles carved for chiefs in local administration. Even though the 1957 Constitution thought it fit to reserve one-third membership of local government units for chiefs, the penchant of the then ruling government to enhance the trappings of party power and party officials at various levels at the expense of chiefly authority, led to the banning of chiefs from local government through the Local Government Act of 1961. Although the government of the day harped on making local administration more representative with the election of members of the various councils through the Act, the reality was that the places reserved for chiefs were taken by CPP appointed members. The 1969 Constitution reversed the trend and did not only establish the National House of Chiefs but also reserved one-third of the membership of District Councils for chiefs. Additionally, a provision was made for the inclusion of not more than two chiefs from the Regional House of Chiefs in the Regional Council. The 1979 Constitution ensured that membership of District Councils included one-third chosen from traditional authorities in the district in accordance with traditional and customary usage (Art.183 (ii)). Not more than two chiefs from the Regional House of Chiefs were to be members of the Regional Councils (See Art. 185).

However, the Local Government Law (PNDCL 207), of 1988 restructured the composition of the District Assemblies that came as part of the decentralization process. Therefore, chiefs lost their one-third membership. The main reason was that “the PNDC government regarded the representation or active participation of chiefs in decentralized institutions, such as the District Assemblies (DAs), or the organs of power, as undemocratic and counter-revolutionary. In other words, “the PNDC decentralization reforms did not set aside a place for chiefs within the structures of local government” (Ayee, 2000). This did not preclude the PNDC government from appointing chiefs as DA members on the strength of the power of the central government to appoint one-third of DA members.

Article 242 (d) of the 1992 Constitution made provision for two chiefs from the Regional House of Chiefs (elected by the chiefs at a meeting of the House) to serve on their respective Regional Coordinating Councils. The Local Government Act (Act 462) of 1993, section 5 (d) makes similar provision. However, neither the constitution nor Act 462 makes a provision for chiefs to be automatic members of the DAs.

Legislative Instrument 1589 of 1994 also did not make any provision for the automatic inclusion of chiefs in the sub-district structures such as the Urban, Zonal, Town Councils and Unit Committees. The Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives are, however, enjoined to consult the chiefs in the appointment of five persons ordinarily resident in the urban area, zone, town or unit to be members of such administrative set up. What has to be stressed is that the groups to be consulted on behalf of the President in the appointment of five representatives on the various administrative levels is broadened to include the Presiding Member of the DA and organized productive economic groupings in the urban area, zone, town or unit.

This arrangement has created problems which do not augur well for efficient administration. As Ayee aptly argues, “the lack of institutionalized representation of chiefs in the local government structure has resulted in strained relations between some chiefs and functionaries of the DAs and their sub-district structures. In some districts, the District Chief Executive and the chiefs are not in good terms while in other districts it is the chiefs and the Assemblyman or Unit Committee members who are at loggerheads” (Ayee, 2000:3).

One may ask why such constitutional-legal provisions that seem to preclude chiefs in the day-to-day administration of the community were promulgated. This may be due to the desire to restrict chiefs to the performance of their purely traditional functions. It is also argued that such provisions are made to insulate the chiefs from the attrition of partisan politics. One would have thought, however, that since the DAs are deemed to be non- partisan, chiefs would have been given automatic representation. The point to be noted is that the DA members are non-partisan, just on paper. The neutrality of some members is put in serious doubt if one considers the fact that 30 per cent of the Assembly Members are appointed by the government of the day. At the same time, it may not be wrong to state that the insulation of chiefs is well intentioned. It is meant to ensure that chiefs are politically neutral with the ability and mental toughness to work with all, irrespective of political persuasion.

On this note, it is appropriate to turn one’s attention to the constitutional provisions that debars chiefs from partisan politics. What are the implications of this to the democratic governance of this country? How do nananom (chiefs) feel about this?

The 1992 Constitution and Chieftancy

Paragraph 339 subsections 1&2 of the Proposals in the Draft Constitution of Ghana states: (1) “Chieftancy constitutes a major resource that could be officially tapped in reinforcing the modern government structure. (2) Having regard to the high intellectual and professional calibre that the institution of Chieftancy attracts these days, chiefs may now be regarded as a significant source of talent for the modern sector”. Put in context, one can argue that chiefs possess the requisite qualification that cannot be glossed over in several areas of our national life, including political governance.

However, the 1992 Constitution unambiguously states the specific roles the chieftancy institution and for that matter chiefs are to play in our new democratic dispensation. Although Chapter 22 of the constitution does not state in a command form that a chief should do this or that to sustain our democratic governance, it does not need a soothsayer to note that its specific roles, when well played, will guarantee development and enhance democratic governance. Respect for the constitution and by implication adherence to its provisions is bound to impact positively on democratic consolidation. Where constitutional provisions are disregarded, serious problems that may in the long run undermine the stability of the nation are created.

According to Article 272 of the Constitution, the National House of Chiefs which represent the interest of all chiefs at the national level shall:

  1. advise any person or authority charged with any responsibility under this Constitution or any other law for any matter relating to or affecting chieftancy;
  2. undertake the progressive study, interpretation and codification of customary law with a view to evolving, in appropriate cases, a unified system of rules of customary law, and compiling the customary laws and lines of succession applicable to each stool or skin;
  3. undertake an evaluation of traditional customs and usages with a view to eliminating those customs and usages that are outmoded and socially harmful
  4. perform such other function, not being inconsistent with any function assigned to the House of Chiefs of a region, as Parliament may refer to it.

However, stakeholders in national development and constitutional rule should take more than a passing interest in the import of Article 276 (1) and (2) of the constitution. This stems from the raging debate on whether chiefs should engage in partisan politics or not. The constitution states categorically in Article 276 (1) that, “ a chief shall not take part in active party politics; and any chief wishing to do so and seeking election to Parliament shall abdicate his stool or skin”. Article 94 (3) (c) reinforces this by noting that a person shall not be eligible to be a Member of Parliament if he is a chief. By such specificity, some latent talents of chiefs that could be exploited in developmental terms for the nation may not be tapped. The straitjacket the 1992 constitution places chieftancy could be traced to popular opinion expressed by a cross-section of Ghanaians. In the opinion of the National Commission for Democracy “any future constitution should define a role for Chiefs because they represent the interest of their people”.4 Since chiefs are deemed to represent the interest of the people their involvement in political pluralism should be such as would facilitate development at both the national and local levels. The question is whether this has been the case.

Whilst the provisions of Article 276 (1) (that is, a chief should not take part in active politics) appear to be flouted by most chiefs, Article 94 (3) (c), to the best of my knowledge, is adhered to. Disregard for Article 276 (1) is an affront to our democratic dispensation.

It is because of the crucial role chiefs are supposed to play that Parliament is not allowed to make a law:

  1. Which gives any person or authority the right or power to accord or withdraw recognition to or from a chief.
  2. Which diminishes the honour and dignity of the institution of chieftancy, and
  3. Which affects chieftancy, without having secured the prior approval of the National House of Chiefs (Afari-Gyan, 1998:99).

Thus, a counter argument could be developed that Article 276 (1) is contrary to the spirit and letter of the constitution. If the constitution upholds the right of individuals to freedom of association, which shall include “freedom to form or join trade unions or other associations, national and international, for the protection of their interest” (Article 21 (e) ), then the restriction imposed on chiefs does not augur well for our democratic dispensation. The National House of Chiefs registered its disapproval of their disqualification. In a communiqué, it condemned the disqualification of its members from active partisan politics as discriminatory and an infringement on their fundamental rights guaranteed under the 1992 constitution (Ansah-Koi, 1998:144). Perhaps, this may explain why some of the prominent chiefs interviewed for this study in the Central Region endorsed the relevance or appropriateness of Article 276 (1) of the constitution.

The views of the chiefs notwithstanding, it must be stressed that the provisions debarring chiefs from active or partisan politics is revolutionary both in letter and spirit. No past constitution was ever so forthright with regard to the intermeddling of chiefs in partisan politics. Whilst the rationale may be logically sound, one cannot gloss over the fact that the constitutional provision is an affront to the fundamental democratic rights of chiefs to join any association of their choice if they so wish. However, one has to look at it in the context of the greater harm such intermeddling in partisan politics would bring to the revered institution. One must equally not lose sight of the historical evolution of the relations between chiefs and the central government since colonial times. The dynamic nature of modern politics and the inherent dynamism of chieftancy should be key pointers in understanding the present constitutional provision. More significantly, the national desire for peace at all levels of governance to facilitate development should be uppermost in the minds of people in this regard.

Chiefs and Partisan Politics

Even though the constitution does not define “active politics” as stated in Article 276 (1), one can operationalize “active politics” as being actively involved in various political functions such as holding office in a political party, speaking or delivering an address on the platform of a political party, or clearly identifying with a political party by being a card carrying member.

Why should Article 276 be complied with? Many chiefs interviewed in the Central Region gave very candid views on this matter. To the question whether chiefs should be involved in partisan politics, the majority of those interviewed answered in the negative. According to Barimah Kwame Nkyi, Omanhene of Assin Traditional Area, “a chief swears oath of office and allegiance to his people and indulgence in active partisan politics will mean serving two masters and such divided allegiance impairs the trust and the confidence that his people have in him”. He argues further that a chief in partisan politics may expose himself to the dictates of the party and could be victimized should the party he supports lose power. This became the fate of many chiefs during the First Republic and should, therefore, serve as a reminder to chiefs. Chiefs, therefore, have to be neutral so that they can call their subjects to order when there is trouble, (especially of a political nature). In addition, a chief may lose his prestige, honour and dignity if he participates in partisan politics. In an address to the National House of Chiefs in 1996, its president noted: “On the participation of Chiefs in politics, a Chief who dabbles in politics is likely to be treated like a politician who could be hooted at or booed. This would not only undermine his position but ultimately desecrate the institution of chieftancy as a whole”.5 The innuendoes passed by many on the Osu Declaration6 by chiefs for peace before and after the 2000 elections could be traced to the fact that many prominent chiefs are seen as allies of the ruling government. As such, their views are not well respected on account of the perception that they are willing tools of the government of the day. This would not have been the case if chiefs had embraced the constitutional provisions debarring them from partisan politics in its entirety.

Generally, the majority of chiefs interviewed were supportive of the constitutional restrictions on chiefs for the following reasons:

The compelling argument of those opposed to the constitutional provision is that the exclusion of chiefs from partisan politics violates their basic rights as enshrined in Article 21 of the constitution. Some have called for an amendment of the constitution to restore the rights of chiefs to participate in active politics. Such a view seem to have the support of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani, king of Dagbon in the Northern Region who has also suggested amendment to the 1992 Constitution to enable chiefs to comment meaningfully on future political issues in the country.7 The only problem so far as the position of the Ya-Na is concerned is whether the constitution prevents them from commenting on national issues. The 1992 constitution asked the chiefs not to participate in partisan politics so that they would have the moral courage and authority to tell the truth and approach all national issues with equanimity. It is believed that their neutrality, if well taken, should rather strengthen them to comment on national issues of any kind without fear or favour.

The decision of the constitution framers, in my opinion, was in the best interest of the nation given the role chieftancy has played in our national development from time immemorial.

Notwithstanding the constitutional restrictions, the nation has found an efficient means of making use of the talents and expertise of chiefs to facilitate national development. Chiefs still play important roles in national life apart from the traditional roles. This has also been made possible by Article 276 (2) which states: “Notwithstanding clause (1) of this article and paragraph © of clause (3) of article 94 of this Constitution, a chief may be appointed to any public office for which he is otherwise qualified”. My only problem is that whilst this exit clause for chiefs with expertise might have been inserted with the best of intentions, most chiefs who have had the misfortune or fortune of being so appointed have conducted themselves in ignoble partisan manner that begs the question as to whether article 276 (1) is being breached or not. A chief so appointed is constrained to explain government policies, at times on the platform of the ruling party. This compromises his neutral position and sends wrong signals to his subjects as to his political allegiance. There is, therefore, a dichotomy between the constitutional provisions and the realities on the ground. This has become the case because of the inability of chiefs to abide by constitutional stipulations pertaining to the role of chiefs in partisan politics. As such their genuine appeals for peace are treated with scorn. The moment one takes sides in politics, the moral mandate to become an impartial arbiter is sacrificed and genuine intentions become jaundiced ab initio.

Being repositories of knowledge, and revered by their subjects as such, chiefs are also expected in the name of democracy, national development, democratic consolidation etc., to be bold and forthright in championing the rights of individuals. This implies also the ability to speak out against government excesses capable of derailing our fragile democratic dispensation and thereby undermine our national development. However, for inexplicable reasons, some chiefs simply ignore the constitutional provision and openly pledge allegiance of their people and themselves to a particular party. Party leadership may applaud forgetting that such acts are contrary to the dictates of the constitution. The blanket pledging of allegiance to a particular party may create problems because some of the inhabitants under a chief’s jurisdiction may prefer some other party. Thus, the stage is set for bitter confrontation in some cases between the chief and his subjects on the issue of political orientation. All that it takes is for a chief to maintain his neutrality for the sake of national development and in line with the constitution. This may give him the moral authority to be an impartial arbitrator or mediator when conflicts develop between opposing parties in his area of jurisdiction.

Recommendations

Chiefs have to put their houses in order to be of lasting benefit to the national cause of a search for lasting democracy. I personally think that given its role in Ghana’s political set up, it could be an effective countervailing institution just like parliament and the Judiciary, especially by drawing public attention to Executive excesses and infractions as well as inactions.

They are obliged to address socio-political ills with the fearlessness of our forefathers whose sweat and blood assured the survival of chieftancy. The situation where chiefs maintain stony silence in the face of gross injustices in the society undermines national development as well as our democratic aspirations. Democratic deepening calls for effective protection of our liberties, the maintenance of law and order and checking corrupt practices in our national life. Can our revered chiefs come clean of these? How often do they speak against corruption at the national level? What about the corrupt practices some of them adopt to become chiefs?

They should play their unifying role having at the back of their minds the overall national interest. It is only when their non-partisanship is manifest that they could be the rallying point for national unity. It is also through the fostering of national unity that our democratic aspirations could be attained.

Proper education could help push national democratic aspirations to the forefront. Chiefs are expected to use the powers and resources to educate their subjects on their social, economic, political and other rights. Some chiefs have set the ball rolling by setting up Education Funds for brilliant students in their jurisdiction. This is worthy of emulation by others. Since education is the key to development and the general enhancement of our well being, the resources spent in fruitless litigation and other polarizing activities could be expended on the education of qualified and brainy students.

In sum, it would be desirable if: